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Abstract 
This thesis presents an analysis of the NSW summary criminal jurisdiction (the ‘summary 
jurisdiction’). The summary jurisdiction is a dynamic criminal justice apparatus where 
magistrates preside over the determination of liability for certain proscribed behaviours in the 
lower courts without the intervention of a jury. My close analysis of the summary jurisdiction 
tells the previously little-known story of its development and offers a basis for critique. Adopting 
a socio-historical approach, this thesis offers a fresh analysis. At a broad level, change over time 
in the summary jurisdiction can be seen as following a trajectory of formalisation. I argue that 
‘formalisation’ is a useful concept for understanding the historical development of the summary 
jurisdiction. It has four overlapping and interacting dimensions that assume differing degrees of 
significance at different times. Those dimensions are: juridification; rationalisation; 
professionalisation together with what I call ‘lawyerification’; and the separation of law from 
other spheres of social power. Formalisation has been a product of changing legitimation 
demands and attempts to increase the efficiency of the criminal law. Applying formalisation as a 
lens through which to view the development of the summary jurisdiction reveals how the 
summary jurisdiction has achieved the criminalisation of behaviours that have been constructed 
as harmful.   
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Introduction 
1. Introduction 
Criminal law scholarship is in need of an understanding of summary jurisdiction. In excess of 95 
per cent of criminal offences are finalised summarily in New South Wales (NSW) — the 
numbers are similar in other Australian jurisdictions — and criminalisation is happening 
increasingly via the summary jurisdiction, and yet it is rarely examined. This thesis develops an 
account of how the summary jurisdiction should be understood and provides a basis for critique.
1
 
My account proceeds on the premise that in order to critique it is first necessary to understand 
what is being critiqued. This section of the Introduction sets out the ‘terrain’ I am mapping. 2  It 
sets the parameters of the thesis based on what I have included in, and excluded from, my 
analysis.  
The summary jurisdiction is vast and there is no single way to define its parameters. On 
one view it might be said to encompass all crime-related matters dealt with by magistrates in the 
Local Court including committals, bail for both summary and indictable matters, prosecutions 
brought by statutory agencies,
3
 problem-oriented therapeutic processes,
4
 and the separate 
Children’s Court.5  Aside from being too much to cover in sufficient depth in one thesis, there is 
already a sizeable literature on each of these topics (except perhaps summary prosecutions by 
statutory authorities).
6
  This means that such a focus would be of more limited value. Also 
committals relate to matters that form part of a magistrate’s administrative rather than judicial 
function,
7
 and while criminalising, bail serves purposes other than the determination of criminal 
liability.  
                                                          
1
 With respect to law and law reform proposals, this thesis is current as of 6 November 2017. 
2
 Nicola Lacey, 'Philosophy, History and Criminal Law Theory' (1998) 1(2) Buffalo Criminal Law Review 295, 306. 
3
 Such as the Environment Protection Authority (‘EPA’). 
4
 Such as the Magistrates Early Referral into Treatment (‘MERIT’) for defendants with drug and alcohol problems 
NSW Government: Justice. Magistrates Early Referral into Treatment (13 March 2017) 
<http://www.merit.justice.nsw.gov.au/>. The Local Court Act 2007 (NSW) s 3 contains a list of what is included in 
the definition of ‘criminal proceedings’. 
5
 Where young people under the age of 18 are prosecuted. 
6
 Arie Freiberg, 'Problem-Oriented Courts: Innovative Solutions to Intractable Problems?' (2001) 11(1) Journal of 
Judicial Administration 8; John Seymour, Dealing with Young Offenders (Law Book, 1988). 
7
 Indeed the Acts Interpretation Act 1897 (NSW) excluded committals from the definition of ‘summary jurisdiction’ 
because summary jurisdiction was limited to occasions when magistrates were acting in their judicial function, 
9 
 
The aim of this thesis is to map the relatively uncharted terrain of the ‘legal practices’ 
that create a ‘legal space’ where magistrates preside over the determination of criminal liability 
of adult defendants in the lower courts without the intervention of a jury.
8
  My approach is 
premised on the understanding that the criminal law is a social practice.
9
  On this view legal 
practices consist of the ‘(more or less) coordinated actions of conscious agents’ within the 
summary jurisdiction.
10
  My working definition is that the summary jurisdiction is a complex 
criminal justice apparatus comprised of numerous component parts, all of which engage in legal 
practices within ‘mutually constitutive relationships’.11 Each component serves different 
purposes and none can be privileged over the other. 
This thesis focuses on the development of the summary jurisdiction in NSW. There are 
two reasons for circumscribing the thesis in this way. The first is that the socio-historical method 
adopted in this thesis (set out in Part 3 of this Introduction) is premised on the view that the 
criminal law cannot be understood in isolation from its social, historical and institutional 
context.
12
  In order to make sense of the legal practices that constitute the summary jurisdiction it 
is necessary to pay close attention to local context. At the same time, however, it is necessary to 
widen the socio-historical lens to the national and international because, as Dubber and Farmer 
have pointed out, ‘[s]ystems of criminal law do not develop in isolation from each other but are 
embedded in power relations between different states or between states and their colonies …’.13 
The (British) Imperial context is particularly relevant to NSW.  
The second reason for the NSW focus is because this thesis proceeds on the basis that to 
understand and critique the criminal law it is necessary to pay close attention to how it is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
whereas committals are an administrative function. G C Addison and D G Paterson, The Law and Practice Relating 
to Appeals from Magistrates (Law Book, 1927) 21-2. 
8
 In NSW these courts were known as Courts of Petty Sessions until 1982, Local Courts from 1982 to 2007 and the 
Local Court from 2007. 
9
 Lacey, 'Philosophy, History and Criminal Law Theory' above n 2, 309. See also Lindsay Farmer, 'The Obsession 
with Definition: The Nature of Crime and Critical Legal Theory' (1996) 5 Social & Legal Studies 57, 68. 
10
 Lacey, 'Philosophy, History and Criminal Law Theory' above n 2. 
11
 Nicola Lacey, In Search of Criminal Responsibility: Ideas, Interests, and Institutions (OUP, 2016) 3.  
12
 See eg, Nicola Lacey, 'In Search of the Responsible Subject: History, Philosophy and Social Sciences in Criminal 
Law Theory' (2001) 64(3) Modern Law Review 350, 351. 
13
 Markus Dirk Dubber and Lindsay Farmer, Modern Histories of Crime and Punishment (Stanford University Press, 
2007) 5. 
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institutionalised.
14
  Unlike in the United Kingdom where the workings of the lower courts and 
magistrates have been subjected to detailed historiographical examination,
15
 limited historical 
attention has been paid to the lower courts in Australia.
16
 And the Australian Federal system 
means criminal law varies from state to state. For these reasons, it is important to trace the socio-
historical development of the summary jurisdiction of a single jurisdiction in detail. 
2. Existing Accounts of the Summary Jurisdiction 
With the notable exception of Lindsay Farmer’s scholarship,17 the summary jurisdiction has 
rarely been an object of study in the criminal law literature. However, after decades of neglect, 
more recent criminal law scholarship is beginning to pay attention to the summary jurisdiction. 
In other disciplines, such as history, sociology, and criminology, aspects of the summary 
jurisdiction have been either the focus of study,
18
 or relevant material has arisen peripherally.
19
  
Because of the diffuse and often tangential nature of scholarship touching on the summary 
jurisdiction, categorising existing understandings of the summary jurisdiction by the themes 
addressed in that scholarship, rather than by methodological approach or disciplinary origin, is a 
useful means of analysing it.  
                                                          
14
 This approach is derived from the work of Lindsay Farmer. See eg, Lindsay Farmer, 'Criminal Law as an 
Institution' in R A Duff et al (eds), Criminalisation: The Political Morality of the Criminal Law (Oxford Scholarship 
Online, 2015) 80; Lindsay Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law: Criminalisation and Civil Order (OUP, 
2016) 7. 
15
 See eg, Norma Landau, The Justices of the Peace, 1679–1760 (University of California Press, 1984); Norma 
Landau, 'Summary Conviction and the Development of the Penal Law' (2005) 23(1) Law and History Review 173; 
Bruce Smith, Circumventing the Jury: Petty Crime and Summary Jurisdiction in London and New York City, 1790-
1855 (PhD Thesis, Yale University, 1996); Thomas Sweeney, The Extension and Practice of Summary Jurisdiction 
in England c.1790–1860 (PhD Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1985); Peter King, Crime, Justice and Discretion in 
England 1740–1820 (Oxford University Press, 2000); Lindsay Farmer, Criminal Law, Tradition and Legal Order: 
Crime and the Genius of Scots Law, 1747 to the Present (Cambridge University Press, 1997); David Barrie and 
Susan Broomhall, Police Courts in Nineteenth-Century Scotland, Volume 1 (Routledge, 2014); David Barrie and 
Susan Broomhall, Police Courts in Nineteenth-Century Scotland, Volume 2 (Routledge, 2014). 
16
 Notable exceptions are Hilary Golder, High and Responsible Office: A History of the New South Wales 
Magistracy (Sydney University Press, OUP, 1991); Michael Sturma, Vice in a Vicious Society: Crime and Convicts 
in Mid-Nineteenth Century New South Wales (University of Queensland Press, 1983); and David Neal, The Rule of 
Law in a Penal Colony: Law and Power in Early New South Wales (Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
17
 Farmer, Criminal Law, Tradition and Legal Order, above n 15. 
18
 See eg, Golder, High and Responsible Office, above n 16; Doreen McBarnet, Conviction: Law, the State and the 
Construction of Justice, Oxford Socio-Legal Studies (Macmillan Press, 1981). 
19
 See eg, Mark Finnane, Punishment in Australian Society (Oxford University Press, 1997).  
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2.1 Expansion and Efficiency 
The expansion of the summary jurisdiction has been well-recognised. In Australia, legal 
historians Hilary Golder and Michael Sturma have remarked upon the increasing use of the 
summary jurisdiction from the mid-nineteenth century in NSW.
20
  More recently Brian Opeskin 
has described the ‘rise of lower courts’ attributing it to a drive to improve access to justice and to 
accommodate an expanding summary jurisdiction.
21
  In the United Kingdom, Jackson, writing in 
1937, was one of the first scholars to comment on a reduction in the incidence of the jury trial 
over the preceding century, attributing it to the expansion of the summary jurisdiction.
22
  In 1986 
Leon Radzinowicz in the final volume of A History of English Criminal Law and its 
Administration, meticulously traces the expansion of summary jurisdiction in England in the 
early decades of the nineteenth century setting out the contemporary official justifications given 
for it and the objections raised against it.
23
 He notes that in this period, the summary jurisdiction 
was expanding because indictable offences were being reclassified as capable of being finalised 
summarily by magistrates. The justifications for reclassification included reducing the costs of 
proceedings, but equally important was the belief that the ‘absence of “strict legal proof”’ in the 
summary jurisdiction would produce more convictions and this ‘greater certainty of prosecution 
and punishment would ensure greater deterrence.’24 Recognition of the potential of the summary 
jurisdiction to regulate harmful behaviours germinated in this period.  
In the early-mid nineteenth century in England objections were made to the expansion of 
the summary jurisdiction. One was the claim that the practice of finalising indictable matters 
summarily ‘confound[ed] moral distinctions’ between minor ‘mischief’ and ‘truly’ criminal 
behaviour, and that it eroded the ‘traditional protection of trial by jury’.25  The first objection 
suggests that the summary jurisdiction, in the mid-nineteenth century, was understood as dealing 
only with offences to which no moral obloquy attached. This mid-nineteenth century 
understanding persists in the twenty-first, but this thesis shows that it is not an accurate reflection 
                                                          
20
 Golder, High and Responsible Office, above n 16; Sturma, above n 16. 
21
 Brian Opeskin, 'State of the Judicature: A Statistical Profile of Australian Courts and Judges' (2013) 35 Sydney 
Law Review 489, 498–9. 
22
 R M Jackson, 'The Incidence of Jury Trial During the Past Century' (1937) 1 Modern Law Review 132. 
23
 Sir Leon Radzinowicz and Roger Hood,  A History of English Criminal Law and its Administration from 1750 
(Stevens & Sons, 1986) 618–24. 
24
 Ibid 619. 
25
 Ibid 619–20. 
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of the summary jurisdiction in the current era. My use of the term ‘current era’ derives from my 
analysis of change over time to the summary jurisdiction and refers to the period from the final 
quarter of the twentieth century to present. 
Another mid-nineteenth century objection to the expansion of the summary jurisdiction in 
England was that summary disposition is an erosion of the protection of trial by jury.
26
  Because 
of this objection the expansion of the summary jurisdiction is typically constructed as a 
pernicious trade-off between the rights of the accused and economic rationalism. David Brown et 
al in the leading criminal law text book in NSW provide a paradigmatic example of this view of 
the expansion of the summary jurisdiction in the current era: ‘The expansion of summary 
jurisdiction, carried out in the name of rationalisation, speed and efficiency, is also … in part, a 
diminution of access to trial on indictment and hence trial by jury.’27  Farmer’s study of the 
development of summary jurisdiction in Scotland offered a more nuanced analysis. Farmer 
observed that the emergence of summary jurisdiction was grounded in the imperatives of 
‘efficiency and economy’, but in the process, the concept of jurisdiction was reconfigured from 
being organised around moral categories to being defined through procedural rules.
28
  Farmer’s 
work is explored in greater detail in part 2.6 of this Introduction below. 
The socio-historical method adopted in this thesis (discussed in Part 3 of this 
Introduction) discloses that efficiency has been a continuing theme in the development of the 
summary jurisdiction from the early decades of the nineteenth century. However, efficiency has 
meant different things at different times, has taken on more importance in some eras than others, 
has been justified in different ways, and has been impacted upon differently by various social 
forces. For example, in nineteenth century England efficiency was epitomised by the shedding of 
formalities and complexity thereby increasing the speed with which cases could be despatched 
by the court.
29
  Efficiency has also meant increasing the number of convictions as a proportion of 
total charges. In mid-nineteenth century England it was thought that the shedding of formalities 
would prevent the guilty from escaping punishment on mere technicalities. In early twentieth 
                                                          
26
 This objection persists in NSW in the current era. 
27
 David Brown et al, Criminal Laws: Material and Commentary on Criminal Law and Process of NSW (Federation 
Press, 6
th
 ed, 2015) 376. See also, eg, Dat T Bui, 'The Expansion and Fragmentation of Minor Offense Justice: A 
Convergence between the Common Law and the Civil Law' (2016) 19 New Criminal Law Review 382. 
28
 Farmer, Criminal Law, Tradition and Legal Order, above n 15, 74. 
29
 Ibid ch 3;  Lindsay Farmer, 'Reconstructing the English Codification Debate: The Criminal Law Commissioners, 
1833–45' (2000) 18(2) Law and History Review 397, 410–11. 
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century NSW it was thought that transferring more offences to the summary jurisdiction would 
help to reduce the 40 per cent acquittal rate in the Courts of Quarter Sessions.
30
  This second 
definition of efficiency is evident in Herbert Packer’s ‘crime control model’ of criminal justice, 
which is discussed at the end of this section.  
In NSW, while there has been concern about guilty people escaping conviction, 
particularly since the 1980s, the overarching efficiency-related concern has been how to 
accommodate the government’s increasing use of the criminal law in summary form to regulate 
behaviours that have been constructed as harmful. This imperative became particularly acute in 
the post-war period as increasing car ownership led to increasing numbers of driving offences, 
which placed unprecedented pressure on the summary jurisdiction.  Increasing delays in the 
courts and the recognition of new harms such as drink-driving and domestic violence accelerated 
the process of ‘defining deviance down’31 by reclassifying indictable offences as summary and 
removing certain traffic offences from the summary jurisdiction through the introduction of self-
enforcing penalty notices. One offence was removed from the court lists (for example, certain 
traffic infringements) only to be replaced with a different offence that had been enacted as a 
means of regulating behaviour that had been newly recognised as problematic (for example, 
domestic violence). In recent decades the language of efficiency has assumed a managerial tone, 
but the extent to which managerialism has impacted upon the summary jurisdiction has varied in 
different jurisdictions.
32
  In relation to domestic violence, which is the subject of chapter 7, there 
has been a return to a concern about offenders escaping detection and conviction, but this is 
called ‘effectiveness’ rather than efficiency to incorporate the deterrence aspirations of the 
criminal law.  
At this point it is necessary to set out the key features of Packer’s two models of criminal 
process, which he formulated in 1968, because they have been influential in the criminal law 
literature on the summary jurisdiction.  The first is the ‘crime control model’ of criminal justice. 
According to this model the ‘repression of criminal conduct is by far the most important function 
                                                          
30
 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 23 October 1923, 1709, (Thomas (Tom) 
Bavin). 
31
 David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (Oxford University 
Press, 2001) 117. 
32
 Compare, eg, Victoria, discussed by Arie Freiberg, 'Managerialism in Australian Criminal Justice: RIP for KPIs' 
(2005) 31 Monash University Law Review 12 with NSW. 
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to be performed by the criminal process’.33  For the criminal process to perform this function it 
must be efficient. Packer says ‘[b]y “efficiency” we mean the system’s capacity to apprehend, 
try, convict, and dispose of a high proportion of criminal offenders whose offenses become 
known.’34  The concern underlying this definition is that if too many guilty people escape 
detection, conviction and punishment, the criminal justice system loses its legitimacy and social 
order is threatened. However, because the number of criminal offences continues to increase as 
Parliament identifies conduct that is to be governed by the criminal law, a ‘premium’ is placed 
on speed, finality and uniformity.
35
  This, Packer argues, results in an ‘administrative, almost 
managerial, model’.36     
Packer’s second model of criminal process is the ‘due process model’. The purpose of 
due process, Packer argues, is to protect the accused against the tyranny of the state in the 
exercise of its coercive and stigmatising criminal law powers. The requirements of due process 
place obstacles in the way of achieving a conviction. In the due process model due process is 
placed into a hydraulic relationship with efficiency whereby ‘maximal efficiency means maximal 
tyranny’.37 However, Packer argues that a ‘substantial diminution’ in efficiency will be tolerated 
‘in the interest of preventing official oppression of the individual.’38 In Packer’s model, due 
process protections both increase the opportunity for accused persons to escape conviction and 
increase the time taken in reaching convictions, resulting in a reduction in efficiency. These two 
models, although not always discussed explicitly, have led to the pitting of efficiency against due 
process in scholarly discussions of the summary jurisdiction. 
2.2 Triviality and the Erosion of Due Process 
The summary jurisdiction has received more attention from sociologists and criminologists than 
it has from criminal law scholars. These empirical analyses provide rich accounts of the legal 
practices in the lower courts at particular moments in time. The seminal piece is Doreen 
McBarnet’s Conviction: Law, the State and the Construction of Justice, which was a qualitative 
                                                          
33
 Herbert L Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford University Press, 1969) 158. 
34
 Herbert L. Packer, 'Two Models of the Criminal Process' (1964) 113(1) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1, 
10. 
35
 Packer, Limits of the Criminal Sanction, above n 33, 159. 
36
 Packer, 'Two Models of the Criminal Process' above n 34, 11. 
37
 Ibid 16. 
38
 Ibid. 
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study of 105 cases before the magistrates and district courts in Scotland in the late 1970s.
39
 
Because of its revelatory nature, and through repetition in text books, this study has become 
orthodoxy in the criminal law literature in NSW. Embedded in the realist tradition McBarnet 
draws attention to the distinction between ‘law in the books’ and the law in practice in the 
summary jurisdiction. McBarnet begins with the legal definition of the summary jurisdiction at 
the time and then proceeds to make a number of observations about practices in magistrates’ 
courts. The legal definition of the summary jurisdiction in Scotland at the time was the shedding 
of ‘certain formalities required by the common law’, namely the indictment, a detailed record of 
proceedings, notice of the case against the defendant, and a jury.
40
 
McBarnet famously describes the criminal process as ‘two tiers of justice’. An ‘ideology 
of triviality’ pervades the lower courts, and as a consequence, they operate according to a logic 
that differs from that of the higher courts. Notwithstanding that the legal definition of summary 
jurisdiction was framed in terms of lack, McBarnet observes that the method and criteria of proof 
in defended summary hearings are ‘exactly the same’ as those in a jury trial; that is, an 
adversarial procedure where witnesses are examined and cross-examined.
41
 This has implications 
for the fairness of proceedings. Implicitly adopting Packer’s model of due process, McBarnet’s 
court observations lead her to the conclusion that proceedings in summary courts depart from the 
requirements of ‘due process’ and that this is justified by the criminal justice system on two 
grounds. The first is that because of the ‘ideology of triviality’, due process is thought not to be 
required for trivial offences. The second justification is that the offences prosecuted in the 
summary jurisdiction do not involve ‘much law’ and therefore lawyers are not needed. These 
observations tend to equate a lack of due process with the absence of legal representation for 
defendants, although McBarnet suggests that even when defence lawyers do appear on behalf of 
defendants the ideology of triviality results in sub-standard representation.
42
  The majority of 
defendants in her study were unrepresented, and because prosecutors in Scotland at that time 
were legally qualified, there was an inequality of arms. This inequality was the basis for her 
conclusion that ‘the practice of criminal justice does not live up to its rhetoric.’43  McBarnet 
                                                          
39
 McBarnet, above n 18. 
40
 Ibid 138. 
41
 Ibid 125. 
42
 At this time there was only limited provision of legal aid in magistrates’ courts in Scotland. Ibid, 124-138. 
43
 Ibid 155. 
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attributes the ‘gap’ between the rhetoric and the reality of the criminal law to appellate judges 
who use the techniques of legal reasoning to ensure that those who are factually guilty do not 
escape conviction and punishment through legal technicalities.
44
 She argues that instead of there 
being a distinction between crime control and due process as Packer suggests, ‘due process is for 
crime control’.45  Russell Hogg suggests that McBarnet is in fact arguing that summary 
proceedings are about crime control and not due process.
46
  In other words, Hogg’s interpretation 
of McBarnet’s thesis is that in the summary jurisdiction due process, such that it is, has been 
marshalled to the purposes of crime control, and this is not how it should be. The way in which 
McBarnet’s thesis has been picked up in a leading NSW criminal law text book47 is perpetuating 
an understanding that the summary jurisdiction in the current era is in fact the bottom tear of a 
two-tiered criminal justice system and that it deals with trivial offences. More recent studies in 
the UK have begun to disrupt the perception of triviality by examining the increasing role of law 
and legal representation in the lower courts and reform of the lay magistracy.
48
 
McBarnet’s thesis was subjected to a robust but little-known critique by a fellow 
sociologist, Neil Hutton, in 1987.
49
  Hutton’s critique is grounded in a discussion of what he 
considers to be the shortcomings of McBarnet’s sociological methodology, but his main 
argument is that McBarnet’s analysis is infused with an implicit Marxist ideology; that the law is 
manipulated in practice to reproduce unequal social power relations. With this as her starting 
point McBarnet fails to acknowledge that ‘magistrates courts … have several contradictory 
objectives’.50  The law’s purpose, Hutton argues with constructivist undertones, is not to produce 
outcomes that accord with objective reality, although it might be hoped that it does so. Rather, its 
purpose is to translate factual guilt into legal guilt, while its procedures are designed to ensure 
that those who are factually innocent are not convicted. Thus, the utility of pointing out the ‘gap’ 
between the rhetoric and the reality of the law is lost if it is not asked how that gap is managed 
                                                          
44
 Ibid 155–6. 
45
 Ibid 156 (original emphasis). 
46
 Russell Hogg, 'Politics, Prisons and Punishment' (1991) 4 Journal for Social Justice Studies 1, 22. 
47
 Brown et al, (6
th
 ed), above n 27, ch 4. 
48
 Lucy Welsh, 'Are Magistrates' Courts Really a ‘Law Free Zone’? Participant Observation and Specialist Use of 
Language' (Paper presented at the British Criminology Conference, Wolverhampton, 2–4 July, 2013); Jane C 
Donoghue, 'Reforming the Role of Magistrates: Implications for Summary Justice in England and Wales' (2014) 
77(6) Modern Law Review 928. 
49
 Neil Hutton, 'The Sociological Analysis of Courtroom Interaction: A Review Essay' (1987) 20 Australian & New 
Zealand Journal of Criminology 110.  
50
 Ibid 119. 
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and whether the law serves its purpose. A more useful analysis, he suggests, would provide us 
with an understanding of how power is ‘inscribed in the dynamics of the production and 
reproduction of structures in social practices.’  Such an understanding of how power operates in a 
particular context enables us ‘to redistribute power to the less powerful’.51  
Malcolm Feeley conducted a similar observational study to McBarnet’s but of the lower 
courts in one city in the United States, also in the late 1970s. He concluded that for defendants 
facing minor charges, being required to go through the time-consuming, frustrating, confusing 
and tedious court process is punishment in itself, quite apart from any formal penalty that may be 
imposed. To increase due process in the lower courts, he argues, would increase the punishment 
by lengthening proceedings. For this reason the lower courts are like a ‘complex bargaining and 
exchange system, in which values, goals, and interests are competing with one another’.52   
These observational studies have provided a window onto the operation of courts that 
have remained inaccessible to traditional legal scholarship because of the relative (although not 
complete) lack of reported case law. Observational studies, by their nature, however, are able to 
provide only a snapshot, producing a static impression of the summary jurisdiction. This is a 
reason to suggest that an approach that examines change over time may yield significant insights 
into the summary jurisdiction. 
2.3 Comparisons between the Summary Jurisdiction and the Jury Trial 
Many studies of the summary jurisdiction, such as McBarnet’s, compare it unfavourably with the 
criminal trial on indictment as though the criminal trial represents the epitome (or at least a 
superior form) of justice. For example, Ashworth and Zedner have analysed summary trials as 
one of seven phenomena, including diversion, plea bargaining and preventive orders, that have 
increased in prevalence in recent decades and which, they argue, pose a challenge to a liberal 
model of the criminal trial.
53
  They conceive of the criminal law as ‘an engine of government’ 
and so argue that ‘a normative conception of the criminal law cannot be distinguished from a 
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theory of good government’.54  To make a contribution to this overall aim they assess the impact 
that the seven phenomena have had on the relationship between the individual and the state. For 
the purposes of analysis they use three models of the modern state:  the regulatory state; the 
preventive state; and the authoritarian state. They posit that the rise to prominence of notions of 
human rights has led to the development of cumbersome protections for accused persons and that 
these seven phenomena have been developed as a means of circumventing ‘the more onerous 
procedural requirements’ of the criminal law.55  They conclude that because the criminal law 
exposes convicted persons to both stigma and ‘significant punishment’, the ‘liberal model’ of the 
criminal trial ought to be adhered to.
56
  Such comparisons have highlighted the potential dangers 
of the proliferation of means of circumventing protections of accused persons, but they 
perpetuate an understanding of the summary jurisdiction as the poor cousin of the criminal trial 
on indictment. By contrast, this thesis tells the story of the formalisation of the summary 
jurisdiction on its own terms and reveals the relationship between formalisation and 
criminalisation in the current era.  
2.4 Studies of the Magistracy 
Several Australian scholars have examined the historical development of the office of magistrate 
either as the sole object of study,
57
 or as part of a broader study of Australian legal history.
58
 
Replete with historical context these studies do not undertake doctrinal analyses, nor are they 
concerned to examine how the summary jurisdiction in the current era has been shaped by 
historical developments, which is what this thesis provides. There is also a body of sociological 
scholarship revealing previously hidden aspects of the role of the magistrate in the summary 
jurisdiction.
59
  For more than a decade Kathy Mack and Sharon Roach-Anleu have been 
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conducting empirical research into magistrates, investigating such issues as their career 
aspirations, job satisfaction and demographic background, as well as the legal practices engaged 
in by magistrates in court. These studies provide vital insights into the practices of magistrates at 
particular moments in time, but this thesis adds to the literature an analysis of the law and the 
operation of the summary jurisdiction as a whole. 
2.5 Examination of Particular Offences 
The criminal law literature, with only a few notable exceptions,
60
 overlooks the impact of 
jurisdiction on the criminal law. There is a growing body of literature on offences that are 
finalised summarily — most often as a discussion of mala prohibita and the accompanying 
concern about the erosion of protections of the accused.
61
  Material on summary offences also 
appears as an adjunct to discussions of police powers, or as an analysis of offences at the lower 
end of the hierarchy of more ‘traditional’ criminal offences, such as common assault as part of a 
broader examination of offences against the person. Indeed, more recent scholarship has selected 
certain summary offences, or offences that are capable of being finalised summarily, as its 
primary focus.
62
  However, the significance of the fact that these offences are finalised 
summarily has not been addressed. 
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In this body of scholarship, summary offences are characterised, predominantly, as either 
regulatory offences,
63
 or low level public order offences. This is perhaps because of the enduring 
influence of McBarnet’s ‘ideology of triviality’, a focus on the nineteenth century, and an 
orientation towards England where the summary jurisdiction has not expanded or formalised to 
the same extent as in NSW. More recently Australian criminal law scholars have begun to draw 
attention to the broader range of harms that constitute public order offences.
64
  This thesis offers 
an account of the summary jurisdiction that enables the impact of jurisdiction on the criminal law 
to be analysed. 
 2.6 Jurisdiction, Governance and Criminal Responsibility 
More recently, criminal law scholars writing in the socio-historical tradition have integrated 
understandings of the summary jurisdiction into analyses of the criminal law. Farmer has 
provided the most detailed and sustained account of the summary jurisdiction in criminal law 
scholarship.
65
  His study painstakingly documents the emergence and formalisation of a 
summary jurisdiction in mid-nineteenth century Scotland when formal legal rules and procedures 
replaced moral categories as the criminal law was moulded into a tool of ‘good government’ in 
the modernising nation state.
66
  In doing so Farmer showed how the new summary jurisdiction 
wrought a transformation of the concept of jurisdiction in the criminal law. Rather than 
providing a longer history of the summary jurisdiction from its inception to the current era as this 
thesis does, Farmer’s focus is on the impact of the transformation of jurisdiction in the mid-
nineteenth century on the broader criminal legal ‘tradition’—the Sottish equivalent of the 
common law. He argues that what is ‘characteristic of the modern criminal law’ is its ‘reliance 
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on procedural law’67 for the purposes of the ‘management and production of social and legal 
order.’68 In relation to the impact of the summary jurisdiction on the criminal law he concludes: 
 The modern criminal justice system is a complex administrative system geared towards dealing 
with large numbers of people in a summary manner and controlling behaviour through small 
penalties for minor offences. And the crucial period for its formation was the nineteenth 
century.
69
 
He notes that the summary courts have challenged the authority of the tradition to such an extent 
that they can no longer be regarded as anomalous. On the contrary, it is the ‘survival of the 
common law’ that is anomalous.70  On this basis he makes a case for the importance of procedure 
to criminal law scholarship.
71
 
Alan Norrie argues that the proliferation of regulatory summary offences in the 
nineteenth century enabled harms caused by industrialists to be governed by the criminal law 
without invoking moral condemnation.
72
  This argument implicitly construes summary offences 
as regulatory offences that do not attract moral obloquy. This thesis shows that such a 
construction is not accurate in NSW in the current era.  
In relation to criminal responsibility in the criminal law more broadly, Nicola Lacey has 
emphasised the importance of understanding the impact of summary jurisdiction on the 
development of ‘outcome responsibility’73 and the changing ‘institutional structures available for 
the realisation of the legitimation and coordination roles of criminal responsibility’.74  Building 
on these analyses, this thesis reveals how formalisation has moulded the summary jurisdiction 
into a tool for regulating harmful behaviours produced by changing social conditions.  
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2.7 Judicial Accounts of the Summary Jurisdiction 
The Australian High Court has had the opportunity to consider the nature of summary 
jurisdiction only once in its history in Munday v Gill in 1930.
75
  In the absence of more recent 
cases, the conceptualisation of Justice Dixon’s — a member of the majority and one who later 
became known as one of Australia’s finest legal minds — has been adopted as the current 
understanding of summary jurisdiction in the Australian criminal law literature.
76
  The decision 
must therefore be analysed in detail. Chapter 2 discusses the social and political context in which 
it arose, but here it is examined for what it tells us about the High Court’s understanding of the 
nature of summary jurisdiction in 1930. 
Munday v Gill arose out of a protracted strike at the Rothbury coal mine in the Hunter 
Valley in NSW. Nineteen striking workers who were protesting the conservative government’s 
forcible reopening of the mine had informations laid against them under s 545C of the Crimes 
Act 1900 (NSW) (‘Crimes Act’) for ‘knowingly continuing in an unlawful assembly’, which had 
recently been enacted as a means of regulating strike action. This offence was punishable by six 
months imprisonment or a maximum fine of £20.
77
 It was alleged that the accused were part of a 
gathering of between six and ten thousand coal miners who ‘moved upon the Rothbury coal 
mine’.78  The lockout had persisted for some eleven months prior to the date of this incident and 
had caused considerable political embarrassment for the NSW government.
79
  The case came 
before the High Court by way of an appeal from the grant of a writ of prohibition in the Supreme 
Court of NSW. The immediate issue was whether the magistrate at first instance had committed 
a jurisdictional error of law. A broader question was to what extent fundamental common law 
principles apply in the summary jurisdiction, the answer to which depended on how the Court 
constructed the nature of summary jurisdiction. A subsidiary question was whether the statutory 
interpretation principles of legality and lenity operated in the summary jurisdiction to protect 
those common law principles.  
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The debate about a jurisdictional error of law arose in the following manner. At first 
instance, after hearing the charge against the first defendant, the remaining defendants had 
consented to the magistrate ‘lumping’ the remaining charges together; or, in other words, hearing 
them together. All nineteen accused were convicted. The eighteen accused whose charges had 
been lumped sought statutory prohibition in the NSW Supreme Court to restrain the magistrate 
from enforcing the convictions on the ground that the magistrate ‘had no jurisdiction to hear 
together several informations against different defendants even by consent…’.80 The NSW 
Supreme Court granted prohibition and the informant (that is, the police officer who had laid the 
informations, and who was the respondent in the Supreme Court) appealed to the High Court 
arguing that lumping the cases together did not constitute an error of law that went to 
jurisdiction. The majority of the High Court agreed, holding that although it was an anomaly, it 
was not a jurisdictional error and therefore the defendants’ consent had corrected the error. 
The majority of the High Court perceived a fundamental distinction between trials on 
indictment and summary hearings. I will focus on the judgment of Dixon J because it considers 
the nature of summary jurisdiction in the most depth. Dixon J, perceived a fundamental 
difference between solemn (indictable) and summary procedure ‘in history, in substance and in 
present practice.’81  Citing Blackstone, His Honour described the difference between the two. 
Solemn procedure is prosecuted in the name of the Crown and requires the intervention of a jury 
between the Crown and subject to protect the accused from arbitrary state power.
82
  Summary 
prosecutions by contrast, on Dixon J’s construction, are ‘between subject and subject’, the 
implication being that the fundamental common law protections are of less importance.
83
  His 
Honour did not state so explicitly, but his characterisation of summary proceedings is based on 
an enduring belief that summary prosecutions are private prosecutions. In doing so he may have 
been elevating the form of prosecutions, which by historical convention are brought in the name 
of the informant rather than the Crown, over their substance. Bruce Smith’s research reveals that 
the police and other public agencies have been conducting prosecutions in the summary 
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jurisdiction in England for centuries.
84
  This thesis shows in Chapter 3 that in NSW, police have 
been bringing summary prosecutions since at least the late nineteenth century.
85
  In the 
overwhelming majority of cases the informant is a police officer, as in Munday v Gill. Therefore, 
for all practical purposes, summary prosecutions have been brought on behalf of the state since at 
least as early as the late nineteenth century, and they continue to be so brought in the current era.  
While Dixon J conceded that accused persons in summary proceedings are entitled to the 
application of the common law protections, on his analysis a failure to apply them does not 
amount to a want of jurisdiction. Rather, it is an irregularity to which the accused may consent.
86
  
An ‘ideology of triviality’87 is discernible in his description of summary proceedings which he 
compares with proceedings upon indictment: 
 The former are solemnly determined according to a procedure considered appropriate to the 
highest crimes by which the State may be affected and the gravest liabilities to which a subject 
may be exposed. The latter are disposed of in a manner adopted by the Legislature as expedient 
for the efficient enforcement of certain statutory regulations with respect to the maintenance of 
the quiet and good order of society.
88
 
This passage, which is repeated Brown et al,
89
 has perpetuated the construction of the summary 
jurisdiction as ‘trivial’ in NSW. While it pre-dates McBarnet, it corroborates her argument that 
the ‘ideology of triviality’ is used to justify the abrogation of due process.90  Dixon J also 
constructed summary offences as regulatory or minor public order matters. As this thesis shows, 
that is no longer exclusively the case in NSW. In proceedings upon indictment, His Honour 
observed (quoting Blackstone’s Commentaries) that the accused ‘puts himself upon the Country 
and he who prosecutes for our Lord the King doth the like’; whereas in summary proceedings ‘he 
is dealt with by those assigned to keep the peace, who judge both law and fact.’91  In trials on 
indictment ‘the jurors are summoned particularly to pass between their Sovereign Lord the King 
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and the prisoner at the bar.’92  From a pragmatic perspective Dixon J also noted that the tribunal 
of fact in summary hearings is the magistrate. It is ‘fixed and remains the same whether the cases 
are dealt with successively or simultaneously.’93  These fundamental differences, he said, explain 
why the common law principles protecting accused persons apply to trials on indictment in 
relation to summary proceedings.
94
   
Notwithstanding the fact that Dixon J’s construction of the nature of the summary 
jurisdiction has been cited in subsequent NSW and Victorian Supreme Court cases,
95
 and has 
been reproduced in text books, it is Isaacs CJ’s understanding of the summary jurisdiction that 
more accurately reflects the summary jurisdiction in the current era.
96
  Isaacs CJ’s dissenting 
view was based on the salience of due process protections for defendants. For Isaacs CJ, 
summary criminal proceedings are between the Crown and subject. Therefore the common law 
principles protecting ‘individual liberty’ apply equally to the summary jurisdiction and the higher 
courts: 
The slightest consideration reminds us that an accused person needs at least as much protection 
from a sentence of twelve months’ imprisonment with hard labour when inflicted by a Police 
Magistrate, as when inflicted on a jury’s verdict guided by a Supreme Court Judge.
97
 
His Honour referred to the fact that when first commissioned to keep the King’s peace, justices 
were empowered to ‘hear and determine’ matters, but were to do so in the mode known to the 
common law.
98
  Therefore common law principles remain applicable in the absence of clear 
statutory provisions to the contrary. It follows, he argued, that although the summary jurisdiction 
is a product of statute, the common law principles of lenity and legality must apply.
99
  Summary 
proceedings are, on his construction, merely the substitution of one ‘judge’ for a jury of twelve 
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men.
100
  All criminal prosecutions are brought by the Crown and the ‘entrusting of jurisdiction in 
some criminal matters to a single tribunal determining both law and fact … is procedural 
only’.101  Therefore, ‘in the absence of any statutory direction to the contrary’, the ‘inherent 
principles of the common law safeguarding the liberty and property of the individual’ apply.102  
While the common law rule prohibiting the lumping of cases had, up to that point, only 
been applied in cases of trial upon indictment, Isaacs CJ was of the view that the rule also 
applied in the summary jurisdiction, and when the magistrate at first instance flouted the rule he 
committed an error of law that went to jurisdiction. The defendants’ consent could not cure the 
defect because where ‘jurisdiction derived from the King to dispense his royal justice is 
transgressed … private submission is incapable of condoning it where personal liberty [is] 
concerned’.103  It is the prerogative of the legislature alone to abrogate fundamental common law 
protections because ‘an individual cannot waive a matter in which the public have an interest.’104  
His Honour took this one step further, citing authority to the effect that ‘a prisoner can consent to 
nothing.’105  He might also have added that jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a court by a 
party (in this case the defendant) in the absence of a statutory power to do so. In support of his 
argument that the common law rule prohibiting the lumping of cases applies in the summary 
jurisdiction, Isaacs CJ referred to s 10 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1848 (UK) (Justices Act 
1902 (NSW) s 57). This section provided that ‘every … information shall be for one offence 
only, and not for two or more offences.’106  Although he conceded that at common law judges 
have discretion to lump cases, he interpreted s 10 as prohibiting the practice in the summary 
jurisdiction.
107
  
There are reasons other than differing constructions of the summary jurisdiction that help 
to explain the distinction between Dixon J and Isaacs CJ’s judgments. One is the nature of 
jurisdictional errors of law. The High Court case of Kirk v Industrial Court, decided in 2010, 
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helps to shed light on the decision in Munday v Gill. In Kirk, citing with approval the work of 
Professor Geoffrey Sawer written in 1956, the High Court noted that the area of law relating to 
jurisdictional error is ‘at bottom’ a question of ‘policy, not of logic’.108  Thus it ‘has not yielded 
principles that are always easily applied’. The reason for this, Sawer argued, is the tension 
between the need to keep inferior tribunals within the bounds of their jurisdiction on the one 
hand, and the desire ‘to give the inferior decision some degree of finality … for reasons of 
expediency’, on the other.109  Given the ‘open textured’ nature of the law relating to 
jurisdictional error, it is tempting to speculate that Chief Justice Isaacs and Justice Dixon in 
Munday v Gill constructed understandings of the summary jurisdiction that produced the 
outcome they desired, rather than one that can be seen to reflect an objective reality. It is clear 
from Dixon J’s emphasis on pragmatic considerations that finality was an important 
consideration for him. An element of professional rivalry may also have been at play given that 
the recently appointed Dixon J’s star was rising as Isaacs CJ’s was on the wane.110  Whatever 
may have been the reasons for the differing decisions, my analysis of the development of the 
summary jurisdiction shows that Isaacs CJ’s construction has turned out to be the more accurate 
understanding of summary jurisdiction in the current era. Therefore, to repeat Dixon J’s 
construction as though it reflects current reality is misleading. However, rather than declaring 
one judge’s view correct and the other incorrect, the case is better understood as capturing a 
moment of transition in the development of the summary jurisdiction from an informal forum 
with few protections for accused persons to a more formal criminal justice apparatus. In some 
respects Isaacs CJ was ahead of his time because although the summary jurisdiction had 
formalised to an extent by 1930, his perception of it did not gain paramountcy until the final 
quarter of the twentieth century, as this thesis shows.  
3. Methodological Approach and Sources 
This thesis presents a close analysis of the summary jurisdiction as it developed over time. It 
employs a socio-historical methodological approach. In order to understand the summary 
jurisdiction in the current era and to provide a basis for critique, it charts the ‘emergence and 
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development of legal practices’ and how they have been legitimated.111  Such an approach 
derives from recognition that the ‘network of practices’ constituting the criminal law and its 
institutions has a history and that that history has informed the current form, substance and 
practice of the law.
112
 It is also a means of accounting for the contingency of substantive criminal 
law.
113
  This approach is particularly appropriate because in contrast to the static picture 
produced by the empirical analyses discussed above, the socio-historical method reveals the 
dynamic nature of the summary jurisdiction. 
The socio-historical method has led me to draw upon particular sources. The NSW 
summary jurisdiction has developed primarily through statute. Therefore it has been necessary to 
trace the myriad statutory instruments that have shaped it. The need to decipher the legislative 
practices and social context behind these instruments has led me to the Hansard reports of 
parliamentary debates and reports by various government bodies (such as the New South Wales 
Law Reform Commission (‘NSWLRC’)). While, for the most part, Local Court cases are 
unreported, there is nevertheless a substantial body of case law to draw upon. In 2002 the Chief 
Magistrate began the practice of publishing (but not formally reporting) a handful of cases every 
year to provide guidance to magistrates on particular issues, such as how to deal with certain 
issues of proof, or the applicable sentencing practices for certain offence types. These cases are 
available on the NSW Caselaw website administered by the NSW Department of Justice and are 
discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
114
  There are two further bodies of case law. The first comprises 
appeals against conviction and sentence to the District Court, the majority of which are 
unreported. The second is Supreme Court and High Court case law developed through the 
prerogative writs, the case stated mechanism that was introduced in 1881, and statutory appeals. 
I draw upon these cases where they illuminate the legal practices of the summary jurisdiction. 
Treatises written by lawyers to assist practitioners and magistrates have also been valuable. 
Dating back to 1700 these treatises consolidate the legislation and common law at particular 
points in time. They have contributed to the development and formalisation of the law. 
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The key to the socio-historical method is to analyse the historical development of legal 
principles and practices in their ‘social, cultural, political, and economic context’.115  If law is a 
social practice it follows that divorcing the law from its social context results in only a partial 
understanding of it. I have derived the social context for my study from parliamentary debates 
and historical, sociological and criminological studies. For the historical context it has been 
necessary to rely on sources written by legal historians. Because the summary jurisdiction in 
NSW, and indeed Australia more broadly, has been subjected to limited historical analysis, the 
names of some authors, such as Hilary Golder and Alex Castles, appear more frequently than 
they might in other, more thoroughly-studied jurisdictions. In relation to drink-driving I have 
consulted contemporary newspaper reports because the public relied upon such reports for an 
understanding of the law to a far greater degree than for other offences. 
4. A Frame for a Critical Analysis of the Development of the Summary Jurisdiction 
To gain an understanding of this relatively opaque criminal justice apparatus, this thesis 
constructs a composite picture of the summary jurisdiction by presenting a critical analysis of its 
component parts. Each component part is equally important and is therefore given equal 
attention. My analysis reveals that the legal practices of the summary jurisdiction have, broadly 
speaking, followed a trajectory of formalisation. NSW has had a summary criminal jurisdiction 
since colonisation, but the way in which it has been conceived of has changed from an 
amorphous collection of formal and informal powers into a procedurally defined ‘legal space’ 
with demarcated boundaries. The relationship between formalisation and the increasing use of 
the criminal law in summary form to regulate harmful behaviours helps to explain how 
criminalisation is achieved in the current era. This part of the Introduction introduces my 
formalisation frame. The next part gives an overview of the structure of the thesis.  
Formalisation 
Drawing attention to the trajectory of formalisation in the summary jurisdiction challenges the 
enduring perception of the summary jurisdiction as a forum of informality. Two descriptions of 
the summary jurisdiction at points in time one and a half centuries apart illustrate the orthodox 
perception of the summary jurisdiction. Farmer, in describing the summary practices of Scottish 
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courts in the early nineteenth century, says:  ‘The informal and summary practice of these courts 
was thus justified on the basis of expediency. It is clear that there were no definite rules of 
procedure.’116 In the late 1970s McBarnet, in her two tiers of justice and ideology of triviality 
formulations, observed that in the second tier, ‘[a]lmost all criminal law is acted out in the lower 
courts without traditional due process. But of course what happens in the lower courts is not only 
[considered to be] trivial, it is not really law.’117 This emphasis on informality, though correct 
having regard to the context of these studies in place and time, has blunted scholarly awareness 
of change over time and obscured the similarities (while emphasising the differences) between 
the summary jurisdiction and the indictable jurisdiction. 
I use the concept of formalisation to capture the trajectory of the legal practices of the 
summary jurisdiction over time. A trajectory of formalisation, albeit implicit rather than explicit, 
can be discerned in scholarly accounts of the development of the criminal law over time with 
reference to England and Wales.
118
  Arlie Loughnan detects what she calls the ‘formalisation 
account’ in the criminal law literature according to which the ‘principles and practices’ of the 
criminal law have followed a trajectory of formalisation.
119
 Loughnan’s account applies to the 
principles of the common law and the practices and procedures of, and surrounding, the criminal 
trial. Loughnan’s formalisation account identifies a body of literature that explains the 
development of the criminal law as a process of formalisation whereby disparate and particular 
legal rules have been replaced by uniform rules of general application. In this process there has 
been a shift from organising the criminal law around moral categories to organising it through 
formal, technical legal rules. In addition to formalisation of the criminal law there has been a 
formalisation of the rules of evidence, and, at an institutional level, the increasing appearance 
and professionalisation of lawyers and the refinement of the adversarial process.
120
  However, 
Loughnan’s formalisation account contains a qualification. It raises awareness of the fact that 
this process has not been uniform, inexorable or ‘unilinear’.121  
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My concept of formalisation in the context of the summary jurisdiction has emerged from 
my research. It has four overlapping and interacting dimensions that assume differing degrees of 
significance at different times. Applied as a lens, the value of this concept is the power it has to 
explain how criminalisation is achieved in the summary jurisdiction in the current era. These 
dimensions are: 
4.1 Juridification 
I use the concept of juridification as a means of understanding what I have identified as the turn 
to law via the summary jurisdiction to regulate practices of the actors. For the purposes of 
analysis I conceptualise juridification in relation to the summary jurisdiction as having an 
internal and an external aspect. The external aspect is criminalisation, which I analyse under a 
separate heading below. Internally, juridification can be seen as the turn to law to regulate the 
practices of magistrates and the justice personnel within the summary jurisdiction. This includes 
the process of subjecting the practices and the exercise of discretionary power of these actors to 
legal rules.
122
  Good examples of this type of juridification are the development of an 
increasingly sophisticated system of appeals from the decisions of magistrates and the 
juridification of sentencing practices, which are examined in Chapter 1. Juridification in this 
sense has cut across offence categories by the development of legal rules that apply generally to 
multiple offence categories. It has taken place primarily through legislation, but it also has 
included common law developments. In the context of drink-driving it incorporates the use of 
precise technology-derived rules that enable removal of more open-ended evaluative judgements, 
such as the degree of drunkenness. 
On a descriptive level juridification in the summary jurisdiction also includes maturation. 
I use the term maturation to capture the development of the summary jurisdiction’s power to 
regulate its own processes, which has been accompanied by what the current Chief Magistrate, 
Judge Graeme Henson has described as an increasing ‘self-confidence’.123  Without wishing to 
imply that it has been inevitable, maturation of the summary jurisdiction has been discernible 
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from the final quarter of the twentieth century onwards, largely as a result of lawyerification 
(which I discuss below).  
4.2 Rationalisation. 
The formalisation of the legal practices of jurisdiction, appeals and sentencing can be seen as a 
process of rationalisation, by which I mean that particular rules applying to specific offences 
have been replaced by rules of general application. One aim of rationalisation has been to 
achieve a measure of consistency of legal practices amongst magistrates. There have been two 
key periods of rationalisation: (1) between the mid-nineteenth century and the turn of the 
twentieth century; and (2) from the final quarter of the twentieth century onwards. Changing 
legitimation demands arising from increasing criminalisation as the nature of representative 
democracy changed and matured account for rationalisation during these two periods.  
4.3 Professionalisation and ‘Lawyerification’.  
The actors in the summary jurisdiction can be usefully divided into two categories: (1) 
magistrates and ‘justice personnel’— those actors (aside from magistrates) who are there in their 
official capacity; and (2) those individuals who are affected by the law most directly, namely, 
victims and defendants. Justice personnel in the summary jurisdiction are the police, police 
prosecutors, Director of Public Prosecutions lawyers, and defence lawyers. Formalisation in the 
context of the actors who are there in their official capacity has occurred through two 
complementary processes: professionalisation and what I call ‘lawyerification’. 
Professionalisation, in the sense of the development of a professional identity through the 
monopolisation of specialised knowledge, has been taking place amongst police, police 
prosecutors,
124
 magistrates and lawyers since at least the early nineteenth century. 
Professionalisation and its impact on the criminal trial has been well-documented in the scholarly 
literature,
125
 but it has not been examined in relation to the summary jurisdiction.  
Lawyerification in the sense used here differs from John Langbein’s concept of the 
‘lawyerization’ of the criminal trial. Langbein’s account of the lawyerization of the criminal trial 
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in England refers to the infiltration of solicitors, firstly into the work of private and public 
prosecutions, and then into defence work in the early eighteenth century.
126
  Most of the work of 
these lawyers was, at first, performed pre-trial. The increasing use of lawyers in the prosecution 
role precipitated the decision by trial judges to allow counsel to appear increasingly for the 
defendant. This was done as a matter of practice rather than by common law precedent. The 
reason why there was a delay between lawyers appearing for the prosecution and lawyers being 
permitted to appear for the defence was because defence solicitors were held in poor regard. 
However, Langbein argues that this distrust of the ‘unscrupulous’ tactics employed by defence 
solicitors in the pre-trial preparation of evidence ultimately prompted judges to permit defence 
counsel to examine and cross-examine witnesses in court, thereby enabling the judge to assess 
the credibility of the evidence.
127
  The increased appearance of defence lawyers was thus a 
response to increasing prosecution power, concern about false prosecutions, and the construction 
of false defence evidence. Lawyerization, Langbein argues, was one of the main reasons for the 
replacement of ‘trial by altercation’ with the adversarial trial. 
 By contrast, lawyerification of the summary jurisdiction began with magistrates, followed 
by defence lawyers, and served a different purpose. The use of lawyers as prosecutors in the 
summary jurisdiction has been marginal. Lawyerification is a much more recent phenomenon 
than lawyerization. It began in the mid-twentieth century and gained momentum from the final 
quarter of the twentieth century. Unlike lawyerization, which has been totalising, lawyerification 
of the summary jurisdiction has been a nuanced development. Despite the complexity of the 
story of lawyerification, it is clear that the number of lawyers in the summary jurisdiction as a 
whole has increased significantly and this has contributed to the formalisation of summary 
procedure.     
4.4 Separation of Law from Other Spheres of Social Power 
The separation of law from other spheres of social power, such as religion and politics, is 
identified in the socio-historical literature as an aspect of the development of ‘formal rational 
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law’,128 and it has been a prominent theme in the summary jurisdiction. It has manifested itself in 
the achievement of autonomy from the government. However, formalisation in this dimension 
has been piecemeal and has taken place only in the current era. The magistracy achieved 
autonomy in the early 1980s and the creation of the ODPP in 1986 gave the prosecution in 
indictable matters formal autonomy from the government. By contrast, police prosecutors, who 
are responsible for the prosecution of the vast majority of matters in the summary jurisdiction, 
have been retained even though they are part of the executive arm of government.  
The Relationship between Formalisation and Criminalisation. 
As the summary jurisdiction has formalised there has been a turn to law to regulate behaviours 
that have been constructed as harmful, what I call, for brevity, ‘constructed harmful behaviours’. 
I use this expression to emphasise that what is considered to be harmful is socially constructed 
and to avoid appearing to endorse implicitly such constructions. As will be seen throughout the 
thesis, and particularly in Chapter 4 in relation to defendants, social perceptions of harmfulness 
change over time. A timely example is homosexual sex acts between men.
129
  This behaviour 
was criminalised in NSW until 1984. Today the criminalisation of such behaviour is considered 
to be a breach of human rights. The turn to law to regulate constructed harmful behaviours is the 
external dimension of juridification that I refer to as ‘criminalisation’. There is a vast literature 
on criminalisation but the concept is used in a limited way in this thesis.
130
 Criminalisation is 
understood in this thesis as the turn to the criminal law in summary form to regulate constructed 
harmful behaviours. Criminalisation in the criminal law literature is recognised as encompassing 
not only the rules that are developed to govern social conduct, but also the enforcement and 
institutionalisation of those rules,
131
 and this thesis confirms that this is so. I argue that 
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criminalisation in the summary jurisdiction has taken place along two axes: one vertical 
(‘vertical criminalisation’); and one horizontal (‘horizontal criminalisation’).132   
Vertical criminalisation comprises the reclassification of indictable offences as capable of 
being finalised summarily. It might be objected that reclassification is not criminalisation 
because that behaviour is already criminalised and has merely been transferred from the 
indictable jurisdiction to the summary jurisdiction. However, this thesis shows that since the 
mid-eighteenth century reclassification has frequently been motivated by the expectation that 
rendering an offence triable summarily will increase conviction rates, thus extending the reach of 
the criminal law. In some instances, such as with the offence of affray discussed in Chapter 5, 
that expectation has been realised.  
It might also be objected that reclassification is in fact de-criminalisation rather than 
criminalisation because the offence is being transferred to a forum that deals with regulatory 
offences that do not carry the usual moral stigma attaching to criminal convictions. However, the 
close examination of drink-driving and domestic violence offences presented in Chapters 6 and 7 
of this thesis shows that the summary jurisdiction is capable of manufacturing moral 
condemnation and thus is not a ‘moral free’ zone.  
Horizontal criminalisation comprises the creation of new offences, and, in relation to 
behaviours that are already criminalised, a shift away from rules of general application towards 
offences defined with increasing particularity.
133
  A good illustration of this shift in the context 
of the summary jurisdiction is the apprehended domestic violence order and accompanying 
offence of contravening an apprehended violence order (the ‘domestic violence statutory 
regime’) enacted in the 1980s and refined over subsequent decades. While domestic violence has 
been criminalised since at least the mid-nineteenth century, the domestic violence statutory 
regime, which sets norms of behaviour via the civil standard of proof and punishes breaches via 
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the criminal standard, has enabled the criminal law to be moulded to the particular circumstances 
of the individual offender and his or her relationship with the person in need of protection, thus 
enabling the criminal law to define proscribed behaviour with a fine degree of particularity.
134
 
5. Overview of the Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into three parts that correspond with the three component parts of the 
summary jurisdiction, namely, procedures and practices; actors; and substantive offences. Part I, 
which contains Chapter 1, presents an analysis of the procedural rules and practices that have 
developed to instruct the magistrates, and other actors, on how a matter is to proceed through the 
courts from the moment when a charge is laid to the conclusion of the final appeal. Procedure in 
this sense is to be distinguished from the substantive offence definitions and whether or not 
criminal liability is to be imposed upon a particular offender, although they are closely related. 
Procedures and practices can be sensibly divided into three categories: those relating to 
jurisdiction; those relating to appeals; and those relating to sentencing. Broadly speaking, the 
evolution of procedures and practices in NSW, particularly those relating to the boundaries 
between the summary and indictable jurisdictions, has followed a trajectory of formalisation.  
Despite its importance in criminal law scholarship, questions of jurisdiction tend to be 
ignored, left implicit rather than explicit, or are quarantined from the substantive criminal law as 
a topic reserved for technical procedural focus.
135
  At its simplest, jurisdiction has been defined 
as the authority to ‘do things with law’.136 There is now a body of scholarship examining what is 
termed the ‘metaphysical’ aspects of legal jurisdiction, namely the way in which questions of 
jurisdiction shed light on power and authority, who may speak for whom, and ‘normative legal 
ordering’.137 However, the approach taken to jurisdiction in this thesis is more concrete. It 
examines the legal practices through which the jurisdictional allocation of offences has been 
organised. These legal practices have constructed a ‘legal space’ that we know as the summary 
jurisdiction in NSW.  
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Part II of this thesis contains chapters 2 to 4. It presents an analysis of the development of 
the roles of the various actors in the summary jurisdiction to reveal the way in which they have 
shaped the legal practices which constitute the summary jurisdiction. Chapter 2 examines 
magistrates, Chapter 3 examines the ‘justice personnel’, who are the police, police prosecutors, 
the ODPP, and defence lawyers; and Chapter 4 examines defendants and victims. Defendants 
and victims are examined together because they are the actors who are there in a non-official 
capacity and the law impacts upon them most directly. Broadly speaking, the development of the 
roles of the legal actors has followed a trajectory of formalisation, but formalisation has been 
piecemeal and plays itself out in specific ways in relation to each of them. Chapter 4 illustrates 
the relationship between formalisation and criminalisation by analysing how the demographic 
mix of defendants in the summary jurisdiction has changed as the government has increasingly 
deployed the criminal law in summary form to regulate constructed harmful behaviours. 
Part III of this thesis comprises chapters 5, 6 and 7 and presents an analysis of substantive 
offences. These chapters illustrate how criminalisation is achieved, and explore the relationship 
between formalisation of the summary jurisdiction and criminalisation. The criminal court 
statistics are a way in to this otherwise opaque dimension of the criminal justice system and are a 
starting point for making interpretive arguments about the socio-historical material. Chapter 5 
examines assault and affray, Chapter 6 examines drink-driving, and Chapter 7 examines the 
domestic violence offence of contravening an apprehended violence order (‘CAVO’). I have 
chosen these particular offences for three reasons. The first is that they are representative 
examples from the three largest offence categories in the summary jurisdiction according to the 
Australian and New Zealand Standard Offence Classification. Together these three offence 
categories account for approximately 60 per cent of all offences finalised in the summary 
jurisdiction at the time of writing.
138
  The second reason is that they have been pivotal to the 
development of the summary jurisdiction in the current era.  The third reason is that they provide 
illustrations of both vertical (assault and affray) and horizontal (drink-driving and contravening a 
domestic violence order) criminalisation.   
My analysis of change over time in the component parts of the summary jurisdiction has 
led me to identify four chronological periods that are marked by changing social conditions: (1) 
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from colonisation to the mid-nineteenth century; (2) from the mid-nineteenth century to the end 
of the nineteenth century; (3) from the end of the nineteenth century to the final quarter of the 
twentieth century; and (4) from the final quarter of the twentieth century today. Each chapter 
follows this periodisation except for Chapter 6 — drink-driving, and Chapter 7 — CAVO. The 
reasons why drink-driving and CAVO differ are set out in the chapters themselves, but broadly 
speaking it is because different social forces were operating on the development of those areas of 
law. 
6. Outline of Thesis Question and Main Arguments 
The question that this thesis seeks to answer is: ‘How can the historical development of the 
summary jurisdiction be understood?’  In answering this question this thesis shows how the 
summary jurisdiction has been set up to regulate constructed harmful behaviours. This thesis 
argues that formalisation is a useful concept for understanding the historical development of the 
summary jurisdiction. By analysing each component of the summary jurisdiction through the 
formalisation lens this thesis exposes aspects of the development of the summary jurisdiction 
that have been under-analysed in the criminal law scholarship. The utility of the formalisation 
lens is set out in the individual chapters of this thesis. However, one general argument may be 
advanced here. Formalisation has facilitated criminalisation in two important respects. Firstly, it 
has increased the efficiency of the summary jurisdiction. Efficiency in this context is understood 
as increasing the number of convictions as well as improving the flow of matters through the 
system. Improvements in efficiency make space for further behaviours to be regulated by the 
criminal law. Secondly, formalisation legitimates the increasing use of the criminal law’s 
coercive powers via the summary form in the current era. Whether or not ‘legitimacy’ exists as a 
social phenomenon is contentious,
139
 but that is not the subject of inquiry here. Here legitimation 
is understood as the way in which the state’s adjudication of criminal liability and consequent 
exercise of coercive powers in the imposition of punishment is justified.
140
  In arguing that 
formalisation of the summary jurisdiction plays a legitimating role in the current era this thesis 
builds upon Nicola Lacey’s argument that the ‘development of ideas of individual responsibility 
for crime are responses to problems of co-ordination and legitimation faced by criminal law’, 
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and that these problems change as the social context in which they operate changes.
141
  My close 
analysis of the procedures, practices and substance of the criminal law in the summary 
jurisdiction shows that change over time can be best understood as a response to changing 
legitimation demands. This framework helps to understand why formalisation took place at 
different times and to varying degrees in the different component parts of the summary 
jurisdiction. It also helps to understand why formalisation intensified in the final quarter of the 
twentieth century, particularly since 1995, and not earlier. 
This thesis shows how criminalisation is achieved and argues that to understand the 
‘how’ it is necessary to examine each instance of it closely. The next logical question is why 
criminalisation is used as a means of regulating constructed harmful behaviours. This thesis 
suggests that to answer this second question it is necessary, again, to examine each instance of 
criminalisation closely, for as this thesis shows, the reasons why differ from offence to offence.
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Chapter 1: Procedures and Practices 
The procedural rules and practices that instruct the magistrates, and other actors, on how a matter 
is to proceed through the courts from the moment when a charge is laid to the conclusion of the 
final appeal are the backbone of the development of the summary jurisdiction. A close 
examination of the procedures and practices of the summary jurisdiction reveals that change over 
time has followed a trajectory of formalisation. As noted in the introduction, this phenomenon 
has been under-analysed in the criminal law literature. Formalisation in the summary jurisdiction 
has been distinctive from formalisation in the indictable jurisdiction largely because of the 
summary jurisdiction’s distinctive history. This chapter analyses the development of what I have 
identified as the key procedures and practices, namely, jurisdiction, appeals and sentencing, from 
colonisation to present. It shows that while the overall trajectory has been one of formalisation, it 
has, in some areas, been piecemeal, and has not taken place in a smooth and steady progression. 
There have been long periods of inertia with seismic quantitative, but not necessarily qualitative, 
shifts taking place in the final quarter of the twentieth century.  
This chapter argues that rationalisation and juridification are the most useful dimensions 
of formalisation in this context. As set out in the Introduction to this thesis, I use the concept of 
juridification as a means of understanding what I have identified as the turn to law to regulate 
practices of the magistrates and the justice personnel within the summary jurisdiction. I use the 
concept of rationalisation as a way of understanding the replacement of particular rules that 
apply to specific offences with rules of general application.  Rationalisation and juridification 
have been products, in part, of changing legitimation demands, but they have also taken place to 
improve the efficiency of the summary jurisdiction. Improved efficiency has facilitated the 
increasing use of the criminal law in summary form to regulate constructed harmful behaviours. 
Identification of this relationship between formalisation and criminalisation helps us to 
understand how criminalisation happens. It shows that criminalisation is as much a function of 
procedures and practices as it is a function of expansion of the substantive criminal law.  
 
Over the course of the second half of the nineteenth century the way in which jurisdiction 
was conceived of in NSW transformed from being allocated to magistrates on an ad hoc offence 
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by offence basis to being defined primarily in procedural terms.
1
  During this period a procedural 
mechanism for distributing accused persons between the indictable and summary jurisdictions 
developed. There was a transition from informal and porous jurisdictional boundaries to 
technical formal legal boundaries—a shift that marks it out as ‘a decisive moment in the 
modernisation of the law’.2  This is a similar pattern to that detected by Farmer in the Scottish 
context. However, while I show that the broad trajectory in NSW was similar, the ‘legal 
practices’3 of criminal jurisdiction in NSW were distinct because of the colonial context in which 
the developments took place. Farmer notes that the transformation and growth of criminal justice 
in the early nineteenth century has ‘generally been interpreted as part of the movement towards 
centralisation and formalisation’ and this is ‘said to be characteristic of the modern state’. 
However, it is the transformation of the operation of jurisdiction, he argues, that is the most 
significant feature of the rise of the summary jurisdiction.
4
  This chapter shows that while in 
NSW, as in Scotland and England, the formalisation process was underway by the middle 
decades of the nineteenth century,
5
 the period from the final quarter of the twentieth century 
onwards is the crucial period for understanding the summary jurisdiction in the current era. To 
make sense of this complex process this chapter traces the reorganisation of the courts and the 
criminal law through procedural rules and practices from colonisation to the current era.  
Procedures and Practices of Jurisdiction 
From Colonisation to the Mid-Nineteenth Century 
The convict colony of NSW inherited the criminal justice institutions of England but they were 
modified to meet the ‘exigencies of the situation’.6  For the first four decades two courts operated 
in the penal system: the Court of Criminal Jurisdiction for more serious offences (which operated 
as a military tribunal), and the Bench of Magistrates for less serious offences. The nature of 
magisterial power and the way in which it was exercised is examined in Chapter 3, but for 
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present purposes it is important to note that the borders between the jurisdictions were porous 
and magistrates frequently exceeded their jurisdiction.
7
 
In the decades leading up to responsible government in 1856, the Imperial government 
transplanted to NSW a criminal justice system from England that was premised on territorial 
(that is, geographic) jurisdiction.
8
 But the local legal practices that formed the basis of territorial 
jurisdiction in England were not present in the NSW colony, which was occupied by Aboriginal 
peoples with laws and customs that were unfamiliar to the colonising power.
9
 In this context 
magistrates were central to the construction of the link between England’s declaration of 
jurisdiction over NSW and the actual exercise of the authority of the English criminal law. This 
link was forged, in part, through the exercise of summary jurisdiction, at least in relation to 
convicts and free settlers.
10
 From the inception of colonisation until well into the second half of 
the nineteenth century ‘the magistracy was the closest everyday link between the colonial 
communities and the law.’11 
In contrast to England, the NSW colony employed an expanded summary jurisdiction as 
a tool of colonisation to maintain order amongst certain ‘problem’ groups that were perceived as 
a potential threat, such as convicts. Power to finalise matters summarily was conferred on 
magistrates on an ad hoc basis by the statute creating the offence. Some statutes contained 
procedures for magistrates to follow, others were silent. The result was inconsistency and 
confusion.  
One of the earliest uses of the term ‘summary jurisdiction’ was in 1823 when the Courts 
of Quarter Sessions were established. These courts were presided over by a bench of magistrates 
until 1858 when magistrates were replaced with judges and it became a court where criminal 
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matters proceeded on indictment.
12
 When Courts of Quarter Sessions opened in 1824 they were 
vested with ‘power and authority in a summary way to take cognizance of all crimes and 
misdemeanours not punishable with death, which have been or shall be committed by any 
[convicts]…whose sentences shall not have expired or been remitted…’ (emphasis added).13 
Outside of sessions, however, magistrates heard and determined a range of minor civil and 
criminal matters even though legal authority to do so had been omitted from the First Charter of 
Justice. This was remedied in 1825 when an Act was passed to create Courts of Petty Sessions 
and to confer the same power upon a single magistrate over convicts as was exercised by the 
Courts of Quarter Sessions.
14
 Between 1823 and 1850, faced with a shortage of magistrates, the 
colonial government increasingly conferred the power to hear and determine charges relating to 
persons other than convicts in a summary way upon one magistrate sitting alone instead of 
requiring the presence of two or more, as was the case in England. This was a significant dilution 
of the protection against the arbitrary exercise of power traditionally afforded by using more than 
one magistrate. 
Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Turn of the Twentieth Century 
In 1856 responsible self-government was established in NSW. Between the mid-nineteenth 
century and the turn of the twentieth century a procedural mechanism emerged — what I call the 
‘reclassification mechanism’ — for the administrative distribution of offenders between the 
indictable and summary jurisdictions. This mechanism achieved vertical criminalisation. Two 
pieces of legislation provide bookends for this period. The Juvenile Offenders Act 1847 (UK), 
which was adopted in NSW in 1850, marks the beginning of the transition.
15
 At the other end is 
the Justices Act 1902 (NSW) which consolidated summary criminal procedure. These Acts 
represent two interrelated strands of legislative change: a reorganisation of the substantive 
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criminal law around the emerging procedural notion of jurisdiction; and the regularisation and 
formalisation of summary procedures through rules of ‘increasingly general application’.16 
NSW, as a penal colony, employed a vastly expanded summary jurisdiction to control the 
convict ‘problem’ group. It readily followed developments in England by adopting the summary 
form of disposition for juveniles charged with minor larcenies and, in 1847, summary 
jurisdiction was extended to adult free settlers charged with minor larcenies.
17
 The motivation for 
this extension of the use of the criminal law in summary form, both in England and in NSW, was 
to improve the speed and efficacy of the criminal law, which, it was believed, would make it a 
more effective tool for maintaining order. The British Parliament had become concerned about 
the corrupting influence of imprisonment upon young people charged with criminal offences
18
 
and there were similar concerns in the NSW colony.
19
 Permitting minor larcenies committed by 
juveniles to be finalised summarily by magistrates would, it was argued, permit speedier disposal 
of charges, increase rates of conviction, and reduce the amount of time offenders spent in 
prison.
20
 Ironically, prior to this expansion, as Thomas Sweeney’s work demonstrates, the 
majority of juveniles in prison in England had been convicted summarily.
21
 Nevertheless the 
adoption of the Juvenile Offenders Act 1847 (UK) in NSW coincided with a concern about 
‘Sydney’s young vagrants — popularly known as “street Arabs”’.22 Whether or not it achieved 
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its desired purpose, law reformers had recognised the potential of the summary criminal 
jurisdiction to regulate behaviours that had been constructed as harmful.  
NSW was less hostile to the summary form than England, perhaps because of a 
combination of the extensive use of summary jurisdiction historically and the exigencies of 
establishing order in the colony.
23
 Unlike in England, where such changes were vigorously 
debated,
24
 in NSW the new summary regime for juveniles was adopted without hesitation and 
extended to adult free settlers a mere two years later in 1852.
25
 Breaking the usual pattern of the 
NSW legislature following English developments, NSW extended summary jurisdiction to adults 
charged with larceny of goods valued up to 5 shillings three years earlier than England did 
because it was thought ‘so reasonable that it would hardly be objectionable.’26  
It is tempting to assume that the summary form was easily introduced in NSW because it 
was seen as a forum for convicts and criminals who were less deserving of procedural 
protections. However, there is a paucity of evidence that this was so. In the period between 
1788–1823, both settlers and convicts alike were dealt with summarily before the bench of 
magistrates. Trial by jury was not introduced until 1828.
27
 As legal historian Alex Castles 
explains ‘In theory at least, under the old court system [1788–1823], convicts and freemen were 
dealt with in the same fashion as far as the administration of the criminal law was concerned.’28 
In 1823 a Supreme Court was established and from that date onwards the NSW courts took on a 
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form that more closely resembled the courts in England.
29
 It appears to be this background of the 
penal nature of the colony that provided fertile soil for the expansion of the summary jurisdiction 
in the mid-nineteenth century, rather than a belief that certain groups deserved less protection 
from the exercise of state power. 
The English and NSW iterations of the Juvenile Offenders Act contained the prototype of 
a procedural mechanism — the reclassification mechanism — for distributing cases between the 
jurisdictions that has persisted into the current era. The Acts permitted simple larcenies of goods 
up to a certain value to be finalised summarily unless the offender ‘object[s] to the case being 
summarily disposed of…’.30 This procedural reclassification mechanism formed the basis of 
what is termed elsewhere the ‘administratisation’31 of the criminal law. It created a category of 
offences that are triable either summarily or on indictment, namely, those offences that were 
formerly triable on indictment but which have been reclassified as capable of being finalised 
summarily by magistrates. Woods refers to these offences as an ‘elective’ or ‘hybrid’ category of 
offences.
32
 After 1995 they became known as ‘table offences’. To avoid confusion I prefer the 
term ‘triable either way’, which has been adopted in the criminal law literature.33 This manner of 
reclassifying indictable offences in order to redistribute them between jurisdictions is a defining 
feature of the NSW criminal justice system in the current era.
34
  In NSW, as in England and 
Scotland,
35
 territory remained important because the jurisdiction of the various Courts is tied to 
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offences committed within certain geographical areas. However, by the end of  the nineteenth 
century in NSW an administrative distribution of offenders was emerging as the predominant 
means by which authority in the criminal law was organized.  
At the same time as jurisdiction was being placed on a more formal footing over the 
second half of the nineteenth century in NSW, the legislature began to formalise the manner in 
which summary defended hearings were to be conducted and to mould the disparate procedures 
spread across numerous statutes into rules of general application. This promoted uniformity of 
practice amongst magistrates. Formalisation of this ‘informal’ summary form began in 1848 
when the British Parliament passed a series of three Acts known as the Jervis’ Acts after their 
proponent, Sir John Jervis.
36
 These Acts were adopted in the NSW colony and the second in the 
series, dealing with the summary jurisdiction of Justices,
37
 became known in NSW as the 
Justices Act 1850 (NSW) (the ‘Justices Act 1850’).38 Like the Jervis Acts, the Justices Act 1850 
consolidated some procedural rules but left many untouched and, again, did not strive for 
consolidation.
39
  As Farmer explains, the Jervis Acts mark the beginning of a period in which the 
procedure in magistrates’ courts was formalised to ‘facilitate prosecution and conviction’.40 In 
NSW they formed a foundation for the increasing formalisation of summary hearing procedure.  
A good example of how this was achieved was the stipulation that defended summary 
hearings were to be conducted by the examination and cross-examination of witnesses as 
opposed to being conducted ‘on the papers’.41 This provided the foundation for increasing 
formalisation with the evolution of increasingly complex rules of evidence and the greater 
involvement of lawyers in summary proceedings in the late twentieth century. Hearing procedure 
was further clarified in 1853 when Parliament enacted a provision to regulate summary 
proceedings which provided that ‘the examination and cross-examination of witnesses and the 
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right of addressing such Justices upon the case in reply or otherwise be in accordance with that 
of the Supreme Court upon the trial of an issue of fact in an action at law’ (emphasis added).42 
The phrase ‘in an action at law’ served to distinguish summary hearing procedure, which was to 
be conducted through the oral testimony of witnesses, from actions in equity, which were 
conducted on the basis of affidavits.
43
 By 1848 both the prosecution and defence were permitted 
to be represented by counsel,
44
 but while counsel could examine witnesses, they were precluded 
from making ‘any observation in reply upon the evidence’.45  
The provisions stipulating the form of summary hearings were consolidated in 1902,
46
 
but they were not altered and have remained largely the same to this day with two notable 
subsequent developments. The first was an amendment in 1883 to permit counsel to make ‘full 
answer’ to the opposing case;47 and the second, introduced in 2001, was that summary defended 
hearings were to be called ‘trials’.48 The latter change is more than a matter of mere 
nomenclature. It reflects both the reality of the increasing formalisation of summary hearings and 
the desire of magistrates for greater status within the legal profession, a point which is explored 
in Chapter 3. Indeed, in a prosecution appeal from the dismissal of charges by a magistrate in 
2012, Justice Johnson of the Supreme Court of NSW, explicitly equated trials before magistrates 
with trials in the higher courts, in particular trials by judge alone. After citing authorities on the 
nature of the ‘role of the Judge in a jury criminal trial’, His Honour said ‘I consider that they are 
equally applicable to Magistrates hearing and determining criminal proceedings in the Local 
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Court, whether defended hearings or sentence proceedings following a plea of guilty.’49  This is 
an indication of the extent of the formalisation of the summary jurisdiction in the current era. 
The next part of this discussion shows how the practices of jurisdiction transformed in 
NSW from ad hoc provisions attached to particular offences into a procedural mechanism of 
general application governing the allocation of offences between the summary and indictable 
jurisdictions (the ‘jurisdictional allocation of offences’), which facilitated increasing vertical 
criminalisation. 
The Criminal Law Amendment Act 1883 (NSW) (‘the 1883 Act’) represents a defining 
moment in the emergence of the modern criminal law in NSW,
50
 and a stepping stone towards 
the development of a summary jurisdiction defined in formal procedural terms. A marker of its 
modernity was its categorisation of offences into ‘families’.51 Most of these families had two 
divisions: offences punishable on indictment; and offences ‘punishable by justices’.52 Offences 
punishable by justices fell into two categories. The first category contained offences that could 
be finalised summarily without the consent of the accused, such as possession of the skin of a 
stolen animal.
53
  Justices were not required to finalise these offences, but if they chose to, they 
could do so without the accused’s consent.54 The historical material shows that while they could 
finalise these matters, magistrates frequently committed them for trial on indictment. This was a 
cause of frustration to the legislature which was concerned that the limited resources of the 
Courts of Quarter Sessions were being wasted on trivial matters. The second category contained 
offences that could be finalised summarily with the consent of the accused.
55
  Offences in the 
first category (without consent) were usually less serious than those in the second category and 
this justified abrogation of the consent requirement. In the 1883 Act this second category (with 
consent) was restricted to simple larcenies (‘or an offence punishable as simple larceny’). This 
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category preserved the accused’s choice of jurisdiction and was considered to be one of the 
greatest merits of the Bill because of its potential to increase efficiency and decrease cost.
56
  
The 1883 Act captures a moment of transition from conferring summary jurisdiction 
upon justices on an offence by offence basis to organising jurisdiction by means of a procedural 
mechanism, and demarcating the boundary between the summary and indictable jurisdictions 
with reference to a generally applicable maximum penalty. Section 150, discussed above, was an 
early step in this transition. It was the first provision of general application that reclassified 
formerly indictable offences as triable summarily. It applied generally to simple larcenies (‘or an 
offence punishable as simple larceny’), and any such offence finalised summarily was 
punishable by a maximum penalty of 6 months imprisonment (or 3 months for offenders under 
sixteen years of age).
57
  This method of organisation cuts across the ‘offence family’ method of 
organising the substantive criminal law by creating a summary legal space with a boundary 
demarcated by a maximum sentencing jurisdiction. It is a defining feature of the criminal justice 
system in the current era. 
However, while the 1883 Act contained some provisions of general application,
58
 it did 
not completely consolidate and rationalise summary procedure. An example of the lack of 
rationalisation is the absence of differentiation between the penalties that could be imposed for 
without consent summary offences and those that required consent. For instance, both common 
assault and aggravated assault could be finalised summarily without the consent of the accused. 
The former carried a maximum penalty of three months’ imprisonment or a fine of ten pounds 
and the latter carried a maximum penalty of six months’ imprisonment or a fine of twenty 
pounds.
59
 By contrast, petty larceny — a with consent summary offence — carried a maximum 
penalty of six months’ imprisonment (or 3 months for offenders under sixteen years of age).60  
Thus the maximum penalty for aggravated assault (a without consent offence) was the same as 
for petty larceny (a with consent summary offence).  
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A good example of the lack of consolidation is that the 1883 Act gave justices the choice 
of proceeding ‘in a summary way’ under the Justices Act 1850 (NSW), the ‘present Act’, or ‘in 
such other manner as shall be directed by any Act hereafter passed for the like purpose … as if 
the same were incorporated in this Act.’61 Because the 1883 Act was never intended to codify the 
criminal law,
62
 many offences that were capable of being finalised by justices remained in other 
statutes. This left a residue of confusion. There were also many statutory offences that were 
silent as to the manner of disposition. Magistrates were required to commit such matters for trial 
on indictment. The legislature put a halt to this practice through an amendment enacted in 1900 
which provided that where an Act did not specifically state how the offence was to be tried, it 
was to be ‘dealt with by the justices summarily’ unless it was either ‘treason, felony, or 
misdemeanour.’63  This amendment was expressly designed to address ‘the frequent complaints 
that are made in both the district courts and the Supreme Court of the many cases that are sent up 
for trial that should have been dealt with summarily by the magistrates.’64  It effected a 
significant expansion of summary jurisdiction and represents a reorientation of the criminal 
justice system away from the jury trial and towards summary disposition. Together with the 
amendments introduced in 1891 and provisions relating to appeals, both of which are discussed 
below, the 1900 amendments laid the foundation for the subsequent consolidation of procedures 
relating to justices in the Justices Act 1902 (NSW).  
Two amendments to the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1883 (NSW) introduced in 1891 
are significant in the development of the summary jurisdiction because they consolidated the 
foundation upon which jurisdiction is conceived of in the current era. In the first of these 
amendments, Parliament used the reclassification mechanism to reclassify indictable offences 
other than simple larcenies as triable either way. The Criminal Law and Evidence Amendment 
Act 1891 (NSW)
65
 detached the reclassification mechanism from simple larceny and re-enacted it 
as a provision that applied generally to offences that Parliament wished to reclassify. These 
became with consent summary offences. The extension of summary jurisdiction was justified on 
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the grounds that a ‘great saving to the country would result’, witnesses would be spared the time 
and expense of attending two courts, and ‘the prisoner would not be unnecessarily deprived of 
his liberty in awaiting trial.’66  After the 1891 amendment, to reclassify indictable offences as 
triable either way, Parliament simply had to add offences to the list in the section containing the 
reclassification mechanism.
67
 This was the prototype of the ‘Table System’ that was introduced 
in 1995 and is currently used to organise the jurisdictional allocation of offences. 
The second significant amendment introduced in 1891 expanded the summary legal space 
created by s 150 of the 1883 Act (simple larcenies) that was discussed above. It created a 
maximum summary sentencing jurisdiction for a cluster of offences by applying the maximum 
penalty for simple larcenies to several additional offences, namely, ‘attempting to commit 
suicide[;] …stealing from the person of another[;] …’ and all offences finalised summarily by 
justices pursuant to the reclassification mechanism where the value of the property did not 
exceed £20.
68
 The maximum penalty was 6 months imprisonment (3 months for offenders under 
16). It also added an alternative penalty of a fine of £20 (£10 for offenders under 16).
69
 These 
provisions of general application were carried over into the Crimes Act,
70
 which continues to 
contain the core of the substantive criminal law in the current era.  
From the Turn of the Twentieth Century to the Final Quarter of the Twentieth Century 
A century of near inertia in the formalisation of jurisdictional practices followed the 1891 
amendments, but the triable either way category of offences was expanded twice: once in 1924 
and again in 1974. In 1924, a small number of offences were reclassified as with consent 
summary offences (34 in total)
71
 and the maximum summary sentencing jurisdiction for with 
consent offences was increased from six to 12 months imprisonment.
72
 By 1974, the without 
consent summary offences (except for common and aggravated assault, which are discussed in 
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Chapter 5) had been consolidated into one provision so that the Crimes Act contained two 
sections for reclassified offences: s 476 for offences that were triable summarily with the consent 
of the accused; and s 501 for offences that were triable summarily without the consent of the 
accused. The High Court considered the effect of s 501 in 1936. The case turned on the 
distinction between felonies and misdemeanours.
73
 The distinction gradually fell into disuse and 
was abolished in 1999.
74
   
The NSW government expanded the with consent category again in 1974.
75
  The 
magnitude of the increase in this category of triable either way offences over the course of the 
twentieth century up to 1974 — which is modest when compared with what happened after 1995 
— is clear from the numbers:  containing 15 offences in 1900; approximately 49 in 1924; and 
after the 1974 amendments ‘nearly 70’.76  Across the same period the maximum sentencing 
jurisdiction for with consent summary offences increased from six months in 1891 to twelve 
months in 1924, and to two years in 1974,
77
 where it has remained (although the maximum 
period for cumulative sentences was increased from three years in 1999 to five years in 2003).
78
  
By contrast, the without consent category, which was small — containing approximately 17 
offences — was expanded only marginally in 1974 by increasing the monetary value of the 
property that was the subject of the charges. The maximum sentencing jurisdiction for without 
consent offences remained at twelve months imprisonment.  
How was it possible for Parliament to undertake this expansion of the triable either way 
category of offences and the four-fold increase in summary sentencing jurisdiction?  Part of the 
answer lies in the response of the legal profession to the changing legitimation demands raised 
by the expansion. The Criminal Law Committee, which was commissioned to consider the 
government’s reform proposals in 1973 stated that the ‘consent of the Bar to these 
recommendations is conditioned on the provision of an adequate legal aid scheme in magistrates’ 
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courts’.79  The expansion of legal aid that took place from the mid-1970s (but subsequent to the 
expansion of summary jurisdiction) is discussed in Chapter 3. It is likely that another part of the 
answer lies in the changing legitimation demands arising from the transformation of penal 
practices that took place across the twentieth century. Corporal punishment in the form of 
whipping (or flogging) had largely fallen into disuse by the 1920s, although it was not removed 
from the Crimes Act until 1974.
80
 Similarly, capital punishment ceased in NSW in the mid-
twentieth century, although it remained in the Crimes Act until 1985.
81
 The regulatory fine began 
to appear in the first half of the twentieth century and expanded massively as a penalty in the 
inter-war period.
82
  Scholars attribute the rise of the fine to the loss of faith in the correctional 
capacity of short-terms of imprisonment.
83
  In the post-war period probation (which was first 
introduced in 1894)
84
 and parole began to professionalise,
85
 and the development of non-
custodial punishments such as periodic detention and community service orders facilitated the 
‘non-carceral management of offenders’.86  In this penal context, by 1974 magistrates had a 
larger range of non-custodial penalties available to them than in the early decades of the 
twentieth century, which, together with the extension of legal aid, produced conditions that made 
an expansion of the summary jurisdiction possible. 
From the Final Quarter of the Twentieth Century to Present 
The formalisation of the summary jurisdiction intensified in the final quarter of the twentieth 
century as a result of a legitimacy crisis in the criminal justice system. This crisis precipitated 
dramatic changes to legal practices and procedure in a number of the component parts of the 
summary jurisdiction. There was a structural reorganisation of criminal law institutions, a further 
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rationalisation of the jurisdictional allocation of offences, and a reassignment of control over the 
distribution of offences between the summary and indictable jurisdictions between the 
prosecution and defence. While the central organising reclassification mechanism remained the 
same, these developments constituted a significant renovation of the criminal justice system after 
a century of near-inertia. A small change in emphasis in the allocation of jurisdiction radically 
altered the balance of power between the actors and further reoriented the criminal justice system 
away from the jury trial and towards summary disposition. For ‘reasons of administrative 
efficiency’ the Local Court Act 2007 (NSW) replaced the 148 separately constituted Local 
Courts with one Local Court ‘that sits in locations across the state’,87 as does the Crown Court in 
UK. 
In 1981, under the stewardship of the then recently appointed Chief Magistrate Briese, 
the magistracy — after a considerable period of resistance to change — unanimously voted to 
push for independence from the Public Service.
88
 (For a more detailed history see Chapter 2). 
Shortly afterwards Parliament granted the magistracy independence under the Local Courts Act 
1982 (NSW). There then ensued a remarkable sequence of events that precipitated sweeping 
reforms to the entire criminal justice system. The former Chief Stipendiary Magistrate and 
Chairman of the magistracy under the Public Service, Murray Farquhar, was convicted of 
perverting the course of justice and sentenced to four years imprisonment.
89
 A short time later 
Justice Lionel Murphy of the High Court was charged with attempting to pervert the course of 
justice as was Judge John Foord, a NSW District Court Judge.
90
 Both Murphy and Foord were 
acquitted, but these scandals were followed by repeated revelations over the next two decades of 
widespread police corruption, first in Queensland, and then in New South Wales.
91
 In 1986 the 
then opposition leader, Nick Greiner, described New South Wales as being on the ‘brink of a 
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constitutional crisis of the first order.’92  Political hyperbole notwithstanding, there was a need to 
restore public confidence in the criminal justice system.
93
  
To this end Parliament enacted the Judicial Officers Act 1986 (NSW), which granted 
tenure to magistrates for the first time and provided the same mechanism for their removal from 
office as judicial officers, namely, an address to both houses of Parliament.
94
 This Act also 
ensured that magistrates enjoyed the same immunities that judicial officers enjoy at common 
law.
95
 In the same year another bundle of reforms created the ODPP giving the prosecution 
formal independence from the executive. When first enacted, the Director of Public Prosecutions 
Act 1986 (NSW) gave the Director tenure for life, subject only to removal by the Governor for 
‘incapacity, incompetence or misbehaviour’, or if convicted of a criminal offence punishable by 
12 months imprisonment or more.
96
 In 2007 life tenure was replaced with a fixed term 
appointment of ten years.
97
 Also, the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) (‘CPA’) was 
introduced to consolidate summary and indictable procedure and to separate procedural 
provisions from the substantive criminal law.
98
 Placing these developments in a wider context, 
during the same period the system of civil justice in NSW (as in England) had also reached a 
state of crisis. Excessive focus on the trial was diagnosed as one of the main causes of delays, 
which precipitated sweeping reforms, such as the introduction of case management, to improve 
access to justice in the civil jurisdiction during the ensuing decades.
99
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Armed with evidence of inefficiency and expense in the criminal justice system, in 1995 
the NSW government undertook further significant procedural and institutional reforms. Concern 
about increasing delays in the criminal justice system had been mounting since the late 1970s. In 
late 1987 a report of the NSW Law Reform Commission (‘NSWLRC’) exposed inordinate 
delays within the criminal justice system.
100
 It quoted from a 1975 English report that 
acknowledged the reality of finite resources and characterised the solution as a choice between 
due process and timely resolution of charges: 
In the last analysis, society has to choose between two conflicting aims. On the one hand is the 
existing right of the citizen to be tried by a judge and jury… On the other is the right, especially 
important to anyone defending a serious charge, to be tried as soon as possible. These two 
requirements have to be met with resources which are finite and cannot be further expanded 
without limit.
101
 
In 1989 the NSW Attorney-General proposed that the summary jurisdiction be expanded ‘as a 
measure to reduce delays in criminal trials’.102 In 1992 the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and 
Research (‘BOCSAR’) revealed that a ‘surprising’ proportion of penalties imposed in the District 
Court were within the sentencing jurisdiction of magistrates.
103
 For example, more than 85 per 
cent of penalties imposed for assault were within the summary sentencing jurisdiction, which, as 
discussed above, by that time, had increased to two years imprisonment.
104
 This meant that those 
offences could have remained and been finalised in the Local Court instead of being committed 
to the District Court. Thus, the economic logic of shifting those offences from the slower and 
more expensive District Court into the summary jurisdiction was inescapable. In 1995, with a 
view to making ‘considerable savings…to the administration of justice’,105 the government 
further rationalised the mechanism for reclassifying indictable offences as triable either way by 
introducing the ‘Table System’ into the CPA.  
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As noted in the Introduction, the Table System has been recognised as ‘in part, a 
diminution of access to trial on indictment and hence trial by jury’,106 but what has not been 
remarked upon is how it has facilitated vertical criminalisation and redistributed the power 
amongst the actors of the summary jurisdiction. Part III of this thesis examines the impact of the 
Table System on criminalisation in detail; but in order to grasp the significance of the change it 
is important to examine the 1995 procedural amendments closely. Under the Table System 
indictable offences punishable by up to ten years imprisonment (sometimes more) are divided 
into two tables: Table 1 and Table 2.
107
 Section 260 of the CPA provides that Table 1 offences 
must be finalised summarily unless either the prosecutor or the person charged elects to have the 
matter dealt with on indictment.
108
  (Table 1 roughly equates to the former with consent category 
of triable either way offences, but with important changes of emphasis.)  Section 260 of the CPA 
further provides that Table 2 offences must be finalised summarily unless the prosecutor elects 
for a trial on indictment.
109
 (Table 2 roughly equates to the former without consent category of 
triable either way offences, but again, with important changes of emphasis.)  As can be seen, the 
accused has no choice of jurisdiction for Table 2 offences, and because the legislature expanded 
this category of offences when the Table System was introduced, it has effectively restricted 
defendants’ access to trial by jury. Another way to look at Table 2 offences, however, is that if 
the prosecution wishes to have access to a higher penalty than the two year maximum summary 
sentencing jurisdiction, the accused must have access to a jury trial. Today there are hundreds of 
offences in both Tables 1 and 2, which, when compared with the numbers in 1974 set out above, 
shows the magnitude of the change that the Table System wrought on the summary jurisdiction. 
In addition to increasing the number of offences in the summary jurisdiction the Table 
System effected a significant increase in prosecutorial power, and a marginal ‘in principle’ 
increase in defence power. Prior to the introduction of Table 2, the prosecution had no direct 
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power to choose the jurisdiction in which a without consent offence could be finalised—the 
discretion to commit for trial lay with the magistrate. Table 1 has devolved the power to choose 
jurisdiction from the magistrate to both the prosecution and defence. In other words, prior to the 
introduction of Table 1, a magistrate could commit a with consent matter for trial even if the 
accused person consented to summary disposition and the prosecution had no direct power to 
choose jurisdiction.
110
 After the introduction of Table 1 the magistrate no longer had a say in the 
question of jurisdiction. The rationale for this reconfiguration of power was that the parties, who 
are in possession of all of the relevant information, are in the best position to decide which 
jurisdiction is most appropriate.
111
  I describe the increase in defence power as ‘in principle’ 
because in practice defendants rarely exercise the option to elect to have a trial on indictment.
112
 
This is largely because of the in-built incentives for both parties to resolve the matter in the 
summary jurisdiction, such as the presumption of summary disposition in s 260 of the CPA, the 
lower maximum penalties in the Local Court, and the sentencing discount for a plea of guilty.
113
 
However, the election is a useful bargaining chip in the charge negotiation process, a topic to 
which I return in Chapter 3. 
During the twentieth century the requirement of obtaining the defendant’s consent to 
summary jurisdiction had come to be regarded as a protection of the defendant’s ‘right’ to a jury 
trial (which was a constitutional right in England, but not in NSW for state offences).
114
 For 
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example, in 1974 the NSW government defended its proposed expansion of the category of 
offences that could be finalised summarily with the consent of the accused by emphasising that 
‘the interests of the accused, including his right to trial by jury, cannot be said to be prejudiced, 
because he cannot be dealt with summarily except with his consent.’115 This perspective on the 
consent requirement, which was in fact originally designed to increase the efficiency of the 
criminal justice system in order to facilitate criminalisation, illustrates the rise to prominence of 
ideas of due process protections for defendants in the second half of the twentieth century. This 
is why its removal under the Table System in 1995 was seen as further erosion of access to jury 
trial for defendants. In practice, of course, there are many structural disincentives to electing a 
jury trial (as mentioned above) suggesting that for the defendant it is not a free choice. It is also 
possible for Parliament to remove or restrict the defendant’s ability to elect to have a jury trial by 
reclassifying strictly indictable and Table 1 offences as Table 2 offences, by placing newly 
enacted offences into Table 2. 
To understand how the jurisdictional organisation of criminal offences described above 
operates in the current era it is useful to think visually. Figure 1 (below) presents a two-
dimensional ‘snapshot’ of how jurisdictional arrangements might look at a particular moment in 
time in the post-1995 era. Where the boundaries between each jurisdiction were previously 
uncertain, they are now certain; but jurisdiction has become contestable and fungible for triable 
either way offences. Each category of offence depicted in the diagram is increasing (or 
decreasing) in size over time as new offences are enacted and/or reclassified, or offences are 
moved out of the courts, for example via the infringement notice system. 
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Figure 1 Snapshot of the Criminal Justice System in the post-1995 era (not drawn to scale) 
How strictly indictable offences are identified for reclassification is opaque. For more 
than a decade after the introduction of the Table System in 1995, reclassification occurred 
haphazardly as particular issues relating to the criminal law came before Parliament. In 2010 the 
NSW Sentencing Council — in a review of the sentencing jurisdiction of the Local Court — 
recommended that a comprehensive review of the Crimes Act be conducted to identify offences 
that ought to be reclassified from strictly indictable to triable either way.
116
 The Department of 
Justice conducted the review in partnership with the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and 
Research. Offences were identified for reclassification if they were receiving actual penalties in 
the District Court that were within the sentencing jurisdiction of the Local Court.
117
 In August 
2016 the government reclassified four further offences as a result of this review.
118
 It is not clear 
whether this process is now complete.  
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There is no quantitative evidence on the impact of the table system on the workload of 
the summary jurisdiction, but the Chief Magistrate reports that the introduction of Table 1 
significantly increased the Local Court’s workload, which increased overall (that is, not only by 
virtue of the introduction of Table 1) by approximately 56 per cent between 1995 and 2008.
119
 
While the total number of table matters finalised summarily is tiny in comparison with the major 
summary offence categories such as traffic offences and breach of justice orders, because of the 
increasing complexity and seriousness of table offences, there is anecdotal evidence to suggest 
that they are consuming more court time.
120
  
It is tempting to characterise the introduction of the Table System as achieving the 
‘massification’121 of criminalisation because it transferred hundreds of offences to the summary 
jurisdiction that were previously strictly indictable, and numerous triable either way offences 
have been created subsequently. David Brown recently began the task of quantifying the number 
of new offences created in NSW by examining legislation enacted in 2008. In that year alone, 
Parliament created 302 new offences.
122
  For some offences, such as affray (which is examined 
in Chapter 5), reclassification has facilitated and increased criminalisation by circumventing 
impediments to securing convictions in the higher courts. However, many offences in Tables 1 
and 2 are charged infrequently. For example, in 2002, s 60E was inserted into Crimes Act 
creating an offence of assault, stalking, harassment or intimidation of a student or teacher at a 
school. Subsection (1) covers such instances where there has been no actual assault. It is 
punishable by five years’ imprisonment and is a Table 2 offence. Between 2003 and 2014 the 
number of such charges finalised summarily averaged 11 per year. To put this in context, the 
total number of charges finalised in the Local Court in 2014 was 198,629. This shows that to 
understand criminalisation (and whether or not ‘overcriminalisation’ is taking place) it is not 
enough merely to count substantive offences. It is also necessary to look at change over time to 
procedures and practices, and to the roles played by the actors and enforcement practices, topics 
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that I examine in detail in Part II in relation to actors and Part III in relation to substantive 
offences.  Thus, while formalisation of the procedures and practices of jurisdiction intensified in 
the final quarter of the twentieth century, there was also continuity with earlier periods because it 
employed tools that had been developed in 1847. The next part of this chapter examines how the 
development of an organized system of appeals has contributed to the formalisation of the 
summary jurisdiction. 
Evolution of the System of Appeals from the NSW Summary Jurisdiction 
At the same time as a more formal understanding of jurisdiction and summary hearing procedure 
was emerging the system of appeals from decisions of magistrates was being formalised. The 
impact of the formalisation of appeals on the jury trial has been noted in the criminal law 
literature,
123
 but the development of appeals in the summary jurisdiction was a distinct process 
and has not been remarked upon.  The process was complex because the power of the higher 
courts to ‘review’ the decisions of magistrates had four overlapping sources. The first was the 
system of judicial review pursuant to the common law prerogative writs — what I will call 
‘common law judicial review’. The second was a statutory system of judicial review that 
partially replaced the common law prerogative writs — what I will call ‘statutory judicial 
review’. The third was a statutory mechanism that empowered the parties to request the 
magistrate to state a case to the Supreme Court on a question of law — what I will call the ‘case-
stated mechanism’. Labels become messy in relation to the case-stated mechanism because in the 
second half of the twentieth century Parliament re-named it a ‘right to appeal on a point of law’, 
so technically it became a statutory appeal. The fourth source of power was a statutory right of 
appeal that initially was attached to some (not all) statutory offences but which was replaced 
over time with a statutory right of appeal that applied generally to all offences within certain 
specified categories — what I will call ‘statutory appeals’.  Overall, for ease of reference, I will 
call the sum total of these diverse powers a ‘system of appeals’.  
My analysis of the development of the system of appeals from the summary jurisdiction 
suggests that as ‘solemn’ (indictable) procedure became more complex, sophisticated and 
formalised, so too did summary procedure, with the result that the two jurisdictions have come 
into closer alignment. This contrasts with Farmer’s observation of Scotland in the second half of 
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the nineteenth century. At that time, when a summary jurisdiction was emerging, as solemn 
procedure was becoming more solemn, summary procedure was ‘becoming increasingly 
estranged from the traditional form’.124  In NSW, as Parliament has turned increasingly to the 
criminal law in summary form to regulate harmful behaviours, changing legitimation demands 
have produced an increasingly formalised system of appeals.  
By contrast with the jury trial, which was subjected to appeals only in 1912 (1907 in the 
UK),
125
 decisions by magistrates have been subjected to two parallel systems of oversight (which 
evolved into four, as set out above), since the fourteenth century, with a brief interlude during the 
early years of the NSW colony. The reason for greater vigilance with decisions of magistrates is 
a historical distrust of the summary form: 
The execution of the powers confided to justices of the peace in summary convictions is generally 
watched by the Courts with jealousy, such summary convictions being derogatory to the liberty of 
the subject; and all powers given in restraint of liberty must be strictly pursued. (Original 
emphasis)126  
For this reason the system of appeals that developed from the summary jurisdiction is distinct 
from that in the higher courts. The two mechanisms were: common law judicial review,
127
 and 
statutory appeals. These mechanisms have enabled the superior courts to apply common law 
principles to the statutory-based summary jurisdiction thereby contributing to its formalisation. 
As is well-known, rights of appeal do not exist at common law. Prior to the advent of a statutory 
system of appeals in the twentieth century in the higher courts, jury trials were, as David Bentley 
has pointed out, ‘wholly deficient’ by today’s standards.128 While systems of oversight of 
magistrates have existed for hundreds of years, the system of appeals that emerged from the mid-
nineteenth century onwards has wrought a similar, albeit distinct, transformation upon summary 
trial and sentencing procedure to that undergone in the jury trial. 
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Judicial Review through the Common Law Prerogative Writs 
The use of judicial review of the decisions of magistrates (both common law and statutory) has 
declined over time as the boundaries between summary and indictable jurisdiction have become 
more certain. Judicial review of the decisions of magistrates by means of the common law 
prerogative writs arose out of the void left by the abolition of the Star Chamber and was, 
according to Wade and Forsyth, the birthplace of modern administrative law.
129
Although the 
prerogative writs were available at common law, controversially, in the eighteenth century, 
individual statutes conferring summary jurisdiction upon magistrates frequently removed this 
option of review.
130
 Rosemary Pattenden explains that Parliament did this ‘to prevent 
interference by the King’s Bench with the work of justices.’131 She characterises subsequent 
changes to the law of certiorari in England as a battle between Parliament and the judiciary. To 
circumvent this ‘ousting’ of certiorari, the courts drew a ‘distinction between errors of law on the 
[face of] the record and errors of law going to jurisdiction.’132 In response the British Parliament 
reduced the scope of certiorari in this context through the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1848 
(UK)
133
 by ‘giving the inferior courts extensive powers of amendment, and by reducing the 
amount of information which had to be included in the record.’134 Until 1848, inferior courts had 
been required to record the entirety of the evidence on the face of the record. This enabled 
superior courts to identify errors easily ‘within the four corners of the record removed on 
certiorari.’135 However, the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1848 (UK)136 provided, ‘as the sufficient 
record of all summary convictions, a common form which did not include any statement of the 
evidence for the conviction.’137 As the Privy Council said in R v Nat Bell Liquors Ltd138, 
thereafter ‘the face of the record “spoke” no longer: it was the inscrutable face of a sphinx’.139  
                                                          
129
 William Wade and Christopher Forsyth, Administrative Law (OUP, 11
th
 ed, 2014), 10. 
130
 Stephen, above n 39, 123. 
131
 Rosemary Pattenden, English Criminal Appeals 1844-1994: Appeals against Conviction and Sentence in 
England and Wales (Clarendon Press, 1996), 212. 
132
 Ibid 212. See also Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531 (‘Kirk’), 568. 
133
 11 & 12 Vic, c 43; discussed in Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, 576. 
134
 Pattenden, above n 131, 212. See also Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, 568. 
135
 Kirk, above n 132, 568. 
136
  11&12 Vict c 43. Adopted in NSW as the Justices Act 1850 (NSW). 
137
 Kirk, (2010) 239 CLR 531, 568. 
138
 [1922] 2 AC 128 at 159. 
139
 Quoted in Kirk, (2010) 239 CLR 531, 568. The nature and extent of certiorari has been considered by the High 
Court in Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163; and Kirk. 
67 
 
In contrast to England, where the distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional 
errors of law was abandoned in 1969,
140
 the High Court has maintained the distinction in 
Australian common law.
141
  The cumbersome, time consuming, costly and, perhaps, malleable 
nature of this distinction and the writ procedure was a significant reason for the introduction of 
the case-stated mechanism, a topic to which I now turn.
142
 
The Case-Stated Mechanism 
A case stated mechanism, which permitted either party to request the presiding magistrate to 
state a case to the Supreme Court on a point of law, was introduced in NSW in 1881.
143
 The 
benefit of this mechanism was that it overcame the complex distinction between jurisdictional 
and non-jurisdictional errors of law by enabling a party who was ‘dissatisfied’ with a 
determination of a justice ‘as being erroneous in point of law’ to apply to the justice to state a 
case to the Supreme Court.
144
 The immediate reason for introducing it was the perceived (and 
actual) poor quality of magistrates at the time. NSW had been slow to adopt the case stated 
mechanism for justices exercising summary jurisdiction, delaying until 1881 a measure that had 
been taken decades earlier in England in 1857.
145
 Pattenden explains that the British Parliament, 
which was eager to ‘expand the summary jurisdiction, had come to realise the importance of 
providing a means of appeal on questions of law’.146  One way to characterise the case stated 
mechanism in England is as a product of the tension between the expansion of the summary 
jurisdiction in a drive to transform the criminal law into a tool for regulating harmful behaviours, 
on the one hand, and a deep suspicion of the erosion of the common law right to trial by jury on 
the other.
147
 By contrast, in NSW the mechanism was introduced not to protect the rights of 
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accused persons, but in the interests of the prosecution ‘out of concerns that there was no ability 
to seek review of a decision of a justice to dismiss proceedings.’148   
As originally conceptualised, the case stated mechanism could be used by either the 
defence or the prosecution.
149
 It thereby effectively enabled the prosecution to appeal against the 
summary equivalent of an acquittal, and was predominantly used for that purpose.
150
 This was 
the origin of a mechanism that remains in force, albeit in altered form, exposing accused persons 
to double jeopardy in the summary jurisdiction,
151
 and is a point of distinction between the 
summary and indictable jurisdictions in the current era. In the higher courts, while the rule 
against double jeopardy is being eroded,
152
 it still applies to prevent appeals against most 
acquittals. 
By the early decades of the twentieth century the case stated mechanism had begun to 
produce a body of case law for the guidance of magistrates and other legal actors, not only from 
the NSW Supreme Court, but also from the Supreme Courts of other jurisdictions where similar 
provisions existed, and the from the High Court. These cases show that as Parliament attempted 
to circumvent difficulties of proof in the higher courts via summary statutory offences, the 
appellate courts attempted to ensure that common law protections of the accused permeated 
summary trial procedure. A good example of this dynamic is the law relating to an offence 
known as ‘goods in custody’. This statutory possession-based offence was enacted to circumvent 
the difficulty of proving the elements of larceny and receiving by placing a reverse onus on the 
defendant of proving lawful possession of suspected stolen goods.
153
  The statutory evolution of 
the offence is a paradigm example of horizontal criminalisation because it shows how Parliament 
was attempting to render convictions easier to secure. As originally enacted in 1855 the offence 
read: 
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 Every person…having in his possession or conveying in any manner any thing which may be 
reasonably suspected of being stolen or unlawfully obtained and who shall not give an account to 
the satisfaction of such Justice how he came by the same shall be deemed guilty of a 
misdemeanour…154 
It was amended in 1908: 
to overcome some of the difficulties that would arise if the strict rule of proof were applied to the 
frequent occasions when persons are strongly suspected of being in possession of stolen property 
although evidence of ownership to establish guilt is not forthcoming.155  
The amended section read (relevantly): 
 Whosoever being charged before a justice with—(a) having anything in his custody; or (b) 
knowingly having anything in the custody of another person; or (c) knowingly having anything in 
a house, building, lodging…whether belonging to or occupied by himself or not, or whether such 
thing is there had, or placed for his own use or the use of another, which thing may be reasonably 
suspected of being stolen or unlawfully obtained, does not give an account to the satisfaction of 
such Justice how he came by the same, shall be liable to penalty…156 
In 1932 the Victorian Supreme Court handed down a decision instructing magistrates to 
‘exercise vigilance to prevent the abuse of the [equivalent Victorian] section which was not 
designed to give summary jurisdiction in cases of larceny: Meikle v Le Sueur (1932) VLR 
190.’157 Although not binding in NSW, the decision was included in a NSW treatise for the 
guidance of practitioners and magistrates.
158
 The appellate courts also reminded magistrates that 
the prosecution must first prove possession and reasonable suspicion before the onus shifts to the 
defendant.
159
 Instructions were also issued to the prosecution:   
The prosecution ought not to withhold evidence of a specific offence, or to use the general 
suspicion contemplated by the section merely for the purpose of depriving a defendant of the 
presumption of innocence and the right to a trial in the ordinary course.
160
  
The offence of goods in custody also created a temptation for police to base their suspicion on 
the character of the person in possession rather than the nature of the goods themselves or the 
circumstances of possession. This temptation produced a significant body of appellate case law 
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stipulating that the suspicion must attach to the goods and not to the person.
161
 In this way the 
case-stated mechanism enabled the appellate courts, at least in principle, to ensure the 
colonisation of the summary jurisdiction by the common law. Goods in custody is still 
commonly used as an alternative to larceny in the current era producing approximately 3-6,000 
convictions per year in the Local Court of NSW.
162
 
In 1998, in a move that reinforced the new balance of power between the magistrate and 
the parties that was effected by the introduction of the Table System in 1995, Parliament changed 
the case-stated mechanism into a right to appeal to the Supreme Court on a point of law. Prior to 
this change the parties were required to ask the magistrate to state a case to the Supreme Court. 
As a result of the 1998 changes the magistrate was removed from the equation. The rights of 
appeal granted to the defendant under the new provision were greater than those granted to the 
prosecution, but the prosecution retained the option to appeal to the Supreme Court against a 
dismissal of charges on a point of law.
163
  The defendant was given a right of appeal to the 
Supreme Court on a question of law against a conviction or sentence and the opportunity to 
appeal on a question of fact, or mixed fact and law, with leave of the Supreme Court.
164
  
While the number of appeals that proceed from the Local Court to the Supreme Court via 
this mechanism is not high in the current era, they are important because they have been integral 
to the formalisation of the summary jurisdiction. Between 15 and 25 such appeals are determined 
each year, the majority of which are appeals by the prosecution against the dismissal of 
charges.
165
  Recent examples are Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Yeo
166
 and Director of 
Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Wililo.
167
 In both cases a single Justice of the Supreme Court of 
NSW held that the principles of fair trial that apply to trials by judge alone in the higher courts 
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— such as open justice, natural justice and the requirement upon magistrates to give reasons — 
apply to criminal proceedings in the Local Court. After reviewing the authorities Johnson J said:  
Although these observations were made concerning the role of the Judge in a jury criminal trial, I consider 
that they are equally applicable to Magistrates hearing and determining criminal proceedings in the Local 
Court, whether defended or sentence proceedings following a plea of guilty.
168
 
Emergence of a General Statutory Right of Appeal 
Writing about England in 1856, Paley considered the development of the statutory ‘right of 
appeal’ (original emphasis) to be the most significant change in the summary institution since its 
inception in the reign of Edward III,
169
 and this is true in NSW in the current era. Paley traces the 
earliest appearance of a statutory right of appeal against conviction by a Justice of the Peace to 
the reign of Charles II (1660–1685).170 He identifies the Conventicle Act 1664171 as ‘[t]he first 
instance of an appeal from the sentence of a Justice of the Peace…’172 From that date 
increasingly numerous statutes creating summary offences conferred ad hoc rights of appeal 
upon convicted persons, but the applicable procedures and the content of the right varied from 
statute to statue. In the late nineteenth century those procedures were gradually rationalised until 
a general statutory right to appeal emerged in 1900, which provided a degree of uniformity for 
the first time.
173
  All of the various avenues of review and appeal were consolidated in 1902, but 
there was a significant degree of overlap between them.
174
  
The general statutory right of appeal is distinct from rights of appeal in the higher courts 
in two respects. Firstly, appeals to the District Court from the Local Court are heard de novo, 
although they are now conducted on the transcript rather than via a re-hearing. As McHugh J 
explained in a Supreme Court case in 1987, such an appeal is not ‘an appeal in the sense that 
lawyers now use that term. It is an election to have the case retried on new materials.’175   
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Secondly, because the District Court is an inferior court it has no power to bind the Local Court, 
so its decisions have no precedent value. For these reasons, it may be argued that the general 
statutory right of appeal has not produced the degree of formalisation that it might otherwise 
have done.  
During the twentieth century statutory appeals began to shift from the periphery of the 
criminal process towards the centre, gradually displacing (but not replacing) the more 
cumbersome prerogative writs and case-stated mechanism. Avenues for appeal from the District 
and Supreme Courts to the newly established Court of Criminal Appeal were created in 1912 
when the NSW legislature enacted a local version of the Criminal Appeal Act 1907 (UK).
176
  
Prior to 1911, judges wrote long hand notes of the evidence given in court.
177
 Appeals were 
facilitated by the establishment of a court reporting service in 1911, which recorded evidence in 
short hand.
178
 While technological developments in the latter decades of the twentieth century, 
such as the introduction of tape recording, have increased the efficiency of court reporting, the 
cost of, and delay caused by, transcription is an enduring concern.
179
 As the twentieth century 
progressed, appeal options, both in the higher courts and summary courts, were incrementally 
consolidated and changes were introduced to promote efficiency. An example of this was the 
abolition in 1998 of prohibition, mandamus and the ‘cumbersome’, ‘unwieldy’, ‘protracted’ and 
‘costly’ case stated mechanism and their replacement with ‘a single avenue of appeal to the 
Supreme Court’ (as discussed above).180  
Just as appeals transformed the criminal trial (and sentencing proceedings) in the higher 
courts by fostering ‘formalisation and professionalisation’ and facilitating uniformity,181 there 
are indications that a similar transformation has taken place in the summary jurisdiction, 
intensifying from the final quarter of the twentieth century. From the late 1970s, with the 
introduction of large-scale government-funded legal aid, defence lawyers began to appear in 
greater numbers in the summary jurisdiction and legal aid funding became more widely (but not 
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universally) available for appeals, increasing the likelihood of lodgment of appeals and legal 
representation on appeal.
182
 In the same way that counsel conduct the criminal trial in the higher 
courts with one eye on the possibility of an appeal,
183
 there is evidence that the ‘threat’ of an 
appeal also promotes a more cautious approach in the summary jurisdiction. In 2008 Magistrate 
Hugh Dillon published an article in The Judicial Review suggesting ways in which magistrates 
might improve the quality of their judgments. Quoting Sir Frank Kitto, a former justice of the 
High Court of Australia, Dillon hinted, somewhat mischievously, that if one is honest about 
human nature, judgment writing is, in part, ‘an exercise in precluding a successful appeal.’184 
Dillon’s reflections are corroborated by the remark of a long-serving magistrate made in 
response to an Australia-wide survey of magistrates conducted in 2008: ‘The nature of the work 
we do is more complex than in the past. The Supreme Court are also more demanding for correct 
procedures, adequate reasons etc.’185  The vast majority of judgments in the Local Court are 
delivered ex tempore, but in the 2000s, the Local Court began to publish (but not report) 
judgments in selected matters.
186
 It is not clear whether there are official criteria for the selection 
of matters for publication, but they appear to be cases that are significant to the summary 
jurisdiction. Examples include decisions that clarify the law in relation to prevalent offences, 
such as offensive language;
187
 decisions that promote consistency in sentencing for offences that 
have recently been added to the summary jurisdiction, such as dangerous driving causing 
death;
188
 cases that have attracted media attention;
189
 and more complex cases, such as those 
where the admissibility of evidence has been challenged.
190
  While in a technical sense decisions 
of magistrates (and of the District Court) do not have precedent value, these published decisions 
can be seen as a form of ‘de facto’ precedent because they are used as such. This is an example 
of magistrates regulating their own processes, which, as set out in the Introduction, is a marker of 
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the summary jurisdiction’s increasing maturity. It can also be seen as a form of quasi-
juridification. However, the fact that these decisions relate to only a small selection of offences 
and issues, suggests that there are differing levels of formality in the summary jurisdiction 
depending on the type of offence that is being dealt with. 
Appeals against Sentence and the Formalisation of Sentencing Practices 
Despite the changes to the system of appeals discussed above, the formalisation and 
simplification of the criminal appeal process is far from complete and the NSWLRC has made 
recommendations for improvement.
191
  Inconsistency in sentencing decisions, for instance, has 
long been a criticism of the summary jurisdiction.
192
 It was hoped that appeals against sentence 
would address this problem, but due to the nature of the sentence appeal mechanism they have 
not done so. Instead, formalisation of sentencing practices has been achieved by other means.  
Appeals by convicted persons against sentences imposed by magistrates were first 
introduced in NSW in 1891. The Criminal Law and Evidence Act 1891 (NSW), conferred power 
upon the Court of Quarter Sessions to ‘reduce or vary the sentence’.193 This power was expanded 
in 1925
194
 and became a right to appeal to the District Court in 1973 when it replaced Courts of 
Quarter Sessions.
195
 The District Court is not provided with the reasons of the magistrate — it 
decides the matter de novo.
196
 The reasons for this are historical. One is the lack of legal training 
of the magistracy.
197
 Another is that when appeals against sentence were first introduced, they 
were heard by a bench of magistrates sitting as Courts of Quarter Sessions before magistrates 
were replaced by judges in 1858. As magistrates did not have the power to review decisions of 
other magistrates, the hearings were necessarily de novo,
198
 and the practice has continued into 
the current era.  
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The issue of inconsistent sentencing practices rose to prominence during the corruption 
scandals of the 1980s. To address the flagging legitimacy of the summary jurisdiction, in 1988 
the government implemented an election promise to give the prosecution a right to appeal against 
Local Court sentences for the first time.
199
 This right, which enabled the prosecution to appeal to 
the District Court, was conferred upon the ODPP, rather than police prosecutors, because of the 
superior legal skills of ODPP lawyers.
200
 It was hoped, in particular, that this avenue of appeal 
would promote consistency in magistrates’ sentencing decisions by providing a ‘thorough system 
of Crown appeals’ that would establish sentencing guidelines.201 However, as discussed above, 
because the District Court is an inferior court with no power to bind the Local Court and its 
sentencing appeal decisions are not routinely reported, they are not necessarily followed by 
magistrates. For these reasons appeals against sentence to the District Court are not addressing 
inconsistency in sentencing practices.
202
  Indeed the NSW Sentencing Council in 2004 was of the 
view that they were a ‘barrier’ to achieving consistency.203  
It can be seen from the history of appeals against sentence that they have achieved only a 
piecemeal formalisation of sentencing practices. As the two reasons for de novo appeals set out 
above no longer pertain it has been argued that appeals by way of re-hearing should be 
abolished, not only because of concerns about inconsistency, but also because they undermine 
the status of the magistracy.
204
 In its consideration of criminal appeals in NSW in 2014 the New 
South Wales Law Reform Commission (‘NSWLRC’) acknowledged the strength of those 
arguments but declined to recommend replacing the re-hearing with an appeal based on error. To 
do so, it reasoned, would make magistrates more cautious about their sentencing judgments, 
which in turn would reduce efficiency. Instead it recommended a reform that attempts to reach a 
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compromise between all of the competing considerations: that sentencing appeals be decided 
upon the magistrates’ reasons for decision and the material before the Local court.205  
Sentencing practices have been formalised, not so much by appeals against sentence, but 
rather by several other reforms introduced from the mid-1980s. The first reform was the 
establishment of the Judicial Commission of NSW, one of whose primary functions is to 
disseminate sentencing data and judgments to magistrates (and judges in the higher courts) in an 
effort to improve consistency. The second reform was that the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal 
(‘CCA’) began to issue guideline judgments in 1998.206 Guideline judgments are a product of the 
battle between Parliament and the judiciary over sentencing discretion. They provide magistrates 
and judges with guidelines to promote a higher degree of consistency in sentencing practices 
whilst preserving sentencing discretion and can be seen as a compromise between statutory 
mandatory sentencing regimes and unfettered sentencing discretion. On three occasions the 
Attorney General has requested the CCA to provide a sentencing guideline. Of those, two were 
issued and one was refused.
207
 On five occasions the CCA has issued guidelines of its own 
motion as permitted by s 37A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.
208
 Guidelines 
have been used in NSW to increase the sentences imposed for certain harmful behaviours such as 
drink-driving, a topic to which I return in Chapter 6. The third reform in 1999, the Crimes 
(Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), was introduced to consolidate sentencing procedure 
and promote more consistent sentencing practices in all courts. Finally, the Local Court practice 
of publishing a selection of sentencing decisions on the internet has also contributed to the 
formalisation process and the results of formalisation can be seen in these judgments.
209
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Conclusion 
This chapter argued that the concept of formalisation is a useful lens for understanding the 
development of procedures and practices in the summary jurisdiction. The two dimensions of 
formalisation that are most useful in this context are rationalisation and juridification. The key to 
this process has been the development of the reclassification mechanism. Perhaps the most 
significant moment in its development was in 1891 when Parliament detached the 
reclassification mechanism from the particular offence of simple larceny and enacted it as a 
stand-alone provision of general application to which formerly strictly indictable offences could 
be added. This provision of general application was used three times in the twentieth century to 
reclassify strictly indictable offences as triable either way: in 1924, 1974, and then in 1995 with 
the introduction of the Table System. This can be understood as a process of rationalisation. The 
sheer size of Tables 1 and 2 with their hundreds of offences, when compared with the modest 
reclassification attempts in 1891, 1924 and 1974, is an indication of the extent to which 
rationalisation has facilitated vertical criminalisation. 
The reclassification mechanism can also be understood as juridification. Prior to the 
introduction of the Table System the relatively unregulated discretion to choose to have a trial on 
indictment resided with the magistrate. Post-Table System that discretion resides with the parties 
as allocated by s 260 of the CPA, and the exercise of that discretion is directed in a way that 
favours summary disposition. In other words, s 260 directs that the matter is to be finalised 
summarily unless an election to have a trial on indictment is made by the relevant party.   
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Part II: Actors 
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Chapter 2: Magistrates 
As the presiding officers in the summary jurisdiction, magistrates have been key figures in its 
development. Upon the colonisation of NSW, the summary jurisdiction was a catch-all 
administrative body and magistrates performed many of the executive, as well as judicial, 
functions of government at a time when central government was still being constructed and the 
ability to exercise jurisdiction over the outlying districts was tenuous.
1
 At this time magistrates 
wielded immense power and, due to lack of oversight, they often did so with impunity. Tracking 
the evolution of the office of the magistrate from colonial times to the present reveals that 
changes to the magistracy have followed a trajectory of formalisation, particularly in the second 
half of the twentieth century, and gathered momentum in the final quarter of the twentieth 
century. These changes have been produced, in part, by changing legitimation demands. The 
terms ‘justice of the peace’ or ‘justice’ are used in the earlier periods because these were the 
terms then used, but the term ‘magistrate’ had largely replaced the term ‘justice’ by the 
beginning of the twentieth century and it is the preferred term in the current era. 
This chapter argues that professionalisation together with lawyerification and the 
separation of law from politics are the two most helpful dimensions of formalisation in this 
context. As set out in the Introduction to this thesis, by professionalisation I mean the 
development of a professional identity through the monopolisation of specialised knowledge. 
Lawyerification refers to the colonisation of summary jurisdiction by lawyers; and the separation 
of law from other spheres of social power, such as religion and politics, is identified in the socio-
historical literature as an aspect of the development of ‘formal rational law’.2   
From Colonisation to the Mid-Nineteenth Century  
NSW inherited England’s criminal justice institutions, including the office of justice of the peace 
(later known as magistrates), but modifications were made to meet the ‘exigencies of the 
situation’.3 The office of justice of the peace developed out of the office of conservator of the 
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peace which existed in every county in England in ‘ancient times’.4 Their role was ‘to conserve 
the King’s peace and to protect the obedient and innocent Subjects from Force and Violence.’5 
The concept of conservation of the peace, also known as ‘the King’s Peace’, developed over 
centuries and was a foundation of the transition from the pre-modern medieval state, a period 
characterised by ‘tumultuous revenges and private warfare’, to the modern state.6 Thus, the 
king’s peace is not to be dismissed as being concerned with mere trifles such as common 
assault.
7
  Rather, it was a formidable mechanism of state power that had evolved from an 
‘occasional privilege’, held by householders and conferred upon certain entrusted individuals for 
particular purposes, ‘into a common right’ by the thirteenth century.8 It contributed to the 
transition from regarding the maintenance of order as a local concern to regarding it as the 
responsibility of a centralised government.
9
  
By 1785, just prior to the colonisation of NSW, the commission of justices of the peace 
had two dimensions, namely, ‘all the ancient power touching the peace, which the conservators 
of the peace had at the common law’ and also specific powers conferred by statute.10 Justices of 
the peace were appointed by commission of the king and, under the first statute of 1 Ed III, ‘had 
no other power but only to keep the peace’. Myriad subsequent enactments expanded the 
commission so that by the time of the colonisation of NSW the jurisdiction of justices of the 
peace had two bases: a broad discretionary power to keep the peace, and narrow, more 
circumscribed statutory powers of both an administrative and judicial nature. 
In the first two decades of the penal colony of NSW, the functions of justices of the peace 
were performed by government officers who also held other posts.
11
  As Golder notes, because 
the conditions in the colony were changing so rapidly, and the circumstances differed so 
radically between different locations, it is misleading to generalise about the early magistracy. 
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The imperial government had conferred the commission of the peace upon these government 
officers as one of their many functions in the colony and with such responsibilities they were one 
of the primary instruments of government. The first appointments made by the governor in NSW 
were current or retired military officers and civil servants.
12
 Described as ‘all-rounders’,13 
justices of the peace combined an enormous array of administrative duties ranging from 
regulating the price of bread and the sale of liquor
14
 with the judicial function of dealing with 
minor criminal matters such as ‘[p]etty theft, assaults, including indecent assault, cases 
concerned with breaking and entering private property, gambling, drunkenness and other 
offences.’15 Due to lack of oversight and an absence of a precisely defined jurisdiction, 
magistrates exercised a broad discretion in choosing whether or not to resort to the criminal 
law.
16
 They were required to maintain order and therefore functioned as a quasi-police force until 
local police forces fashioned in the Peelian style began to be established from 1833.
17
  They also 
performed the role later played by local government before local councils began to be established 
in 1842.
18
 For example, they were responsible for granting licences to butchers and bakers and 
for setting the price of bread.
19
 
None of the magistrates, aside from the Deputy Judge Advocate who doubled as the 
presiding officer of the Court of Criminal Jurisdiction and the Bench of Magistrates, was legally 
qualified. All of them held tracts of land, although in contrast to their English counterparts, there 
was no landholding qualification for the position of magistrate in NSW. The reason for this was 
pragmatic — there were not enough landed gentry in the colony to fill the available positions. 
While their magisterial positions were technically ‘honorary’, they were ‘paid in convict 
labour’.20 These features of the early magistracy gave rise to a number of actual and perceived 
conflicts of interest. Their primary function as administrators of the convict workforce came into 
tension with their position as employers of convict labour. Their position as public servants came 
                                                          
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Ibid 3. 
14
 Castles, above n 3, 83. 
15
 Ibid 76. 
16
 Golder, above n 11, 4. 
17
 Castles, above n 3, 70. 
18
 Ibid 82; State Archives and Records, Government of NSW < http://www.records.nsw.gov.au/state-
archives/guides-and-finding-aids/archives-in-brief/archives-in-brief-106> See ‘Administrative History’.  
19
 Castles, above n 3, 82. 
20
 Golder, above n 11, 13. 
82 
 
into tension with the imperative to make private profit from their own landholdings;
21
 and their 
government posts meant that they performed the judicial aspects of their commission of the 
peace without actual or perceived independence.
22
  
As in England, the position of magistrate carried with it great prestige and power in the 
colony. In the early decades of the nineteenth century magistrates exceeded their sentencing 
jurisdiction so frequently that a legislative inquiry was established in 1825 to investigate the 
extent of the practice.
23
  There ensued a power struggle between the Governor, Sir Richard 
Bourke, and the magistracy that culminated in the enactment of what became known as Bourke’s 
Summary Jurisdiction Act, which placed firm limits on the powers of magistrates.
24
   Despite this 
power struggle the historical record reveals that appointees also accepted their commissions out 
of a sense of public duty.
25
  Unlike in England, however, where magistrates derived much of 
their authority from the deference of the local community, such deference did not exist in the 
NSW colony.
26
  Instead, Golder suggests that the ‘conditions of the early colony had bred … a 
kind of dependence on magistrates.’27  This was not only because of the broad range of functions 
they performed, but also because, in circumstances where no informal dispute resolution 
mechanisms had yet developed, the peaceful resolution of disputes was crucial to the survival 
and economic development of the colony.
28
 There was also a mutual dependence between the 
magistrates and the convicts upon whose labour the survival of the colony rested.
29
  Because of 
the small population of the settlements, magistrates quickly developed local knowledge of the 
character (or reputation) of the people appearing before them — a factor which influenced their 
decisions.
30
  
As the colony developed and expanded, the magistracy provided a means of bringing 
order to rapidly changing social relations. One of the earliest developments was the creation of a 
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‘stipendiary’ or paid magistracy from 1822, although the title of ‘Stipendiary Magistrate’ did not 
become official until 1881.
31
 A key reason why the NSW colony came to rely upon stipendiary 
magistrates was the ‘tyranny of distance’ — the vast distances between settlements — which had 
a ‘fundamental’ impact on the ‘various structures of our law’.32 Stipendiary magistrates were 
introduced gradually to supplement honorary magistrates as ‘a series of ad hoc responses to 
specific crises.’33 There were many different types of paid magistrates. For example, on the 
frontier, incursions into Aboriginal land by squatters and cattle thieves provoked resistance from 
Aboriginal people.
34
  In response the government created ‘specialist police forces and 
magistrates to contain frontier conflict.’35  In the settlements, security and decorum were a 
priority as the colony attempted to attract free settlers from England. This is reflected in the 
crime statistics. The offences most frequently charged against free persons were drunkenness 
(which constituted 59 per cent of arrests in 1842), vagrancy and breaches of licensing laws.
36
  
A police magistracy, which was a form of stipendiary magistrate, developed from 
necessity,
37
 and is emblematic of the experimental and fluid nature of the magistracy in early 
NSW. The role was modelled on the unpopular police magistracy created under the English 
Middlesex Justices Act 1792.
38
  Honorary magistrates in England had resisted the creation of a 
paid magistracy because it threatened their local authority and autonomy. Their tactic was to 
portray paid magistrates ‘as mere agents of the central government’; a tactic which paid off.39 As 
seen below, similar suspicions were to develop in NSW in the early twentieth century, but at its 
inception, there was no resistance to police magistrates from honorary magistrates in NSW. 
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Indeed, Golder suspects the threat posed by frontier violence meant that more magistrates were 
welcome:  
One realist told the 1839 Select Committee on Police and Gaols that police magistrates were 
much sought after because their full-time commitment to judicial duties and police organization 
raised property values in the district!40  
Appointees to the police magistracy were predominantly serving or retired military personnel 
whose military salary or pension provided an alternative source of income, which meant they 
were more willing to accept the low salary offered.
41
 Between 1822 and the mid-nineteenth 
century police forces in NSW remained localised, often administered by the local honorary 
magistrate, so the appointment of a police magistrate to a particular district provided a means of 
communication with central government.
42
 This arrangement forged close ties not only between 
police magistrates and the police, but also between police magistrates and the government.
43
  
After centralisation of the police forces in 1862, police magistrates were no longer responsible 
for the ‘day-to-day supervision of the constabulary’,44 but the magistracy has struggled to shed 
the legacy of that close relationship. So strong was the correlation between magistrates and the 
police that the term ‘police magistrate’ persisted in common usage long after the term was 
officially abolished in 1947.
45
 
From the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the End of the Nineteenth Century  
Between 1840, when transportation officially ended, and 1856 when responsible government 
commenced, the machinery of democracy was being constructed and this had a significant 
impact upon the development of the magistracy. Some honorary magistrates in rural areas 
lobbied the NSW Legislative Council on behalf of their ‘constituents’ for funding for 
infrastructure, giving them great power and influence in their local communities.
46
 By contrast, 
police magistrates were perceived in some communities as a threat to self-government because 
they were thought to enhance the power of the governor.
47
  In others, police magistrates were 
                                                          
40
 Ibid 42. 
41
 Ibid 44–5. 
42
 Ibid 41. 
43
 Castles, above n 3, 212. 
44
 Ibid 374. 
45
 Golder, above n 11, 168. 
46
 Ibid 54–55. 
47
 Ibid 54. 
85 
 
preferred because they were more reliable than their honorary brethren (they were all male) who 
were notorious for not appearing on hearing days and for their poor quality decisions.
48
 In the 
second half of the nineteenth century, honorary magistrates began to be phased out in response to 
lobbying by local constituents. Nevertheless problems with the perceived and actual poor quality 
of the magistracy persisted throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the 1883 
parliamentary debates on the Criminal Law Amendment Act members were scathing of them. For 
example, Mr Tighe said he had: 
 known magistrates who went to the court with their heads full of the fumes of liquor, and who 
had no understanding of matters which came before them except what the clerk of the bench 
thought proper to impart. He had known others feeble in intellect through old age—if, indeed, it 
was ever otherwise,—and who, when once they got a crotchet into their heads, not all the 
common-sense, not all the reason, not all the evidence in the world would alter their 
determination.
49
 
This view was not unanimous, but it was predominant.  
From the end of transportation in the 1840s, as urbanisation progressed, magistrates 
became the guardians of good order and morality.
50
 During this period, due to a belief in the 
superiority of British civilisation, and a drive for progress and respectability, historians have 
detected an increasing concern with propriety, moral standards and order.
51
 As the police forces 
began to centralise, a process that was completed in 1862,
52
 there was an increasing reliance 
upon the machinery of law enforcement to maintain these standards.
53
 At the same time, the 
magistracy began to shed some of its administrative tasks, which were being delegated 
increasingly to the police.
54
  
The decades between 1860 and 1890 were a time of economic prosperity that precipitated 
an enormous expansion of government.
55
 The government was the largest employer in NSW and 
by the 1890s numerous statutory offences were being enacted as the government expanded into 
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previously unregulated areas of life such as ‘public health, education and transport’.56 During 
this period the stipendiary magistracy was expanded, and the existence of chamber magistrates 
— magistrates who gave free advice outside of court — is noted in the historical records from 
1889.
57
 
In the 1890s, there was an economic downturn and in an attempt to end the culture of 
political patronage, which had, it was thought, unnecessarily swollen the ranks of the stipendiary 
magistracy, control over the appointment of magistrates was transferred from the government to 
the Public Service Board.
58
 Under the new system recruitment to the magistracy was to be made 
more transparent by requiring applicants to pass a ‘qualifying examination’,59 although legal 
qualifications were not yet required. However, the replacement of honorary magistrates with 
stipendiary magistrates exacerbated suspicions about the magistracy’s lack of independence from 
the government, particularly in relation to industrial disputes.
60
 These suspicions intensified after 
the magistracy was placed within the public service in 1895, a shift that heralded a new era in the 
development of the magistracy. 
From the End of the Nineteenth Century to the Final Quarter of the Twentieth Century 
In 1895, the magistracy was incorporated into the public service, a move that has had an 
enduring impact on the development and perceptions of the magistracy. In the early decades of 
the public service, as government officers who wished to make a career out of the magistracy 
began to replace honorary magistrates, appointment to the magistracy was still based largely on 
political patronage.
61
  The Public Service Act 1895 (NSW) reformed the public service, and 
within it, the magistracy, by introducing promotion on merit. This provided career options that 
had not previously existed for men (at that time careers were for men only) without political 
connections and was designed to improve efficiency by replacing complacency with ambition.
62
  
The new pathway into the magistracy was a ‘long apprenticeship’ beginning as a clerk in the 
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Petty Sessions branch of the public service.
63
 Salaries were too low to attract members of the 
private legal profession, but it provided ‘social mobility’ to those who did not have access to a 
higher education or to the professions.
64
 While this solved some problems, it created another. 
One consequence of the new structure was that the clerks resisted the appointment of others from 
outside of the public service because it threatened their career prospects. This attitude resulted in 
what Golder describes as a ‘remarkably homogenous magistracy’ that became a ‘closed shop’, an 
illustration of which is that several generations within certain families carved out careers along 
the same pathway from clerk to magistrate.
65
  While there was a rising sense of professional 
identity among the magistrates, they identified more as public servants than as judicial officers.  
As the twentieth century progressed the magistracy became increasingly insular, which 
fueled the perception that magistrates were agents of the government. Clerks of Petty Sessions 
continued to resist the appointment of recruits from outside of the public service and rejected 
suggestions that magistrates be required to obtain legal qualifications.
66
  In the 1920s, in the 
lead-up to the Great Depression, industrial unrest broke out in various locations around 
Australia.
67
 It was in 1929, in this context, and amid rising concerns about the spectre of 
communism, that the NSW magistracy was thrust into a political imbroglio that raised questions 
about its lack of independence and impartiality. This aspect of the historical development of the 
summary jurisdiction in NSW reveals its particularity. It also led to the seminal High Court 
decision on the summary jurisdiction (in fact it is the only High Court case where the nature of 
summary jurisdiction is given detailed consideration), Munday v Gill,
68
 and is therefore worthy 
of detailed discussion.  
In 1929, the conservative NSW government introduced a Bill to criminalise the public 
protest activities of striking workers known as ‘mass picketing’. The introduction of the Bill 
followed the 1928 waterside workers strike and the 1929 ‘lockout’ of coal miners at the 
Rothbury coal mine in the Hunter Valley region of NSW, but it was the timber workers’ strike of 
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1929 that was the focus of attention in the parliamentary debates.
69
 The timber workers’ strike 
was the culmination of a decade-long battle that had been taking place before the 
Commonwealth Arbitration Court over the number of hours in a working week. The 
Commonwealth Arbitration Court ultimately raised the award from 44 to 48 hours in 1929. One 
of the tactics employed by striking timber workers was mass picketing, which, the NSW 
government said, was designed to ‘intimidate’ workers lawfully attending work during the strike. 
Captain Chaffey, Colonial Secretary, when introducing the Crimes (Intimidation and 
Molestation) Bill said: 
 The experience we have had for months, of the existence in our midst of basher gangs, of 
intimidation by those gangs, of resort to violence, of interference with people in their homes and 
with law abiding citizens going to and from their places of employment, has created in the public 
mind a feeling that the time has arrived when action should be taken to suppress this undoubted 
evil.70 
The opposition queried the necessity for, and timing of, the Bill, arguing that the criminal law 
already contained sufficient offences to deal with the conduct complained of and that the term 
‘intimidation’, which was used in the Bill, was too vague. They were suspicious that the Bill had 
been introduced to assist the federal conservative government in its re-election bid and in an 
attempt by the NSW government to reclaim some power over industrial relations from the 
Commonwealth government.
71
 Industrial unrest had become a dangerous political issue for the 
federal government because the strike action was being taken in response to federal awards. A 
federal election was scheduled for the end of 1929 and it was in that context that the NSW 
government introduced the legislation. After vigorous debate the Bill was passed. It inserted 
several new offences into the Crimes Act, including: 
 545C (1) Whosoever knowingly joins an unlawful assembly or continues in it shall be taken to be 
a member of that assembly, and shall, on conviction before a police or stipendiary magistrate, be 
liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding twenty 
pounds. 
The following April, in 1930, the same NSW government introduced the Justices 
(Amendment) Bill 1930 (NSW) (the ‘Justices Amendment Bill’) to permit either party in a 
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summary criminal matter to object to an honorary magistrate adjudicating in their case.
72
 This 
Bill was precipitated by an alleged incident in Maitland, rural NSW, where two honorary 
magistrates had travelled from afar to sit, one of them for the first time, with the local police 
magistrate on the case of a particular defendant concerning charges arising out of the coal 
lockout.
73
  One of the impugned magistrates was the president of the Maitland Australian Labor 
Party and the other was the secretary of the Coal Trimmers’ Union. The imputation was that 
these two magistrates intended to influence, improperly, the outcome of the case in favour of the 
defendant. The Labor opposition rejected the allegations claiming that it was nothing but rumour 
and innuendo,
74
 opposing the bill on the basis that ‘the Minister is deliberately giving to any 
litigant power in effect to choose his tribunal.’75   
The Bill was ultimately defeated, but both sides of politics had been making use of a pre-
existing provision which enabled the government to proclaim ‘stipendiary areas’, which had the 
effect of ousting local honorary magistrates.
76
 Unionists suspected that this was being done to 
depose honorary magistrates who were sympathetic to the labour cause — a suspicion that was 
implicitly, if not explicitly, confirmed by the debates on the Justices Amendment Bill.
77
 Both the 
ruling conservatives (a Nationalist–Country Party coalition) party and the opposition Labor party 
claimed that the impartiality of the magistracy was being undermined. It was in the midst of this 
bitter ideological battle that the events giving rise to the case of Munday v Gill, which is 
discussed in detail in the Introduction to this thesis, took place.
78
  This episode illustrates how 
close the simmering issue of the lack of independence of the magistracy was to boiling point. It 
also shows how the demographic mix of defendants in the summary jurisdiction altered as it was 
deployed to regulate the social upheaval caused by changing industrial and economic 
circumstances. I return to the demographic mix of defendants in Chapter 4. 
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Lawyerification 
In 1955, in response to pressures from within the Public Service, the Public Service Board 
introduced a requirement that magistrates be legally qualified. Thus, one of the most significant 
developments in the summary jurisdiction, and the feature that distinguishes the NSW 
magistracy from the lay magistracy in England, occurred not because of external pressures, but 
rather because of internal politics. The motivations for the introduction of this requirement were 
manifold. First, the Public Service Board wanted to reduce the attrition rate of staff with legal 
qualifications that were departing from the public service to take up private practice. Secondly, 
questions were being raised about the capacity of magistrates without legal qualifications to 
handle the increasing complexity of summary offences; and finally, the Board was under 
pressure from legally qualified staff for ‘accelerated promotion’ and higher status within the 
public service.
79
  This pressure challenged the ‘seniority principle’, which stipulated that the next 
in line would be promoted to the magistracy, and threatened the career prospects of the older 
clerks who did not have legal qualifications, causing tension within the ranks. The Public Service 
Board recognised, however, that the seniority principle was hampering efforts to improve the 
quality of the bench. To address all of these issues, in the late 1940s the Public Service Board put 
the Petty Sessions branch on notice that from 1 July 1955 all appointees to the magistracy would 
be required to be legally qualified.
80
 This requirement had the effect of breaking the rule of 
seniority with the result that the average age of new recruits began to decrease. Over the ensuing 
decades these younger ‘militant’ magistrates, as Golder describes them, began to identify more 
with the judiciary than the public service.
81
 By the 1970s the magistracy’s lack of independence 
from the government and close ties with the police were being questioned in the media and this 
brought the simmering issue of independence to boiling point.
82
 
By the 1970s, as a response to the convergence of a number of social movements, the 
homogeneity of the magistracy began to be questioned. Pressure was mounting in multiple social 
realms. University education became attainable for people from a more diverse range of 
backgrounds when the federal government began to increase public funding of the tertiary sector 
after WWII. This was particularly the case when the federal Whitlam government introduced 
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free university education in 1972.
83
  Student protest movements with progressive agendas swept 
across the United States, England and Australia, and large-scale government-funded legal aid 
was established both federally and in NSW. A progressive Labor government was elected in 
NSW and against this backdrop it conducted a Review of Government Administration between 
1977 and 1982. Professor Wilenski, Commissioner of the review, was critical of the lack of 
class, gender and race diversity in the public service and its lack of responsiveness to changing 
social conditions such as ‘the very large influx of migrants after the Second World War’ and ‘the 
altered status and role of women in the workforce and society’.84  He observed that:  
With its closed career service still largely influenced by seniority and dominated by men recruited 
in the 1930s, the administration often found it difficult to both absorb new ideas and develop the 
policy capacity to deal with the new problems of government.
85
 
It was, the Commissioner argued, a question of efficiency, which he interpreted broadly:  ‘Too 
often it is assumed that the question of efficiency is concerned only with minimising costs or use 
of resources.’86  Instead, he took the view that efficiency is a ‘relationship between the results an 
agency obtains and the resources it uses’. 87  It requires creativity and imagination to understand 
and respond to societal problems, which in turn require a broad range of views. In these 
circumstances the Petty Sessions branch, and the public service more broadly, began to recognise 
that they needed to (or were forced to) diversify.
88
 Within the magistracy this was initially 
interpreted as a need to recruit women to handle ‘women’s issues’ such as domestic violence and 
cases involving children, which, as Golder observes, risked relegating female recruits to a lower 
status women’s issues ‘ghetto’.89  
Women were first appointed to the magistracy in 1921 in the wake of World War I and 
the enactment of the Women’s Legal Status Act 1918 (NSW),90 but they did not make a notable 
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incursion into the overwhelming masculinity of the magistracy until the 1990s. The reasons for 
this were both formal and structural. Notwithstanding the Women’s Legal Status Act, women 
were not accepted into the formal Petty Sessions magistracy apprenticeship until 1954,
91
 and a 
married woman whose husband was employed by the State was precluded by legislation from 
pursuing a career in the public service until 1969.
92
 In the 1970s, in a new phase of resistance to 
applicants with legal qualifications from outside the public service, the Public Service 
Association, the representative body of Petty Sessions clerks, began advising its members to 
obtain post-graduate qualifications in criminology to make them more competitive.
93
  New 
appointees to the magistracy were also required to do country service and were frequently 
transferred to new locations. The repercussions of these requirements were twofold: they 
maintained the closed shop of the magistracy by holding off external recruitment; and they 
rendered it impossible for married women to attempt to build a career as a magistrate at a time 
when women were also expected to manage the domestic realm.
94
 When the magistracy was 
removed from the Public Service in 1985, only four magistrates were women.
95
  
From the Final Quarter of the Twentieth Century to Present  
The magistracy was finally granted formal structural independence from the government when it 
was removed from the public service between 1983 and 1985. This was a result, primarily, of the 
efforts of the then Chief Magistrate, Clarrie Briese, who, it seems likely, was concerned about 
possible corruption within the magistracy.
96
 The issue of independence had remained latent 
throughout the second half of the twentieth century because the magistracy was considered to 
have informal independence from the government, and due to resistance to change from within 
the magistracy. In Ex parte Blume in 1958 the NSW Supreme Court sought clarification of the 
position of magistrates from the Attorney-General and this was his response: 
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It is a departmental rule of long standing that the judicial functions of magistrates are not 
interfered with by the department and that it is not competent for the Minister or any member of 
the Executive to give any direction affecting his judicial functions to a judicial officer.
97
 
The Attorney-General’s emphasis on the independence of the magistracy is evidence of 
acknowledgement of their increasing judicial role and was perhaps crafted to deflect criticism. 
Recognising that appearances are as important as practice in the operation of the justice system, 
and that informal rules provide little protection against outside interference, Briese, who was 
appointed as Chairman of the Magistracy in 1979, was one of the first to begin calling for formal 
statutory independence.
98
  Changes made to the Public Service Act in 1979 that placed 
magistrates under the direct control of ministers instead of the Public Service Board had 
jeopardised what little independence magistrates had.
99
  At the same time a number of 
committals of high profile defendants brought the issue of magisterial independence to public 
attention.
100
 Briese persuaded the magistracy to vote to be severed from the Public Service—a 
move they had been resisting — and the Local Courts Act 1982 (NSW), which achieved that 
outcome, was passed in 1983, coming into force in January 1985. It did not, however, provide 
magistrates with the same security of tenure as Supreme and District Court judges who could be 
removed only by an ‘address from both houses of Parliament’,101 an issue to which I return 
below.  
It was in this context of an increasing focus of the lack of independence of the magistracy 
that the corruption scandals of the 1980s, mentioned in Chapter 1 above, erupted. As the details 
of the scandals have been set out elsewhere,
102
 I will provide only a thumbnail sketch sufficient 
to generate an understanding of their impact on magistrates as actors in the summary jurisdiction. 
It was the media — the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (the ‘ABC’) — that first drew 
attention in 1983 to corruption in the magistracy and implicated the highest levels of the NSW 
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government.
103
 The allegation was that Murray Farquhar, when he was the Chairman of the 
magistracy in 1977, had assigned the committal of K E Humphreys to a particular magistrate and 
‘warned him that the Premier “wants Kevin Humphreys discharged”’.104  Humphreys had been 
charged with the misappropriation of $50,000 from the Balmain Rugby League Club while he 
was its Secretary-Manager.
105
  A Royal Commission headed by Supreme Court Chief Justice Sir 
Lawrence Street investigated the allegations against Farquhar and the Premier. The Premier was 
exonerated but in 1985 Farquhar was charged with attempting to pervert the course of justice.
106
  
He was convicted and sentenced to four years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 
months.
107
 This episode, together with numerous other allegations of corruption amongst 
lawyers, judges, police and public officials at the time, eroded confidence in the integrity and 
competence of the magistracy.
108
 Subsequent structural changes were made in an attempt to 
restore their reputation, and with it, public confidence. 
The issue of tenure — a key feature of judicial independence — arose out of a fiasco that 
ensued when the courts of Petty Sessions were abolished and replace with Local Courts. Briese 
had been calling for the establishment of a Judicial Commission to improve the integrity of the 
magistracy and judiciary since the beginning of his tenure as Chairman of the magistracy in 
1979. In 1983, in the context of the revelations of corruption discussed above, Briese raised 
concerns in a report to the Attorney-General about the fitness for magisterial office of five of the 
then serving magistrates. After seeking advice from the Law Reform Commission in relation to 
his powers, the Attorney-General declined to reappoint these magistrates to the new court. In 
November 1984 the NSW government amended the Local Courts Act 1982 (NSW) providing 
that any magistrate who was not reappointed was entitled to a position within the public service 
on the same salary that they had been paid as a magistrate.
109
  This was perhaps intended as 
compensation for non-reappointment. Four of the five non-reappointed magistrates brought 
proceedings against the Attorney-General alleging a denial of their legitimate expectation of 
reappointment and denial of procedural fairness because they had not been made aware of, or 
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given an opportunity to answer, Briese’s allegations.110 The argument was defeated in the High 
Court, but the episode divided the justices of the NSW Supreme Court and High Court. The issue 
in contention was the relationship between the power of the government to ensure that judicial 
office is held only by the ‘best available appointee’ and the independence of the judiciary.111 To 
restore public trust in the justice system the NSW government created the Judicial Commission 
of NSW in 1986 and granted the same security of tenure to magistrates as Supreme Court 
Justices.
112
  
Adding to the perceived need for a Judicial Commission were revelations published in a 
report funded by the Criminology Research Council (the ‘Vinson Report’) that revealed marked 
inconsistency in sentences imposed in drug cases before the District Court. These data, they said, 
hinted at the possibility of deliberate manipulation by certain members of the legal profession 
and judiciary, but were not conclusive.
113
  To ensure that the courts were ‘above suspicion’ and 
to improve accountability the Vinson Report recommended the establishment of a body that was 
responsible for the collection and dissemination of sentencing data, a ‘probity council’ that 
would investigate the integrity of court officials, and a Sentencing Council that would be 
responsible for developing sentencing principles and practices and for educating the public about 
the sentencing process.
114
 The government responded by establishing the Judicial Commission of 
NSW in 1986. A Sentencing Council was not established until 2003.
115
 
Professionalisation  
The push for professionalisation came from both within and beyond the magistracy. Defence 
lawyers, who were appearing in the summary jurisdiction in increasing numbers subsequent to 
the introduction of legal aid (which I discuss in Chapter 3) were critical of the quality of 
magistrates, and, perhaps because of this, magistrates themselves were vying for increased status. 
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The structural changes discussed above — provision of the same security of tenure to magistrates 
as enjoyed by the judiciary and the creation of the Judicial Commission of NSW in 1986 —  
together with increases in the status of magistrates within the legal profession, fostered 
professionalisation from the mid-1980s. Writing in 1989, John Bishop, a barrister and author of 
books on both criminal and civil procedure, provides empirical evidence that the quality of 
magistrates was still dubious at that time and was having a deleterious impact on the summary 
jurisdiction. An important example of this was that defence lawyers were being discouraged 
from pleading guilty and conducting sentencing matters in front of magistrates who were known 
to be unfair or harsh.
116
  Bishop blamed the low status of the magistracy for the low quality of 
recruits — a vicious cycle — and argued that increased status must be accompanied by improved 
training.
117
 In his view magistrates’ training was irrelevant to the tasks they were required to 
perform: ‘The magistrate is generally a public servant well trained in the administrative functions 
of the Local Courts and poorly trained in the usual functions of judicial office.’118 By providing 
for the continuing education of magistrates and collating sentencing data from across Australia’s 
many jurisdictions, over time the Judicial Commission of NSW has enabled the magistracy to 
keep abreast of changes in the law and to keep sentences within a more consistent range.
119
  In 
2010, Chief Magistrate, Judge Henson attributed the rapid and extensive professionalisation of 
the magistracy since 1985 to the ‘hard work’ of the Judicial Commission of NSW.120  
An incremental increase in the status of the magistracy has accompanied the dramatic 
changes of the 1980s.  Reflecting the ‘predominantly judicial office of the modern magistrate’, in 
2004 the form of address of magistrates in court was changed from ‘Your Worship’ to ‘Your 
Honour’ to bring it into line with the higher courts.121 In 2005 the ban on magistrates wearing 
robes was lifted.
122
 Magistrates and other members of the judiciary have also been lobbying for a 
change of title from ‘magistrate’ to ‘judge’ since at least the beginning of Briese’s tenure as 
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Chairman in 1979.
123
  For example, in 2008 Justice Kirby of the High Court, as he then was, 
argued that changing the title to ‘judge’ would increase the status of the magistracy, which in 
turn would increase the quality of appointees and further bolster their independence.
124
  
Magisterial salaries have also increased significantly, a factor that has successfully lured high 
quality applicants away from lucrative private practices.
125
 The appointment of the former Chief 
Magistrate Price to the Supreme Court
126
 and the appointment of several magistrates as District 
Court Judges are also seen as an indication of the rising quality of the magistracy. The current 
Chief Magistrate, Judge Henson was appointed as a Judge of the District Court in 2010,
127
 
although he continues to act as the Chief Magistrate. Magistrates continue to lobby to change 
their title from ‘magistrate’ to ‘judge’, not only to reflect an increase in status, but also to shed 
the historical association between magistrates and the police.
128
 While the Commonwealth 
government changed the title of federal court magistrates to ‘judge’ in 2012,129 the state and 
territory governments have resisted doing so.  
Two further markers of professionalisation are a burgeoning media consciousness and 
what Judge Henson has described as increased confidence.
130
 Since independence in 1985 the 
magistracy has developed an awareness of the Local Court’s public image, an image which, 
Henson argues, is often tainted by ‘ill informed’ media reports.131 The court now responds to 
inaccurate media reports in two ways. The first is with the assistance of ‘media liaison resources 
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with the Department of Justice and Attorney General’ and the second is through the publication 
of the reasons of magistrates in selected cases.
132
 Linked to this awareness is what Henson 
describes as ‘the court’s confidence of its capacity to lead rather than simply react’, a confidence 
that he observes was lacking ‘in the early years of its independence’. A consequence of this lack 
of confidence was that magistrates allowed the parties to control court proceedings. Now, 
Henson says, ‘[t]hose days are gone forever’.133 A manifestation of this new-found confidence is 
the regular issuing of practice notes to instruct parties on how matters are to proceed before the 
court.
134
  These markers of professionalisation are examples of the system self-regulating, which 
is another indicator of its maturity. 
Diversity 
Increasing gender diversity and the appointment of magistrates from a broad range of 
backgrounds has been a ‘deliberate strategic goal’ in the summary jurisdiction since the removal 
of the magistracy from the public service.
135
 Judge Henson attributes the dramatic improvement 
in gender diversity in particular, and other dimensions of diversity more broadly, to the 
introduction of transparency into recruitment processes and the ‘deliberate appointment’ of 
magistrates with a ‘multiplicity of experiences’.136 This is confirmed in the scholarly literature.137 
Data from an Australia-wide survey conducted in 2007 show that diversification along the 
gender dimension has been more successful in the magistracy than in the higher court 
judiciary.
138
  While female appointments to the higher court judiciary remained at approximately 
one in four for the fifteen years prior to 2007, appointments of women to the magistracy have 
increased to approximately fifty per cent Australia-wide over the same period.
139
  
There is also evidence to suggest that magistrates are increasingly being drawn from a 
more diverse range of social class backgrounds. One source of diversity is mothers in paid work. 
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Female magistrates ‘have more experience of mothers in paid work, compared with their male 
colleagues.’140  However, when comparing the magistracy with the judiciary from a class 
perspective, the male magistracy appears to be more socially diverse from a class perspective 
than the male judiciary. The 2007 data reveal that ‘a higher proportion (nearly two-thirds) of 
male judges report mothers rarely or never in paid work compared with male magistrates (just 
less than one-half).’141  Judge Henson reports that magistrates are increasingly being selected 
from a variety of backgrounds, including private practice as solicitors or barristers, the State and 
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Legal Aid, the Law Society and academia.
142
  
Anecdotally, Magistrate Dillon reports that the appointment of ‘practising lawyers with 
experience in dealing with briefs of evidence and the rules of evidence’ has led to ‘an 
immeasurable but significant cultural change in the Local Courts’.143 This is a reference to a 
change in the perception of magistrates as always accepting the prosecution evidence to a 
general, but not universal, perception that they are ‘fair and competent’.144 Data on the other axes 
of diversity such as ethnicity and sexual orientation are not available in Australia,
145
 but Dillon 
notes the summary jurisdiction has done less well in these dimensions.
146
 
Changes in appointment practices over the last three decades also hint at an increase in 
‘viewpoint’ diversity — that is, the expansion of judicial perspectives — a dimension of 
diversity that is not easily measured. Scholars warn that ‘inclusive diversity … may not 
automatically increase “viewpoint” diversity’,147 but Magistrate Dillon notes that after the 
magistracy was removed from the public service and outside appointments were made, many 
former Legal Aid and defence lawyers were appointed to the bench. 
148
 This broke the ‘perceived 
nexus between police and the magistracy’.149  This is a significant reorientation of the summary 
jurisdiction because historically magistrates have been seen as government partisans existing 
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merely to ‘rubber stamp police actions’.150 This is interesting not only for what it reveals about 
the reality of the summary jurisdiction, but also for what it reveals about the perception of the 
summary jurisdiction that prominent magistrates wish to convey. The discourse discloses a 
concern to depict the summary jurisdiction as a mature criminal justice apparatus that operates 
according to principles of fairness and is to be taken seriously. This concern is a product of 
professionalisation and lawyerification. 
Why is a diverse magistracy considered to be so important in the current era? My 
analysis suggests that in NSW the rise to prominence of notions of fair trial and due process in 
the post-war era, which have increasingly permeated the summary jurisdiction due to the 
increased involvement of lawyers, together with the social movements (discussed in this and 
other chapters) championing human rights and feminist perspectives, have produced conditions 
in which an unrepresentative magistracy will no longer be tolerated. In addition to concerns 
about equal opportunity and objectivity, there are reasons to think that a diverse magistracy is a 
way of ensuring the democratic legitimacy of the summary jurisdiction.
151
  Mack and Anleu 
summarise history of the various reasons given in the scholarly literature for the need for gender 
diversity in the judiciary more broadly.
152
 In the 1990s the reasons were based on the perceived 
need for a broader range of perspectives and life experiences, which, it was thought, may 
produce ‘greater empathy or compassion’. In the 2000s arguments were based on promoting 
equal opportunity for women in the workforce. It has also been argued that diversity is crucial 
for maintaining ‘public confidence and trust’ in the legal system and the judiciary’s ‘claims of 
neutrality and impartiality’.153  But these reasons do not address the magistracy specifically. In 
England, the persistence of lay justices is seen to supply the summary courts with democratic 
legitimacy and to provide protection against ‘professional power’.154  Concerns about the 
concentration of professional power have not been raised in NSW, most likely because of the 
legacy of the historical concern about the poor quality of the magistracy. In a similar way to the 
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diversity supplied by a jury in the higher courts, diversity in the magistracy can be seen as an 
attempt to bolster the democratic legitimacy of an expanding summary jurisdiction. 
Conclusion 
My analysis of magistrates as actors in the summary jurisdiction in this chapter indicated that the 
formalisation lens is a useful means of understanding change over time in this context. The two 
most useful dimensions of formalisation here are professionalisation together with 
lawyerification, and the separation of law from politics, which has taken the form of autonomy 
from the government. While there have always been magistrates who were also lawyers, 
lawyerification began in the mid-twentieth century. It was precipitated by the internal politics of 
the Petty Sessions branch of the Public Service. However, it intensified in the early 1980s in 
response to the legitimation demands raised by the conviction of the former Chairman of the 
magistracy, Murray Farquhar, for perverting the course of justice and the ensuing ‘constitutional 
crisis’. The legitimation demands raised by this crisis also led to the structural separation of the 
summary jurisdiction from the government, thus addressing at last the issue of lack of 
independence that had been simmering since colonisation. This can be understood as a separation 
of law from politics. On a descriptive level my analysis also showed the increasing maturity of 
the summary jurisdiction and diversity of the magistracy. In the current era the official pursuit of 
diversity amongst the magistracy can be seen as providing the summary jurisdiction with a 
source of democratic legitimacy.  
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Chapter 3: Justice Personnel 
Alongside magistrates, the justice personnel are the other actors in the summary jurisdiction who 
are there in their official capacity. They are the police, police prosecutors, ODPP lawyers, and 
defence lawyers. It is useful to group these actors together because they all engage in 
enforcement practices. The police investigate or detect the suspected commission of offences and 
lay charges; police prosecutors and ODPP lawyers prosecute the offences; and defence lawyers 
represent the interests of the accused in the prosecution process, including by retrospectively 
challenging the legality and/or propriety of police enforcement practices in relevant cases. My 
examination of change over time in the practices of these actors reveals that it has followed a 
trajectory of formalisation. However, this trajectory of formalisation plays itself out in specific 
ways in relation to each of them.  
This chapter argues that professionalisation together with lawyerification, and the 
separation of law other spheres of social power are the two most prominent dimensions of 
formalisation here. As set out in the Introduction to this thesis, by professionalisation I mean the 
development of a professional identity through the monopolization of specialised knowledge. 
Lawyerification refers to the colonisation of summary jurisdiction by lawyers, and the separation 
of law from other spheres of social power, such as religion and politics, is identified in the socio-
historical literature as an aspect of the development of ‘formal rational law’.1  In this context, as 
with magistrates, it manifests itself as autonomy from the government. 
Police 
Police as actors have impacted upon the development of the summary jurisdiction in two main 
ways. The first is through charging practices, and the second is through their role as prosecutors. 
This part of the chapter examines each of these in turn. The final part of the chapter examines 
plea negotiation where these two sets of practices and the practices of defence lawyers intersect.  
There has been enormous change in the nature of policing over time in NSW, and yet the 
story of police as actors in the summary jurisdiction is one of relative continuity. There is 
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 ed, 2013), 228–9. 
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another story about changing police practices that is both bigger, and smaller, than the summary 
jurisdiction. A dominant theme of that other story is formalisation through professionalisation 
and juridification. However, while this chapter necessarily gestures towards that story, my more 
circumscribed aim is to examine those instances where police as actors have impacted upon the 
development of the summary jurisdiction. This more specific focus reveals that the formalisation 
of police practices in the summary jurisdiction has been piecemeal. This chapter argues that the 
two dimensions of formalisation that are most useful for understanding the development of the 
police as actors in the summary jurisdiction are juridification and professionalisation.  
From Colonisation to the Mid-Nineteenth Century 
The colonists brought with them from England the office of the local constable, but because of 
the absence of pre-existing local communities, and the need to rely on convicts to act as 
constables, it was of limited success in the NSW colony.
2
 During the early decades a 
magistrate’s jurisdiction was most often invoked by a complaint made on oath by the victim to 
the magistrate. Accusations could also be made by a witness or a police officer and depending on 
the seriousness of the offence, the magistrate would then issue either a warrant of arrest or a 
summons.
3
  During the penal era, from 1788 to at least the 1830s, magistrates largely ‘controlled 
the prosecution process’.4   The historical record shows that magistrates sometimes used 
prosecutions to achieve certain personal ends, such as removing people from ‘a desirable tract of 
land’,5 which illustrates the power of magistrates during this period.  
In the 1830s discrete police forces began to be established for different purposes. They 
were given a wide variety of administrative functions in addition to law enforcement and the 
maintenance of public order. While, as Finnane’s research shows, the initial dispossession of 
Aboriginal people in NSW was accomplished without the aid of police, the police forces that 
were established from the 1830s onwards ‘added to the colonial state an apparatus of great power 
                                                          
2
 Mark Finnane, Police and Government: Histories of Policing in Australia (OUP, 1994), 11. 
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and flexibility in completing the process.’6  The violence of the dispossession process, which has 
been analysed in detail elsewhere, has shaped the relationship between the police and Aboriginal 
people to this day.
7
 Policing in the Australian colonies was based on the identification of 
particular groups who posed a threat to social order, such as convicts and Aboriginal people.
8
  
From the beginning, police in NSW were a governing tool of the state that played a central role 
in state formation.
9
 
From the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Turn of the Twentieth Century 
From the mid-nineteenth century to the turn of the twentieth century, as the summary jurisdiction 
began to formalise, police forces in NSW began to be consolidated and centralised. After early 
experiments with placing magistrates in control of police, police were placed under the control of 
the executive government through police commissioners.
10
 The year 1862 is cited as the precise 
date from when centralisation took effect.
11
  Historians attribute the move towards centralisation 
to social forces such as the unrest unleashed by the influx of settlers during the gold rushes in the 
mid-nineteenth century and the erosion of public respect for the police because of their inability 
to control bushranging.
12
  For these reasons, although the emergence of a centralised police force 
in NSW coincided with a similar move in England and Ireland, the process in NSW was 
distinctive.
13
  
During the middle decades of the nineteenth century as transportation of convicts was 
abolished, the maintenance of a social order based on contemporary ideas of respectability was 
considered to be essential to the prosperity of the developing colony. This became the ‘central 
mandate’ of the newly centralised police forces.14 The importance of this aspect of the policing 
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role is reflected in the incentives offered to police officers to lay charges for certain offences. 
Sturma reports that for an unspecified period prior to 1850 ‘constables received a portion of the 
fines for convictions’ for offences such as indecent exposure and ‘obscene language’.15  Late in 
the nineteenth century the police began to develop a monopoly over ‘crime fighting’,16 which is 
understood in this context as the detection, prosecution and conviction of offenders.
17
   
In the summary jurisdiction the maintenance of social order and the crime fighting 
functions have been less clearly demarcated than in the higher courts. Since the earliest days of 
police forces, the police have used charges such as offensive language and offensive behaviour 
as a means of maintaining social order and these offences have therefore remained staples of the 
summary jurisdiction. This is one reason why police enforcement practices have a significant 
impact on the summary jurisdiction’s offence profile.18  The maintenance of social order function 
has also contributed to the over-policing of certain groups in the community, in particular young 
people and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander People who tend to spend more time in public 
spaces than other community groups.
19
  
It is difficult to determine with precision the statistical profile of the summary jurisdiction 
during the mid-late nineteenth century because it pre-dates the appearance of coherent and 
uniform statistical record-keeping. Despite this, historians have developed an ‘impressionistic’ 
account from extant records. Golder’s research shows that public drunkenness and ‘drink-related 
offences’ dominated the summary jurisdiction at the time.20 In 1884, offences against the person 
constituted approximately 5 per cent of offences, offences against property approximately 10 per 
cent, and ‘offences against good order’, which included offences such as drunkenness, offensive 
language and vagrancy, comprised approximately 80 per cent of total offences.
21
 While the 
offence profile of the summary jurisdiction changed during the twentieth century as new 
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offences were created, it remained dominated by ‘offences against good order’ and ‘petty 
offences’ — which included drink-driving and other parking and traffic offences, drug offences 
and breaches of regulatory Acts (such as the Public Health Act) — until the final quarter of the 
twentieth century.
22
 
From the Turn of the Twentieth Century to the Final Quarter of the Twentieth Century 
In broad terms, the story of Australian policing in the twentieth century is one of 
professionalisation, as in other parts of the common law world, as the state came to assume 
exclusive responsibility for dispute resolution in the criminal context.
23
 The main ingredient of 
professionalisation, the monopolisation of knowledge,
24
 dates from the mid-late nineteenth 
century in NSW.
25
  There were two prongs to this monopoly in NSW: the development of the 
specialised skill of crime investigation, which had already begun by the mid-nineteenth 
century;
26
 and technological developments designed to assist with the identification of offenders, 
such as fingerprinting. These technological developments took place between 1880 and WWII,
27
 
and an emerging ‘science’ of crime detection had its genesis during this period.28  Developments 
such as these led to the police establishing a monopoly over the field of criminal law 
enforcement.  
A driver of professionalisation in NSW was the development of specialised training.
29
 
For the bulk of the twentieth century the emphasis was on physical training and learning on the 
job. Police recruits were rarely exposed to educational influences from outside the police force 
and this resulted in a significant degree of insularity.
30
 One consequence of this insularity was 
the development of ‘a culture of corruption’, which was the main impetus behind the 
juridification of police enforcement practices in the late twentieth century and early twenty-first 
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century.
31
 In the 1980s, radical changes precipitated by the Lusher Commission, which is 
discussed in the next section, were made to recruitment and training practices within the police 
force. Amongst the changes were measures to increase diversity in the police force, the 
introduction of promotion on merit, and training in cross-cultural awareness.
32
   
The degree to which legal regulation influences police practices is contentious.
33
  Legal 
regulation may occur through the common law or legislation and can best be understood through 
the lens of juridification. Reasons for the uncertainty surrounding the degree to which legal 
regulation influences police practices include the limited scope for enforcing legal regulations 
and because policing in NSW, as in England and other countries with similar police forces, is 
predominantly done by consent.
34
  This means that the police conduct activities with the consent 
of the suspect that they otherwise have no power to do. A good example is requesting identity. 
Police have no power to request a person’s identity unless certain circumstances pertain. One is 
that police ‘suspect on reasonable grounds that the person may be able to assist in the 
investigation of an alleged indictable offence because the person was at or near the place where 
the alleged indictable offence occurred, whether before, when, or soon after it occurred.’35 
However, if these circumstances are absent, a person’s consent to disclosing their identity 
operates as the source of power. The NSW Police Force resisted legal regulation for the bulk of 
the twentieth century, influenced in part by the police push for autonomy in the United States.
36
  
For this reason, while there were common law restrictions on the exercise of police power, legal 
regulation had a limited impact on police practices in NSW for much of the period.
37
  Indeed the 
police were, in practice if not in principle, largely unregulated until the 1980s. This is evident in 
the Australian Law Reform Commission’s scathing critique in 1975 of the state of uncertainty 
surrounding the rights of suspects in criminal investigations.
38
 For example, the common law 
position on detention for the purposes of questioning remained unclear until the High Court 
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confirmed in 1986 that it was prohibited.
39
  However, even subsequent to that decision, police in 
NSW continued to detain suspects for the purpose of questioning because in a system dominated 
by guilty pleas the practice was rarely challenged in court.
40
   Underpinned by a measure of 
success that was based on numbers of convictions, police enforcement practices coalesced into a 
culture of impunity and securing convictions at all costs.
41
  This culture led, in turn, to an 
emphasis on obtaining confessions, and, perhaps inevitably, their fabrication.
42
  Due in part to 
deficient leadership throughout the 1960s, and perceptions of police ineffectiveness, the public 
reputation of the NSW police by the late 1970s was poor.
43
 
From the Final Quarter of the Twentieth Century to Present 
In 1976 the newly elected left-leaning Wran Labor government set about rejuvenating the public 
service and public institutions, as discussed in chapters 1 and 2. In relation to policing, it 
established the Lusher Commission to Inquire into NSW Police Administration (the ‘Lusher 
Commission’) in 1979. The Commission was asked, in particular, to investigate ‘the structure of 
the relationship between the Police Force and the Executive Government’.44 One of the key 
problems the Lusher Commission identified was insularity. To overcome insularity the Lusher 
Commission recommended departing from the structure whereby sole oversight of the police was 
vested in the police commissioner and replacing it with a board, members of which would be 
drawn from both inside and outside of the force.
45
 The report, which was handed down in 1981, 
was a precursor to the dramatic overhaul of the institutions of the criminal justice system that 
took place throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s.  
 In addition to these structural changes, in the 1980s, the work of the NSW police force 
underwent a ‘paradigm shift’ that had a significant impact on the summary jurisdiction. The shift 
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was from reactive law enforcement and peacekeeping to ‘community policing’.46 ‘Community 
policing’ in this context is understood as the engagement of members of the community in the 
crime detection and enforcement processes. This paradigm shift took place against a background 
of the collapse of penal welfarism and a crisis of confidence in the criminal justice system in 
liberal democracies.
47
  While the balance of opinion among historians and policing scholars is 
that the community policing paradigm shift was little more than rhetoric and was quickly 
displaced by law and order imperatives,
48
 as an ethos it provided fertile ground for the 
intensification of the focus on risk-prevention in policing that took place in the 1980s. There is a 
large body of scholarship on risk-prevention as a governance strategy, but here I use the term in 
the narrower sense of policing as a means of preventing the risks posed to the community by 
harmful behaviours that are regulated by the criminal law. A good example of this style of 
policing is the offence of drink-driving, which Pat O’Malley describes as the paradigm risk-
prevention offence.
49
  O’Malley argues that in the context of a broader societal shift towards 
risk-prevention in fields such as the ‘medical sciences’ that was precipitated by ‘an explosion of 
scientific knowledge of risk’ and fostered by the insurance industry, there was a shift in policing 
practices from the mid-1980s away from law enforcement and towards ‘preventing crime and 
managing behaviour using predictive techniques’.50  The state’s assumption of responsibility for 
risk prevention through its police ‘service’ (as it was called for a brief period)51 has been one of 
the drivers of the enormous expansion of the summary jurisdiction. I explore these themes 
further in Chapter 6 on drink-driving and Chapter 7 on domestic violence. 
In addition to this external focus, the reorientation of policing towards risk-prevention 
had an internal dimension. Internally, in the wake of the Royal Commission into the NSW Police 
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Force (the ‘Wood Royal Commission’), which was established in the 1990s to investigate police 
corruption, the NSW Police ‘Service’ adopted a ‘new accountability’ which accompanied the 
infiltration of managerialism into the public sector in the late 1990s.
52
  New accountability 
represented a shift away from ‘traditional accountability’ based on the ‘rule of law’ or ‘public-
interest standards’ towards accountability based on ‘managerial’ standards, which ‘promotes 
risk-management rather than rule enforcement’.53  
By the turn of the twenty-first century, policing was moving into an era of ‘policing by 
law’ whereby police powers are not only set out in statutory provisions, but those provisions also 
provide detailed guidance on how those powers are to be exercised.
54
  The Wood Royal 
Commission was the catalyst for the shift to policing by law.
55
  One of the most important 
findings of the Wood Royal Commission was the problem of ‘process corruption’. Process 
corruption occurs when police distort criminal justice processes in order to secure convictions. 
Examples include ‘verballing’ — which is the practice of concocting unsigned records of 
interview or confessions, assaulting accused persons in order to elicit a confession, committing 
perjury, and fabricating or tampering with evidence.
56
  The Wood Royal Commission 
recommended that this form of corruption be addressed by consolidating and elucidating police 
powers and reducing the ‘possibility of abuse of powers through ignorance’, among other 
measures such as changing the culture of the policed force.
57
  This ought to be done, it stated, in 
a way that would ‘strike a balance between the need for effective law enforcement and the 
protection of individual rights’.58  The Commission’s view was that these measures would repair 
the tainted reputation of the police force. 
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In 2001, in response to the Wood Royal Commission recommendations, the NSW 
government introduced the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Bill into Parliament. 
After a three year incubation period the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 
2002 (NSW) (‘LEPRA’) came into operation in 2005.59  NSW was not the only common law 
jurisdiction to consolidate police powers. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (‘PACE’) 
in England was ‘influential’ in the decision to consolidate police powers in NSW.60  The Police 
Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (QLD) was also a ‘landmark’ consolidation that took place 
at a similar time to the enactment of LEPRA.
61
  Unlike PACE, LEPRA has received scant 
attention in the academic literature. One of the few people to comment on the legislation was 
Andrew Haesler, who was a Public Defender at the time, and is now a District Court Judge. He 
pointed out that LEPRA was not a mere consolidation; it created additional police powers in 
response to lobbying by the NSW Police.
62
 Further powers have been added subsequent to 
LEPRA’s enactment in response to atypical incidents, such as the Cronulla ‘race riots’ in 2005 
when anti-Muslim sentiment erupted into violence in the Sydney suburb of Cronulla.
63
  The 
dominant legal discourse in relation to police powers in the current era is critical of the way in 
which legal regulation has led to the augmentation of police powers. This transition to the 
statutory elucidation of police powers may be understood as juridification. 
Despite the juridification of police enforcement practices more broadly, the juridification 
of police enforcement practices in the summary jurisdiction has been less extensive. There are 
two reasons for this. The first is that many summary offences are excluded from the statutory 
provisions. A good example of such exclusion is the legal regulation of conducting interviews 
with suspects. To address the problem of verballing, the electronic recording of interviews with 
suspects was introduced administratively from 1991,
64
 and was enshrined in statute in 1997.
65
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However, the legislative requirement to electronically record interviews with suspects applies 
only to Table 1 and strictly indictable offences. It does not apply to Table 2 or summary only 
offences. The second reason for the piecemeal juridification of police enforcement practices in 
the summary jurisdiction is that in practice, because of the prevalence of guilty pleas, breaches of 
regulations are often not scrutinised.
66
  As guilty pleas are a feature of the entire criminal justice 
system in the current era, lack of scrutiny is not unique to the summary jurisdiction. 
Prosecutions in the Summary Jurisdiction 
Police prosecutors conduct the overwhelming majority of prosecutions in the summary 
jurisdiction. They are intriguing because they represent a combination of the prosecutorial and 
investigative functions in the one actor. Their continued existence — an example of continuity 
over time — is a key feature that distinguishes the summary jurisdiction from the indictable 
jurisdiction. 
The History of Police Prosecutors 
The practice of police prosecutions, whereby senior police officers appear in court to present 
prosecutions on behalf of police officer informants, began informally in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. By the time Commissioner William John Mackay created the NSW Police 
Prosecution Service in 1941 the practice was ‘long-established’.67  In 1965 a Prosecuting Branch 
was established as a separate department within the Police Force.
68
 In the same year, the Privy 
Council approved the informal practice of police officers conducting prosecutions in the 
summary jurisdiction.
69
  The Court held that permitting police prosecutors to appear on behalf of 
informants was merely another dimension of magistrates’ discretion to allow any person, 
whether counsel or not, to appear on behalf of an accused person in the summary jurisdiction. It 
was, they held, an ‘element or consequence of the inherent right of a judge or magistrate to 
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regulate the proceedings in his court.’70  The Privy Council also made the pragmatic observation 
that it is necessary in the administration of justice to permit accused persons or complainants, 
who may not be able to afford counsel, to be represented by a non-lawyer.
71
 In NSW, because 
prosecutors are not required to be legally qualified, they appear before the Local Court with the 
leave of the magistrate.
72
  
Police prosecutors are drawn from the ranks of police officers, establishing a strong link 
between the prosecutorial and investigative functions and thoroughly marinating future 
prosecutors in police culture.
73
 In addition to several years of experience as a police officer, 
recruits are provided with some (limited) training by other police officers in the prosecution 
service, but receive no formal legal training from outside the service.
74
 Until 2008 law graduates 
were prohibited from applying to become a police prosecutor until they had done three years of 
police work.
75
 The Prosecution Service has struggled to retain recruits because prosecutors who 
had obtained legal qualifications often moved into the more lucrative field of private practice 
upon graduation.
76
 In the late 1970s and early 1980s the Prosecuting Branch was failing to attract 
recruits, in part because it provided no financial incentive: police prosecutors had to forego the 
‘financial benefits which accrue to them from working shift work’.77 The resistance of the NSW 
Prosecution Branch to legal qualifications echoes that of the Petty Sessions Branch when 
magistrates were part of the public service, as seen in Chapter 2 on magistrates. Over the last 
decade the Prosecution Branch appears to have been attempting to make prosecutions a more 
desirable career option for police officers and law graduates. In 2008 the NSW Police Force 
introduced an ‘Accelerated Prosecutors Recruitment Program’ pursuant to which law graduates 
can be ‘fast-tracked’ into police prosecutions.78 Chis Corns argues that this will improve the 
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quality of police prosecutors and is a further step towards the ‘professionalisation of police 
prosecutions in Australia’.79  
Competing claims to a monopoly on relevant expertise underpin the debate about police 
prosecutors’ lack of formal legal training. Criticism has come largely from members of the legal 
profession who are acquainted with the justifications for the legal profession’s monopoly on the 
provision of legal services.
80
 An early public criticism of police prosecutors in NSW came from 
Mr Justice Lusher in the Lusher Commission, discussed above, which coincided with the 
increased appearance of defence lawyers in the summary jurisdiction and the removal of the 
magistracy from the public service. Justice Lusher raised a number of concerns, including 
whether the activities of prosecutors constitute the provision of legal advice by unqualified 
persons in contravention of the Legal Practitioners’ Act 1898 (NSW), a regime that the courts 
have emphasised is for the protection of the public.
81
  In response, prosecutors claimed to have 
specialised expertise that is particular to prosecutions in the summary jurisdiction. For instance, 
in 1984, Peter Sweeny, Superintendent in Charge of the Prosecuting Branch of the NSW Police 
wrote:  
…the training experience and constant working in the field, and the requirement to read related 
legal material, provides skill and capacity in the law which is not only adequate and sufficient for 
the purpose concerned, but is also expert... The prosecutors, as police personnel, have a great 
understanding of police work and are perhaps more aware of the requirements necessary for the 
presentation of prosecutions in the magistrates court system.82 
The general pattern of increasing formalisation of the summary jurisdiction revealed in 
this thesis raises questions about the continued existence of police prosecutors. As long ago as 
1989, John Bishop expressed concern that with the expansion and increasing complexity of 
summary matters the continued use of legally untrained prosecutors was inappropriate.
83
  At that 
time he noted the move towards improving the quality of magistrates and, because of the 
formalisation of the provision of legal aid, more defendants were being legally represented, 
dynamics that are explored in Chapter 2 on magistrates and Chapter 4 on defendants. In the 
context of what Bishop described as the ‘maturation’ of the summary jurisdiction, the presence 
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of unqualified prosecutors was perpetuating a lack of sophistication,
84
 a problem that persists in 
the current era. 
How can the continued police control of summary prosecutions in NSW be accounted 
for?  It appears to be a product of the political power of police unions and associations protecting 
the careers of their members, as well as the resource implications of requiring prosecutors to 
obtain legal qualifications, rather than evidence that police prosecutors are the best available 
option for the administration of justice. There is limited available evidence of the effectiveness 
of the office of police prosecutor. A pilot study conducted in 1996 hints that transferring 
prosecutions to legally qualified solicitors would save resources. During the pilot, responsibility 
for summary prosecutions was transferred to ODPP solicitors for three months at two local 
courts in NSW. The tentative finding was that efficiency (defined as reduced time taken to 
finalise matters and increased numbers of guilty pleas) was greatly improved because of, among 
other factors, the ability of ODPP solicitors to identify more readily the weak cases. This was 
particularly the case in assault matters where the victim did not wish to pursue charges.
85
 
However, because of the haste with which the pilot was initiated and its consequent poor design, 
the pilot’s statistical data is unreliable.86  
The Impact of the Establishment of the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (the ‘ODPP’) 
Since 1840 criminal prosecutions in the higher courts in NSW have been conducted in the name 
of the Attorney-General.
87
 In 1840, as one of a cluster of measures designed to improve the 
administration of justice, the colonial legislature enacted a provision stating that all prosecutions 
before the Supreme Court, and the Courts of General and Quarter sessions were to be 
‘prosecuted by information in the name of the Attorney-General or other officer appointed for 
such purpose by the Governor.’88 In accordance with that provision a practice developed 
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whereby the Attorney-General would appoint a barrister to conduct prosecutions.
89
 These 
barristers were called Crown Prosecutors and were briefed by the Crown Solicitor, known as the 
‘Clerk of the Peace’, who was also employed by the Attorney-General.90 Crown Prosecutors 
were therefore not independent of the Attorney-General. This position endured until the ODPP 
was established in 1986. 
In NSW, the establishment of an ODPP that is independent of the Attorney-General was 
a response to the ‘constitutional crisis’ (discussed in the preceding chapters) that befell the NSW 
criminal justice system in the 1980s.
91
 The crisis in NSW occurred at a time when similar 
institutions were being created in the UK and other jurisdictions around Australia.
92
  In the UK, 
an independent Crown Prosecutors’ Service was established in 1986 in response to a 
recommendation of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure.
93
  A key imperative was to 
improve the efficiency of public prosecutions by ‘reduc[ing] the number of weak cases currently 
prosecuted.’94  Corns argues that, in Australia, the reasons for the creation of independent 
prosecution services differed in each jurisdiction,
95
 but close examination of each context reveals 
that the underlying rationale was the prevention of corruption. For instance, in Victoria, 
concerted lobbying by then shadow Attorney-General John Cain led to the establishment of an 
ODPP in that state. Cain’s primary aim was to insulate the prosecution process from political 
influence. He was concerned that powerful actors such as business people, trade unions and the 
police might stymie prosecutions that had ensued from the exposure of illegal conduct in various 
inquiries in the 1970s.
96
  At a federal level a number of Royal Commissions into organised crime 
recommended the establishment of an independent Commonwealth prosecution service as a key 
anti-corruption measure.
97
  The ODPP in NSW was created as one plank of a raft of measures 
designed to restore public confidence in the criminal justice system following the prosecution of 
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a magistrate, a District Court judge and a justice of the High Court for perverting the course of 
justice.  
The establishment of the ODPP contributed to the lawyerification of the summary 
jurisdiction. It will be recalled from Chapter 1 that a Table System was introduced in 1995, 
pursuant to which both the prosecution and defence may elect to proceed by way of a trial on 
indictment in Table 1 triable either way matters, and the prosecution only may elect to proceed 
by way of trial on indictment in Table 2 triable either way matters. Since the introduction of the 
Table System the division of labour between police prosecutors and the ODPP has operated as 
follows. Police prosecutors have carriage of all summary offences except ‘prescribed’ summary 
offences or unless the person ‘responsible for carriage of the matter has consented in writing’ to 
the ODPP taking carriage.
98
 For the last several years the ODPP has taken carriage of 
approximately 500 summary matters per year,
99
 a tiny proportion of the total (approximately).
100
  
For Table 1 and 2 matters, if the police prosecutor, in discussion with investigating officers, 
believes the matter is serious enough to consider electing for a trial on indictment, the file is 
referred to the ODPP. If the ODPP chooses to elect, they take carriage of it. If the ODPP chooses 
not to elect, the brief is returned to the police prosecutor and the matter proceeds summarily,
101
 
unless it is sufficiently complex for the ODPP to retain carriage. In the financial year 2013/14, 
2,980 matters were referred to the ODPP by the police for advice in relation to an election.
102
 
The ODPP also provides advice to the police on ‘sufficiency of evidence or appropriateness of 
charges’,103 but advice is sought in only 3 per cent of cases.104 
In the context of the recently established ODPP, when the Table System was introduced 
it impacted upon the summary jurisdiction in several important respects. It resulted in an 
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enormous accretion of power to the prosecution; it consolidated the judicial nature of magisterial 
power by shedding administrative functions; it formalised prosecution practices for triable either 
way matters; it bolstered the fair trial protections for the accused by preserving the common law 
principle of fair trial that the tribunal of fact should not be aware of prior offending; and it 
reoriented the criminal justice system towards summary disposition. It achieved this reorientation 
by creating a powerful incentive for the defendant to plead guilty in triable either way offences
105
 
thereby facilitating the increased use of the criminal law in summary form. Prior to the 1995 
changes, defendants who wished to plead guilty did not know in which jurisdiction they would 
be sentenced until after they had entered their plea and the magistrate had heard the prosecution 
case and read their antecedents.
106
 Uncertainty about the maximum penalty they faced before 
deciding on a plea was an incentive to put the prosecution to proof.
107
  The 1995 changes made it 
possible for defendants (usually via their legal representative) to plead guilty in exchange for the 
prosecutor agreeing that no election would be made. Thus in addition to formalising the 
jurisdictional allocation of offences, the 1995 changes to criminal procedure further formalised 
prosecution practices and facilitated criminalisation by creating a double incentive: (1) to finalise 
matters summarily; and (2) for the defendant to plead guilty to avoid the higher sentencing 
jurisdiction of the District Court.  
The creation of the ODPP also invites speculation about whether it has contributed to the 
formalisation of prosecution practices in the summary jurisdiction through the institutionalisation 
of fair trial values. In 1987 when the ODPP commenced operation in the context of the loss of 
public confidence in the criminal justice system, it began to publish Prosecution Guidelines that 
were designed to improve the transparency of prosecution practices.
108
  As Nicholas Cowdery, 
Director of Public Prosecutions from 1994 to 2004, has said: ‘[the guidelines] serve to guide 
prosecutors and to inform the community about actions taken in its name.’109  They also provide 
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defence representatives with a negotiating tool and, in some instances, grounds for appeal.
110
 
However, it is difficult to gauge the extent to which this institutionalisation of fair trial values 
has impacted upon the summary jurisdiction for the following reasons:  there is no empirical 
evidence on the subject; the ODPP becomes involved in only a tiny proportion of the overall 
caseload of the summary jurisdiction (as has been seen in this chapter); and the practices of the 
NSW Prosecution Branch are so opaque that it is not possible to determine whether it is official 
policy that police prosecutors apply the ODPP Prosecution Guidelines. Nor is it possible to 
determine the proportion of police prosecutors that has legal qualifications.  
My history of prosecutions in the summary jurisdiction shows that while formalisation 
has taken place through professionalisation of police prosecutors, and the lawyerification of, and 
autonomy from the government in, prosecutions conducted by the ODPP, because of the 
continued existence of police prosecutors it has been piecemeal. The continued existence of 
police prosecutors is an instance of continuity with the earliest days of the colony since when 
there has been little separation of the prosecution and investigation roles.  
Defence Lawyers 
In the current era defence lawyers have come to play a greater role in the development of the 
summary jurisdiction than at any other point in its history. It is challenging to pinpoint the date 
when lawyers first began to appear in the summary jurisdiction in NSW prior to the 1970s and 
the frequency with which they did so. During the early decades of the penal colony there were 
but a few lawyers in the colony, all of whom were ex-convicts,
111
 and the majority of defendants 
appeared unrepresented before the bench of magistrates. A legal profession, as opposed to a 
handful of legal practitioners, began to emerge in the period between 1824, when the Supreme 
Court of NSW opened, and 1856 with the commencement of responsible government.
112
 Few 
defence lawyers appeared in the summary jurisdiction during that period,
113
 and there were even 
fewer in remote districts.
114
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In NSW, the legal profession retained the division between barristers and solicitors, an 
‘accident of English social history’,115 but it was not enforced in the summary jurisdiction. In 
1840 the NSW legislature enacted the Defence on Trials for Felony Act 1840 (NSW), which 
adopted the Prisoners Counsel Act 1836 (UK). This Act permitted barristers to represent 
defendants in both summary and indictable matters.
116
 The Act did not apply to solicitors but that 
was remedied in 1849 when the legislature enacted a provision stating that attorneys (the label 
given to solicitors at that time) ‘shall be allowed to practise and act as Counsel and be heard in 
all matters before the said Courts of Quarter Sessions in the same manner as Barristers are in the 
[Supreme Court]’.117 For this reason, although the division of the profession has been jealously 
guarded in NSW,
118
 solicitors have been entitled to appear as counsel in the summary 
jurisdiction since 1849. 
Until the latter decades of the nineteenth century, criminal defence lawyers struggled to 
gain professional legitimacy.
119
 This is reflected in the restrictions placed on counsel by both the 
Defence on Trials for Felony Act 1840 (NSW) and its counterpart in the UK. Counsel were 
permitted to examine and cross-examine witnesses, but not to make a closing statement because 
of a concern that they would distort the truth with persuasive advocacy.
120
  By 1883, lawyers in 
NSW had achieved a monopoly over the criminal trial in the sense of ousting non-lawyer agent 
competitors, as evidenced in the parliamentary debates on the Criminal Law Amendment Act 
1883 (NSW),
121
 but the division of the profession and lack of qualified solicitors in country areas 
were causing difficulties. As one Member of Parliament said, in Sydney lawyers were ‘as 
plentiful as blackberries…but up the country…it was exceedingly difficult to get any one to 
plead the cause of unfortunate people accused before the courts.’122 To remedy this problem 
some Members urged Parliament to adopt an amendment permitting ‘agents’ to appear on behalf 
                                                          
115
 J R S Forbes, The Divided Legal Profession in Australia: History, Rationalisation and Rationale (Law Book, 
1979) 5. 
116
 Defence on Trials for Felony Act 1840 (NSW) (4 Vic No.27) ss 1, 2.  
117
 An Act for the Removal of Defects in the Administration of Criminal Justice 1849 (NSW). 
118
 Forbes, 'The Divided Legal Profession in Australia: History, Rationalisation and Rationale', above n 115, vi. 
NSW contrasts with other jurisdictions, such as South Australia, where the legal profession is fused. 
119
 Alana Piper and Mark Finnane, 'Defending the Accused: The Impact of Legal Representation on Criminal Trial 
Outcomes in Victoria, Australia 1861-1961' (2017) 38(1) Journal of Legal History 27, 30. 
120
 Defence on Trials for Felony Act 1840 (NSW) s 2. 
121
 See, eg New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 31 January 1883, 176 (Mr Stewart).   
122
 Ibid 174 (Mr Cox). 
121 
 
of accused persons.
123
 Others, such as Sir Alfred Stephen, himself a lawyer, were horrified at the 
deterioration in the quality of representation that would accompany such an ‘innovation’.124  
Stephen’s view is an indication of a growing professional consciousness that was concerned to 
maintain a monopoly for the sake of the profession over who could appear before the court 
despite the shortage of lawyers.  
While lawyers were successful in developing a monopoly over acting on behalf of the 
defence in the higher courts (except, of course, for unrepresented accused), as seen above in 
relation to the history of prosecutions, they were not successful in developing a monopoly in 
relation to prosecutions in the summary jurisdiction. It was not until almost a century later, in 
1965, that the Privy Council resolved the debate about non-lawyers appearing in the summary 
jurisdiction in O’Toole v Scott.125  Legally unqualified police prosecutors continued to appear on 
behalf of informants, but it did not become common practice for unrepresented defendants to be 
assisted by a legally unqualified agent. 
It is no exaggeration to claim that the introduction of legal aid in the late 1970s 
transformed the summary jurisdiction. The NSW government had begun to make limited 
provision for the public funding of criminal trials for impecunious defendants in the early 
twentieth century. For most of the century the provision of legal aid for ‘poor prisoners’ was 
governed by the Poor Prisoners Defence Act 1907 (NSW) which gave judges and magistrates 
power to cause the Attorney-General to make arrangements for the prisoner’s defence. This form 
of legal aid was extremely limited. Its limitations are evident in the three criteria for an award of 
aid. First, the person must have been ‘committed for trial for an indictable offence’. This left the 
person unrepresented during committal proceedings and for offences finalised summarily. 
Second, the person had to be ‘without adequate means to provide defence for himself’; and third, 
the judge or magistrate had to be satisfied that the provision of legal aid was ‘desirable in the 
interests of justice’. In 1969 the government expanded the scheme somewhat by creating the 
office of the Public Defender to represent persons charged with indictable offences, persons who 
had been committed for sentence, or persons who wished to appeal against a conviction for an 
indictable offence. Neither of these schemes applied to summary offences or triable either way 
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offences that were finalised summarily.
126
 Indeed, in 1974, a member of Parliament, in the 
course of parliamentary debates on the clauses of the Crimes and Other Acts Amendment Bill 
that were to expand the summary jurisdiction, remarked:  
It should not be forgotten that criminal legal aid in New South Wales is pitifully inadequate. …it 
is an acknowledged fact that legal aid is virtually non-existent in courts of petty sessions, which 
deal with most criminal offences…127 
These parliamentary debates reveal two things: the extent to which notions of fair trial had 
permeated the democratic process by the 1970s; and how changing legitimation demands created 
by vertical criminalisation were creating circumstances in which the relative lack of defence 
lawyers in the summary jurisdiction would no longer be tolerated. Sir John Fuller noted in his 
second reading speech: 
‘The Bar Council and the Council for Civil Liberties were of opinion that there should be no extension of 
the powers of a magistrate unless the accused is represented by counsel, and that the proposals [to expand 
s476]
128
 should not be put into effect until a comprehensive scheme of legal aid in courts of petty sessions 
is in operation.’129  
The government indicated that it intended to expand the legal aid scheme but, in the 
interests of ‘good administration’, the proposal to expand the summary jurisdiction should not be 
delayed until that had been done. Fuller, on behalf of the government, presented the view that the 
interests of the accused were protected by the fact that the summary disposition of offences 
required the accused’s consent and there was a right of appeal by way of rehearing to the District 
court.
130
 While these arguments are evidence of the legitimating role played by the consent 
requirement and the availability of appeals, they overlooked the reality that without legal advice 
an accused person was unlikely to know whether it was in their best interests to consent to 
summary jurisdiction and whether or not to appeal. What is more, an appeal was an additional 
expense for which legal aid was not routinely available. 
In addition to changing legitimation demands raised by vertical criminalisation, the 
changing nature of the legal profession contributed to the increasing appearance of defence 
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lawyers in the summary jurisdiction. At that time in the early 1970s, the idea that state-funded 
legal assistance was an integral part of the welfare state had not yet taken root in NSW.
131
  This 
is despite the fact that there was a movement in England and the United States in that 
direction.
132
  For instance, the Widgery Committee in England had recommended that legal aid 
be provided in magistrates courts in certain situations, such as where defendants faced a loss of 
employment or liberty, or where ‘language difficulties or mental incapacity’ threatened their 
comprehension of proceedings,
133
 but the legal profession in NSW was initially resistant to the 
provision of legal aid. A prominent concern was that it would erode the income of private 
practitioners.
134
 Writing in 1972, Ross Cranston and David Adams, who were legal practitioners, 
speculated that the inertia on this issue may ‘stem from an ignorance of the plight of the poor’, 
the ‘belief amongst lawyers that the problem is social rather than a legal one’, or a complacent 
belief that the legal aid system was adequate.
135
 Legal aid was also highly political with left-
leaning Labor governments preferring government-funded services and conservative Liberal 
governments preferring profession-based schemes.
136
  
The attitude of the legal profession towards legal aid changed with the ‘welfare rights’ 
movement that arose during this time of relative social prosperity.
137
 As discussed in Chapter 2 
on magistrates, after WWII, the conservative (Liberal) Prime Minister Menzies began to increase 
the public funding of universities as a means of promoting ‘stability and integration among the 
middle classes’, and in 1972, the newly elected socially progressive (Labor) Prime Minister 
Whitlam introduced free university education as a means of promoting social equality.
138
  
Government funding brought tertiary education within the reach of people from the lower social 
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orders for the first time thereby increasing the diversity of the student population. By the 1960s 
the university model of legal education was displacing the apprenticeship model,
139
 as ‘new left 
movements’ swept across campuses in the late 1960s and early 1970s in the midst of anti-
Vietnam war protests and anti-apartheid sentiment.
140
 Influenced in part by these movements, 
and the criticism that high legal fees were preventing poor people from accessing justice, the 
legal profession was being challenged to be ‘more actively involved in the quest for social 
change.’141  
At the same time, improvements in data-gathering methods provided access to new 
information that revealed previously un-examined social problems. In the early 1970s, reliable 
data on the extent of poverty in Australia became available for the first time,
142
 and in 1972 a 
report by the BOCSAR drew attention to the disadvantage faced by unrepresented defendants in 
the courts of Petty Sessions.
143
 Further reports by BOCSAR revealed the particular disadvantage 
of Aboriginal defendants, especially those living in rural towns with high Aboriginal 
populations.
144
  
All of these factors provided the impetus to establish community legal centres for the 
provision of free legal advice and to agitate for an expansion of state-funded legal aid. The 
Redfern Aboriginal Legal Service was the first community legal service in Australia. It was 
established in 1971 with the assistance of a federal grant as a response to decades of 
discrimination against Aboriginal people by police.
145
 Federally, the left-leaning Whitlam Labor 
government, elected after more than two decades of conservative rule, established the Australian 
Legal Aid Office in 1973;
146
 and, in NSW, the left-leaning Wran Labor government, similarly 
elected in 1976 after a long period of conservative rule, followed suit by creating the Legal 
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Services Commission of NSW (later re-named the Legal Aid Commission) in 1979.
147
 The 
Whitlam federal government reforms have been credited with bringing legal aid into the 
mainstream.
148
  
Legal Aid was first introduced into the NSW courts of Petty Sessions in 1974 through the 
Public Solicitor’s office and was expanded in 1976.149 The recently established BOCSAR had 
only introduced a ‘comprehensive system of data collection’ into the summary jurisdiction in 
1972.
150
 No firm figures exist prior to that date on the extent of legal representation in the 
summary jurisdiction, but it is generally agreed that the ‘overwhelming majority’ of defendants 
were unrepresented.
151
 The numbers of legally represented defendants increased rapidly in the 
second half of the 1970s to more than 50 per cent by 1978.
152
 In the current era approximately 
sixty percent of defendants are legally represented,
153
 but of those who are not, many will still 
have received some form of legal advice. An innovation of large-scale government funded legal 
aid has been the provision of duty lawyers at the Local Court and, more recently, advice in other 
forms, such as over the telephone.
154
 At times, when Legal Aid funding has been cut, these 
alternative forms of advice have replaced in-court representation to a degree.
155
 
This history reveals the story of the lawyerification of the summary jurisdiction through 
the increased appearance of defence lawyers in the final quarter of the twentieth century. 
Defence lawyers have contributed to the formalisation and legitimation of the summary 
jurisdiction by insisting upon the application of rules of evidence and the principles of fair trial. 
Several examples may be cited to illustrate this point. In the last two decades it has not been 
uncommon for defence counsel in the summary jurisdiction to challenge the admissibility of 
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evidence under s 138 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) on the basis that it has been obtained 
unlawfully or improperly, or to challenge the existence of an element of the offence, such as 
whether or not a police officer was acting in execution of duty.
156
 Offensive language charges are 
frequently defended,
157
 and in 2013 the Aboriginal Legal Service successfully sought a writ of 
prohibition in the Supreme Court against a magistrate who had refused to recuse himself on 
grounds of apprehended bias.
158
  On the current state of historical knowledge it is impossible to 
determine with precision the extent to which such challenges were made prior to the advent of 
legal aid in the summary jurisdiction, but given the increase in the appearance of defence counsel 
it is reasonable to conclude that they are far more prevalent in the current era than previously.  
For these reasons the increasing appearance of defence lawyers in the summary jurisdiction since 
the 1970s has had an impact beyond individual defendants. In addition to insisting upon the 
application of the rules of evidence and lodging appeals, they also participate in law reform 
debates thereby providing an important source of its legitimacy. For this reason, any government 
reduction in legal aid funding erodes the legitimacy of the summary jurisdiction.  
While the broad impact of defence lawyers has been one of increasing formalisation, it 
has not been unilinear. There are several factors perpetuating informality in the summary 
jurisdiction. One is the high proportion of defendants that is unrepresented. Another is poor 
quality representation (although it must be recognised that this is not true of all defence lawyers 
appearing in that jurisdiction). In 1989, for example, Bishop, while acknowledging the lack of 
empirical evidence and relying instead on ‘impressions’, concluded that there was a ‘wide 
variety in the quality’ of defence lawyers in the summary jurisdiction — some excellent, some 
poor, especially among less experienced practitioners.
159
  In 2005, Magistrate Hugh Dillon also 
noted the variable quality of practitioners appearing in the Local Courts: 
[Local Courts] are …the forum in which young lawyers begin to learn their trades and the level 
beyond which the mediocre rarely progress. In my experience, despite many honourable 
exceptions to the rule, the general standard of advocacy in magistrates’ courts is not high.160 
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Dillon goes on to state that ‘[w]ithout for a moment excusing poor decision-making by 
magistrates … one of the principal causes of bad decisions by magistrates is the inadequacy of 
the advocacy of the lawyers who presented the cases …’161 In 2010 the Chief Magistrate, Judge 
Graeme Henson, referred obliquely to the continuing poor quality of advocacy:  
the development of a compendium of civil and criminal judgments accessible through [various 
websites] is beginning to generate a level of understanding within the practice of law that the 
Local Court is entitled to no lesser standard of advocacy than that displayed in higher 
jurisdictions.162  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that poor quality legal representation remains a problem in the 
current era and thus echoes of McBarnet’s argument that ideology of triviality results in sub-
standard representation continue to reverberate. Dillon hints at one reason for this in the passage 
quoted above: the summary jurisdiction is treated as less important because the stakes for 
defendants are seen to be lower and it is therefore a place where junior lawyers can learn their 
craft.  
Another reason for poor quality representation is the high case load for Legal Aid and 
Aboriginal Legal Service Lawyers. A ‘health survey’ conducted internally at Legal Aid in 2011 
revealed that enormous caseloads, among other factors, were causing ‘high levels of stress’ 
within the organisation.
163
 Caseloads at Legal Aid NSW remain high.
164
 Similarly, the ‘high 
volume legal practice’ is cited as a reason for the ‘declining retention rates’ of solicitors at the 
NSW Aboriginal Legal Service.
165
  
The vagaries of Legal Aid funding impact upon caseloads and quality. Most often the 
cause of fluctuations is political,
166
 but the courts have also played a role. In 1992 the case of 
Dietrich v The Queen
167
 required Australia’s apex court to determine whether the right to a fair 
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trial—more accurately expressed as the right not to be tried unfairly168—included the right to be 
legally represented at public expense. The majority held that it does not, but courts: 
‘possess an undoubted power to stay criminal proceedings which will result in an unfair 
trial… [This power] necessarily extends to a case in which representation of the accused 
by counsel is essential to a fair trial, as it is in most cases in which an accused is charged 
with a serious offence.’169  
The High Court did not define ‘serious offence’, nor did it state definitively the content of the 
right to a fair trial. While being a source of uncertainty, this lack of definition has the advantage 
of allowing what is considered to be ‘serious’ to change over time. As Deane J said, ‘the 
practical content of the requirement that a criminal trial be fair may vary with changing social 
standards and circumstances.’170 Whether or not a particular offence is considered to be serious 
at a particular moment in time can be seen as a dimension of changing social standards and 
circumstances. By not linking the definition of a ‘serious offence’ to  the offence’s classification 
asindictable or summary, the High Court has left it open to argue that certain summary offences 
are ‘serious’ enough to qualify for the Dietrich fair trial protection. As this thesis shows, 
summary offences have been increasing in seriousness according to a number of measures, 
including severity of penalty, and the degree of moral condemnation they attract, particularly 
since the final quarter of the twentieth century. The Dietrich decision had profound implications 
for legal aid funding. Merits tests that allowed funding for trials to be refused on the basis that 
conviction was likely had to be revised and funding re-deployed.
171
  
There is evidence that legal aid bodies interpret ‘serious offence’ to be one that carries a 
risk of imprisonment. In Dietrich, in obiter, Deane J stated there was ‘much to be said’ for 
excluding some categories of criminal offences from the Dietrich fair trial protection, such as 
‘proceedings before a magistrate or judge, without a jury’ where there was ‘no real threat of 
deprivation of personal liberty’.172 To the best of my knowledge this approach has not been 
explored in subsequent reported Australian case law. However, Legal Aid NSW restricts legal 
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representation in the Local Court to matters where ‘there is a real possibility of a term of 
imprisonment being imposed’, where there are ‘exceptional circumstances’, or, in proceedings 
commenced by the police or Centrelink (Australia’s welfare agency) where ‘the offence carries a 
term of imprisonment as an available penalty’.173 
It can be seen from this analysis that a variety of factors impact upon the quality of legal 
representation in the summary jurisdiction. Given the increasing complexity of matters coming 
before the Local Courts, poor quality legal representation threatens to undermine one of the main 
foundations upon which the legitimation of the summary jurisdiction in the current era rests.  
Plea Negotiation in the NSW Summary Jurisdiction 
An important example of how change (and continuity) over time in the practices of the actors in 
the summary jurisdiction has both facilitated and hindered the increasing use of the criminal law 
in summary form to regulate harmful behaviours is the practice of plea negotiation. Plea 
negotiation holds particular significance in the current era because in the Summary jurisdiction, 
as in the criminal justice system more broadly, the vast majority of matters proceed by way of a 
guilty plea. Approximately 90 per cent of defendants are found guilty in one of the following 
ways: following a guilty plea (approximately 60 per cent); following a defended hearing 
(approximately 15 per cent), or being convicted ex parte (approximately 15 per cent).
174
  The 
conviction rate differs between offences. For example, drink-driving has a 99 per cent conviction 
rate, a subject to which I return in Chapter 6, whereas the offence category ‘non-assaultive 
sexual offences against a child’ has a conviction rate of just 5.3 per cent.175  Plea negotiation has 
further augmented the power of the prosecution, which has also facilitated the enormous increase 
in the use of the criminal law in summary form to regulate harmful behaviours in the current era. 
As Mack and Anleu note ‘[w]hen criminal charges are resolved by discussion, the prosecutor is 
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the central and most powerful figure.’176 Plea negotiation arose out of informal practices 
developed by the legal actors as a means of managing the increasing workload in a system that 
had reached crisis point and can be understood as an instance of the system regulating itself. 
Before proceeding with the discussion, a definitional note is required. Plea negotiation is 
known by a number of different terms including ‘plea bargaining’, ‘charge bargaining’, ‘charge 
negotiation’ and ‘negotiated justice’. Although the term ‘plea bargaining’ has currency in NSW 
in the current era, there are moves both in Australia and internationally to shift away from terms 
that connote ‘bartered justice’.177 Mack and Anleu’s research for the Australian Institute of 
Judicial Administration (analysed in detail below) purported to dispel the myth that the aim of 
the practice was to reach an outcome based on bargaining rather than merit. Instead, they argue, 
the aims are similar to those of the criminal justice system as a whole: 
 For the most part, plea discussions in Australia are an informal, semi-adversarial/semi-co-
operative process which attempts, in a situation of uncertainty, to identify the provable facts and 
the charge which most appropriately reflects the facts, to the satisfaction of both prosecution and 
defence, whereupon an agreement is reached that a plea of guilty will be entered to that 
appropriate charge, and that charges which are not appropriate will be withdrawn.178 
For similar reasons Nicholas Cowdery QC, the former Director of Public Prosecutions in NSW, 
prefers the term ‘negotiated justice’.179 He also notes that the term ‘plea bargaining’ is 
misleading because ‘the only plea ever in contemplation is one of guilty. It is invariably the 
charge that is under negotiation.’180  I use the term ‘plea negotiation’ because a plea of not guilty 
is always a possible, if infrequent, outcome, and is the source of the defendant’s power in the 
negotiation process. 
The combined effect of police charging practices and the fact t hat much criminal conduct 
can potentially fall into more than one category of offence gives rise to the possibility of plea 
negotiation. Charging practices and plea negotiation have a profound impact on the course and 
outcome of criminal proceedings and yet they receive little attention in the criminal law literature 
in Australia.  In relation to plea negotiation, this is largely due to its opacity and the dearth of 
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empirical data.
181
 Asher Flynn and Arie Freiberg are working to address this in their research 
project Negotiated Guilty Pleas: An Empirical Analysis.
182
 In 1984 the Superintendent in Charge 
of the Prosecuting Branch of the NSW Police Force wrote that ‘police in the field exercise wider 
prosecutorial discretion than judges, magistrates, the Director of Public Prosecutions or any other 
official involved in the criminal justice system.’183  This is because police decide whether to 
charge or not, and which charges to lay, and there is limited oversight of the exercise of this 
discretion. It must be noted that while this remains true, as seen above in relation to the history of 
prosecutions, there was a shift in the power balance in favour of prosecutors after the 
introduction of the Table System in 1995. 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of charging practices for the summary jurisdiction is 
‘over-charging’. Mike McConville suggests that police deliberately inflate charges as a means of 
obtaining leverage in plea negotiations.
184
 However, Mack and Anleu have noted that the ‘term 
‘overcharging’ implies that there is a single reality for which there exists one truly correct 
charge’.185 This is not the case. Mack and Anleu suggest that more often over-charging is a 
product of the exigencies of the circumstances in which police are required to lay charges. For 
example, time limits imposed on police in relation to detention of a suspect after arrest mean that 
charges are often laid at a time when the evidence is still evolving and police are not in a position 
to know which charges will be appropriate.
186
  The truth is likely to lie between these two 
extremes. As seen above, although police may seek the ODPP’s advice on charging decisions in 
relation to indictable charges (including triable either way charges), they are not required to, and 
rarely, do so.
187
  In summary matters police have exclusive control over which charges are laid. 
All of these factors conspire to create conditions in which plea negotiation has become desirable, 
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not only for the prosecution and the courts, but also for the defendant for whom the ‘process is 
[often] the punishment’.188  The NSWLRC has recently commended the practice of plea 
negotiation arguing that the challenge is how to ensure that ‘appropriate’ guilty pleas are 
achieved without coercion.
189
 
 Plea negotiation grew out of a clandestine practice in relation to indictable matters in the 
higher courts and is now not only sanctioned by legislation and common law, but is expressly 
encouraged. It is difficult to trace the origins of plea negotiation in Australia because of the 
secrecy surrounding the practice. In 1980 the Australian Law Reform Commission said: 
 There is no point in continuing to pretend that plea bargaining does not exist in Australia. Though 
the evidence is incomplete, it is sufficient to establish that the practice is well entrenched and 
enduring. Any agreements made between the prosecution and defence should not remain secret 
‘deals’ struck between them.190 
In the early 1990s, in response to growing concerns amongst the judiciary around 
Australia about the injustice caused by increasing delay in the criminal justice system, the 
Standing Committee of Attorneys-General requested the Australian Institute of Judicial 
Administration to commission research on ‘plea negotiation’.191 Mack and Anleu  conducted the 
research (the ‘AIJA project’) from the mid-1990s and after its initial report in 1995 they 
continued to expand on it into the 2000s. The AIJA project is the only examination of plea 
negotiation that has been undertaken in Australia. It revealed that while, by 1995, ‘plea 
discussions between prosecution and defence legal representatives [were] widespread and 
regarded by everyone interviewed as normal and appropriate’,192 they were marked by ‘secrecy’ 
and this was preventing the ‘development of a professional standard that such discussions should 
occur as early as possible.’193 For example, lawyers and judges who participated in the research 
recalled that until the ‘early eighties’ there was a practice of conducting plea discussions in 
judges’ chambers.194 This practice, which raised numerous ethical issues, had ceased by 1995, 
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but secret plea negotiations continued.
195
  Mack and Anleu’s research reveals that by 2009 
magistrates were actively participating in the production of guilty pleas through their behaviour 
on the bench, such as granting opportune adjournments to allow parties to engage in 
discussions.
196
   
Other practices engaged in by the legal actors also impact upon plea negotiation and these 
have also been formalised over time. The best example is the inconsistent application of a 
sentencing discount for a guilty plea. The discount on sentence for a guilty plea developed out of 
the informal practice of defence lawyers of submitting that the guilty plea should be a mitigating 
factor on sentence.
197
  The AIJA project found that while a key factor motivating defendants to 
plead guilty was the strength of the prosecution case, a secondary factor was the knowledge that 
a guilty plea would be rewarded by a discount on penalty.
198
  By 1995 the discount for a plea of 
guilty was ‘widely accepted in law and practice in Australia’, but the degree to which sentencing 
judges allowed the plea to mitigate the sentence varied markedly.
199
 This variation was 
undermining attempts to achieve consistency in sentencing, an issue that is seen to threaten the 
legitimacy of the criminal process.
200
 To address this problem the discount on sentence was 
formalised. In 1990 a statutory discount for a plea of guilty was inserted into the Crimes Act and 
was transferred to the Crimes (Sentencing procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) when sentencing law was 
consolidated in 1999.
201
 In the current era, when a discount is awarded for the utilitarian value of 
the plea (that is, the saving of time and expense to the criminal justice system), it is to be 
between 10 and 25 per cent of the otherwise appropriate sentence.
202
  The courts have also issued 
a number of guidelines on how to apply the discount.
203
 
The plea negotiation procedure in the summary jurisdiction differs according to whether 
it is conducted by a police prosecutor or an ODPP solicitor. In matters that are finalised 
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summarily, a cumbersome and time-consuming practice of plea negotiation has developed as a 
direct result of the police prosecutor’s lack of independence from the police force. Following the 
Lusher Commission in 1981, which was critical of the office of police prosecutor, the NSW 
Prosecuting Branch was at pains to restore its credibility. To this end, in 1984, for example, 
Superintendent Sweeny, the then head of the NSW Prosecution Branch, stated that ‘it is essential 
that the prosecution system should not only operate impartially, but be seen to do so if it is to 
command public confidence.’204 For this reason, he explained, police prosecutors:  
may only withdraw charges in the following circumstances: 
 Where an offender has been charged with an offence that cannot be substantiated, but another 
offence is disclosed, the prosecutor can charge the offender with the other offence and 
withdraw the original charge when the second charge has been finalised; 
 Where the charge is a ‘back-up’ charge and the major charge has been finalised the 
prosecution may offer no evidence in the minor charge; and  
 Where the Commissioner [of Police] has advised the prosecution that he has favourably 
considered representations for the withdrawal of the charge. 
Motivations for withdrawal other than those mentioned could only be considered as sinister, and 
could leave the prosecution open to accusations of partiality and corruption.205 
The process of plea negotiation in the Local Court therefore requires the defendant or, more 
usually, the defendant’s legal representative, to make ‘representations’ to the Commissioner of 
Police for the withdrawal and/or substitution of charges who then consults with the informant 
(usually the Officer in Charge (‘OIC’)) before making a decision. This is an example of an 
instance where an unrepresented defendant is at an extreme disadvantage because they are not in 
a position to know of the possibility or process of plea negotiation.  
In relation to triable either way matters, until the introduction of the Table System in 
1995, there was, in principle, no plea negotiation in the summary jurisdiction.
206
  The reason for 
this was that any substitution or withdrawal of charges had to be done with the leave of the 
magistrate. Police prosecutors therefore had no power to ‘deliver’ on any bargain made with the 
defence because they could not bind the magistrate.
207
 In practice, prosecutors did withdraw and 
substitute charges and the request for the leave of the magistrate became a mere formality. 
Nevertheless, the institutional structure of the summary jurisdiction, explained in the next 
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section, did not encourage the practice.
208
 Thus, while the practice of plea negotiation subsisted 
in the summary jurisdiction, it was not sanctioned by law, nor was it facilitated by institutional 
conditions.  
By 1996, after the introduction of the Table System, the Commissioner’s Instructions 
contained a detailed procedure for the withdrawal of criminal charges. The withdrawal could be 
done with or without the substitution of alternative charges. The procedure required the OIC to 
‘submit a comprehensive report together with all relevant statements, documents, exhibits, 
photographs, etc.’ to the ‘region commander’ or, in the case of summons traffic matters, to the 
‘district commander’.209  In deciding whether to withdraw charges the commander was instructed 
to follow the ODPP Prosecutorial Guidelines.
210
  It is not difficult to see why an OIC might be 
tempted to avoid such a time-consuming process and take their chances on the defendant 
entering a guilty plea. Where representations by the defence for the withdrawal or substitution of 
charges have been unsuccessful the matter may be set down for a defended hearing (now called a 
‘trial’) if the defendant does not plead guilty. In that situation the assigned police prosecutor will 
receive the file on the day of the hearing allowing time for little, if any, preparation.
211
 The effect 
of this is that summary trials are likely to be poorly run by the prosecution, which impacts upon 
the attainment of convictions and the formality of the proceedings. 
By contrast, in the small proportion of matters in the summary jurisdiction where the 
ODPP has carriage, the defendant’s legal representative negotiates directly with the ODPP 
solicitor. While the ODPP solicitor is required to consult with the complainant and the OIC, the 
overarching guiding principle is the ‘public interest’.212  Because of the ODPP’s independence 
from the executive, there is less likelihood of the police having improper influence over the 
decision. In NSW since the introduction of the Table System in 1995, it has been possible for the 
process of plea negotiation to include an agreement by the ODPP to keep triable either way 
charges in the summary jurisdiction in exchange for a plea of guilty. Plea negotiation may also 
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include a negotiation of the facts that will go before the court for sentence.
213
  This aspect of plea 
negotiation is controversial because of the risk that it may distort or downplay the victim’s 
experience. Avoiding such distortion was one of the reasons for introducing the ODPP 
Prosecution Guidelines in the late 1980s and case law has developed on the issue.
214
  Unlike in 
the United States, plea negotiation in NSW does not include an agreement on sentence that is 
capable of binding the sentencing judge or magistrate.
215
  It was a previous practice of 
prosecutors to agree to give an informal indication on sentence to the bench, but the High Court 
has now disapproved of this practice.
216
 
A further practice that distinguishes plea negotiation in summary only matters from 
triable either way matters is the relative lack of pre-trial disclosure by the prosecution. It has 
been recognised since 1995 that early prosecution disclosure is crucial to successful plea 
negotiations.
217
  In relation to summary only matters, until 2001 — although the defendant was 
to be informed of the nature and content of the charge(s) against him or her 
218
 — there was no 
formal obligation on the prosecution to disclose the brief of evidence to the defence.
219
 When the 
issue of prosecution disclosure was being considered by the NSWLRC in 1982, concerns were 
raised that requiring the police to prepare a brief of evidence in every case would impose ‘a great 
burden’ upon prosecuting authorities.220  However, commentators pointed out that a lack of 
disclosure was impeding the attainment of appropriate early guilty pleas.
221
  In 1997, s 66B was 
inserted into the Justices Act 1902 (NSW), which required the prosecution to serve a brief of 
evidence on the defence ‘at least 14 days before the hearing of the evidence for the 
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prosecution’.222 This provision has the flavour of a compromise that attempts to balance the need 
of the police service to conserve resources with the desire to increase the use of the criminal law 
in summary form by encouraging guilty pleas; however, the effect of s 66B, and its modern 
equivalent, is that the prosecution evidence will not be disclosed to the defence unless the matter 
is set down for a summary trial. Such restrictions on disclosure act as a disincentive to obtaining 
all of the relevant evidence because setting the matter down for trial potentially erodes the 
discount on penalty for an early guilty plea. 
In relation to pre-trial disclosure in indictable matters, practices adopted recently in the 
Local Court demonstrate not only its maturity, but also the impact of the practices of the actors 
on the increasing use of the criminal law in summary form in the current era. It has long been a 
principle of fair trial that the prosecution must disclose the case against the defendant in 
indictable matters, but in 1989, Bishop noted that the practice of disclosure of the prosecution 
case while the matter was still in the Local Court was ‘very weak’.223  The position had changed 
little by 1995.
224
  In 2001 a disclosure regime was inserted into the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 
(NSW) following the recommendations of a ‘working party’ established under the auspices of 
the Criminal Law Review Division of the Attorney General’s Department.225 In its second 
reading speech the government described the state of the law regarding pre-trial disclosure at that 
time as: 
presently subject to ad hoc procedure and practice that diminishes consistency and certainty in 
case management. The present situation is regulated by a combination of common law rules, 
legislation, prosecution guidelines, Bar Association and Law Society Rules and Supreme Court 
practice directions. This bill improves upon and formalises these requirements.226 
The statutory disclosure regime was based on a ‘case management model’, which had been 
borrowed from changes made in the civil litigation system, requiring ‘hands-on’ intervention by 
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the trial court.
227
  Controversially it also imposed circumscribed disclosure requirements upon 
the defence, but it was initially restricted to cases that met certain criteria, such as where the 
District or Supreme Court was satisfied that it would be a ‘complex criminal trial’.228 In 2013 
mandatory defence disclosure was extended to all indictable matters.
229
 However, because 
indictable matters commence and are managed in the Local Court until the finalisation of 
committal proceedings, a need arose to ensure that the prosecution was making adequate 
disclosure prior to committal. For this reason the Local Court developed a practice of making an 
order for service of the brief of evidence in both strictly indictable and triable either way matters. 
In 2012 the Local Court issued a practice note to guide practitioners on the disclose 
requirements. The objects of the practice note included: to ensure that ‘summary criminal trials 
are heard within the Local Court’s published time standards’; and to ensure that the ‘legislative 
purpose in s 260 CPA [that is, the presumption of summary disposition] in respect of Table 
matters is applied.’230  The practice note created a timetable for indictable matters requiring 
service of the brief upon the defence within four weeks with a further two weeks for the defence 
to reply.
231
 The timetable is strict, allowing adjournments only where the Court is ‘satisfied that 
departure from the timetable is in the interests of justice.’232  It is not possible to quantify the 
impact of the practice on the rate of guilty pleas on the currently available data, but the 
NSWLRC is of the view that improving early disclosure increases the rate of early guilty pleas. 
This is evident, the NSWLRC argues, from the large proportion of indictable matters that is 
‘withdrawn or resolved in the Local Court.’233 In 2012/13, ‘41% of indictable matters did not 
proceed to the District or Supreme Court mostly because they were dropped by the prosecution 
or the charge was downgraded and resolved in the Local Court.’234 Of these, 52 per cent were 
‘sentenced in the Local Court, 25% were withdrawn by the ODPP, 5% were returned to police to 
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prosecute, and 3% were dismissed by the court.’235  The process of enshrining disclosure 
requirements in statute and practice notes can be understood as juridification.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I examined change over time to the roles of the justice personnel in the summary 
jurisdiction through the lens of formalisation. This approach was useful because it revealed the 
particularity of the development of each of these roles. It showed that formalisation has been 
piecemeal for each of them and has been a response to changing legitimation demands as well as 
the result of a desire to improve efficiency.  
The most striking example of the particularity and piecemeal nature of formalisation in 
this group of actors is the persistence of police prosecutors. My discussion of police prosecutors 
showed that since the establishment of the NSW Prosecution Service in 1941, police prosecutors 
have developed a sense of professional identity, and a belief in the possession of specialised 
knowledge. Some police prosecutors are legally qualified, but the prosecutions branch of the 
NSW police force has resisted lawyerification. It has also resisted separation from the executive 
branch of government. The impact of the piecemeal nature of formalisation was seen in the 
practice of plea negotiation, particularly when plea negotiations conducted by police prosecutors 
are compared with those conducted by the ODPP. Because of their lack of autonomy from the 
government, the process for plea negotiations is cumbersome and time consuming. However, 
since 1995, when the choice to elect to have a trial on indictment was removed from the 
magistrate and given to the parties as per s 260 of the CPA, plea negotiation, which began as a 
clandestine, informal practice, has been sanctioned and the practices upon which it is based, such 
as pre-trial disclosure, have formalised to a degree. Thus, while piecemeal, formalisation has 
facilitated the increasing use of the criminal law in summary form to regulate constructed 
harmful behaviours. The increased appearance of defence lawyers, which can be understood as a 
response to the legitimation demands raised by the escalating use of the summary form in the 
current era, can also be seen as having facilitated the increasing use of the criminal law in 
summary form. . 
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Chapter 4: Defendants and Victims 
Throughout its history the summary jurisdiction has been deployed to regulate a diverse range of 
constructed harmful behaviours. This chapter shows how the use of the summary jurisdiction for 
that purpose has impacted upon who appear as defendants in relation to, and who are the victims 
of, offences finalised summarily. This chapter argues that the deployment of the criminal law in 
summary form to solve social problems has resulted in the construction of ‘problem’ social 
groups. This has been as much a product of police enforcement practices and procedural 
mechanisms as it has been a product of the substantive law. The summary jurisdiction’s 
increasing maturity (a consequence of formalisation) has also created a new problem social 
group. By the last-mentioned point I mean that as the summary jurisdiction has matured it 
increasingly regulates its own processes by, for example, punishing breaches of court orders, 
such as the imposition of an Apprehended Domestic Violence Order (‘ADVO’). This self-
regulation has created a new cohort of defendants, which is analysed in Chapter 7. As social 
circumstances have changed, not only have new behaviours been criminalised via the summary 
jurisdiction, but some have been ‘decriminalised’ as regulation has been assigned to alternative 
governmental or social structures.  
At the outset of the discussion it is important to note the distinctive changes over time to 
the summary jurisdiction’s regulation of Aboriginal people. Aboriginal people were largely 
absent from the summary jurisdiction until the 1930s. Mechanisms of criminal justice were not 
used in relation to Aboriginal people in NSW until after dispossession had taken place circa the 
1840s.
1
 Indeed, in NSW, the summary jurisdiction was not considered to be a useful tool for the 
regulation of behaviours of Aboriginal people that had been constructed as harmful until the mid-
twentieth century. Between the mid-nineteenth century and the middle decades of the twentieth 
century Aboriginal people were largely segregated and their lives were controlled by civil 
regulatory systems established pursuant to ‘protection’ policies, which kept them out of the 
summary jurisdiction. While these protection systems were criminalising in their own way,
2
 they 
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are the reason why Aboriginal people do not feature in the story of the development of the 
summary jurisdiction until protection began to be dismantled in the 1930s.
3
 
Victims are also largely missing from the story of the development of the summary 
jurisdiction until the final decades of the twentieth century. This is because, until then, the 
overwhelming majority of offences coming before magistrates were ‘victimless crimes’, such as 
public order offences and traffic offences. Such crimes are victimless in the sense that they 
produce ‘harmful’ outcomes rather than victims as traditionally understood. However, two 
features of the current era have led to the increasing involvement of victims in the summary 
jurisdiction. The first feature is the government’s increasing use of the criminal law in summary 
form since the 1980s in an attempt to protect certain groups in the community from harmful 
behaviours. Lobbying by certain interest groups has driven this process, in part. The second 
feature is the intense reclassification of strictly indictable offences as triable either way since the 
introduction of the Table System in 1995. 
From Colonisation to the Mid-Nineteenth Century. 
During the period from colonisation to the mid-nineteenth century the summary jurisdiction was 
used primarily as a means of regulating the convict ‘problem’ group and maintaining order in the 
penal colony. Most of the defendants in the summary jurisdiction were male convicts charged 
with various disciplinary offences such as ‘neglect of work’ and ‘absenteeism’.4  The 
malleability of offences such as ‘insubordination’ or ‘insolence’, which carried a range of 
penalties including the lash, the treadmill and ‘bad reports on ticket-of-leave applications’ gave 
magistrates broad discretion.
5
  Few free persons deliberately chose to settle in the NSW colony 
prior to 1820 with the result that the vast majority of the population was comprised of convicts, 
emancipists (that is, convicts whose terms of punishment had expired and were therefore free) or 
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their children; they represented 87 per cent of the population in 1828.
6
 However, while rare, free 
persons did appear as defendants in the summary jurisdiction. One of the most frequently 
charged offences was drunkenness, an offence that dominated the summary jurisdiction until the 
middle decades of the twentieth century.  
 The gender mix of the summary jurisdiction was male-dominated during this period, as it 
has been throughout its history, but this was not exclusively the case. In 1788 women comprised 
the majority of defendants charged with drunkenness.
7
  Historians have argued that this statistic 
is more likely to reflect the fact that drunkenness was more acceptable in men than in women at 
that time — a double standard — than the relative prevalence of the offence amongst the sexes.  
Drunkenness in women was considered to be ‘distasteful’, as evidenced by the prosecution of 
Catherine Evans in 1799 who was described as appearing before the bench of magistrates in a 
state of ‘beastly Intoxication’.8 
In a context where commodities were scarce, charges of petty larceny were common. The 
case of Richard Cartwright is illuminating because it shows how defended hearings were 
conducted in the earliest days of the colony, at least for free settlers. In 1788, Richard 
Cartwright, a free settler, was charged with suspicion of stealing five pairs of new shoes. The 
shoes had been discovered in Cartwright’s possession during a search of the tent in which he was 
living. Unusually Cartwright called three witnesses in his defence (ordinarily the defendant was 
the only person to speak on his or her own behalf). The shoes were presented before the 
Magistrate and three witnesses were called who then gave evidence about them. The first witness 
swore that he had given the prisoner one of the pairs of shoes as security for a small loan. A 
second witness swore that he had swapped one of the pairs of shoes with the prisoner for a pair 
of his own which had been too small for him. The final witness swore that he had voyaged to 
NSW with the prisoner and had ‘frequently observed him airing several pairs of new shoes on 
deck.’9  The charge against Mr Cartwright was dismissed. 
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From the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Turn of the Twentieth Century. 
During this period from the mid-nineteenth century to the turn of the century when the colony 
was becoming more prosperous, increasing numbers of free settlers were arriving from England, 
and the police forces were centralising. In this context there were two main social imperatives 
that impacted upon the use of the criminal law in summary form: ensuring the colony’s 
prosperity; and, maintaining moral standards in the community. In relation to the former, the 
‘phenomenal growth of pastoral industry’10 in mid-nineteenth century NSW increased the 
incidence of cattle theft, which had become a widespread practice.
11
  This behaviour was 
constructed as harmful and the summary jurisdiction was deployed to regulate it. This offence 
category brought defendants from a variety of backgrounds before the summary jurisdiction. 
‘Duffing’, for example, which ‘involved the theft of branded stock for immediate slaughter or 
with a view to altering’ or ‘cutting out’ the brand, was ‘especially prevalent among the convict 
population and emancipists.’12  But herd owners, who were wealthier and socially ‘respectable’, 
also participated in cattle theft by placing their brand on the ‘unbranded cattle of other squatters’ 
that were accidentally ‘rounded up’ in the muster process.13  Some stockmen used their 
employment as an opportunity to steal cattle and set up their own herd. This is how squatting — 
the practice of taking unlawful possession of a tract of land and establishing a grazing or 
agricultural business — spread. Once a squatter had gathered a herd he (they were usually, if not 
exclusively, men) would move to previously un-settled areas to avoid detection and squat.
14
  
Cattle theft was a capital offence triable only on indictment. However, perhaps for that reason, 
and because juries and judges were sympathetic to offenders, convictions were rare.
15
  In an 
attempt to rectify this impediment to the criminalisation of cattle theft, in 1850 the NSW 
legislature passed the Cattle Protection Act, which created a summary offence of being 
reasonably suspected of being in possession of the carcass(es) of stolen cattle.
16
  Based on an 
Irish provision, the offence placed the burden of proving lawful possession on a defendant who 
had been found in possession of the carcass of cattle that was reasonably suspected of being 
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stolen. Since the eighteenth century the British Parliament had been enacting such reverse-onus 
summary possession-based property offences that circumvented impediments to securing 
convictions at trial.
17
 The Cattle Protection Act’s long title, ‘An Act for the better prevention of 
Cattle Stealing and the Sale of Stolen Cattle’, suggests that it was passed for the same reason. 
In relation to the second imperative — of maintaining moral standards in the community 
— its impact on the summary jurisdiction is illustrated by the prevalence of prosecutions for 
offensive language offences by both police informants and private informants, and a change in 
attitude towards prostitution. In the decades following the cessation of transportation, colonial 
society in NSW was characterised by a ‘preoccupation’ with ‘social status’.18 The composition of 
the colony’s population began to change rapidly after 1820 such that by 1841 the proportion of 
convicts, emancipists and their children had decreased to 63 per cent.
19
  In the 1840s, the 
majority of defendants were still convicts, but the number of convict defendants gradually 
declined as the century progressed. With the numbers of convicts decreasing, police turned their 
attention away from convict management and towards the maintenance of order in the broader 
community.
20
 Together, these social factors produced a concern with behaviour exhibiting 
‘immorality’, such as ‘drunkenness, sly-grog selling, gambling, prize-fighting’ and ‘desecration 
of the Sabbath’, particularly during the gold rushes.21 In 1841, drunkenness constituted 61 per 
cent of cases heard by magistrates, a proportion that dropped to 37 per cent in 1850/51,
22
 but rose 
again to be the most frequently charged offence by the end of the century.
23
 The second largest 
category of offences, ‘disobedience, abusive language and disorderly conduct’, was a 
comparatively small fraction of cases comprising 8.8 per cent of cases in 1941, and 6.7 per cent 
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in 1850–51.24  ‘Making water in the street’, usually accompanying drunkenness, was the most 
usual form of indecent exposure.
25
  However, there were more serious but atypical cases, such as 
that of Andrew Gannon who followed Anne Barker ‘through the tap room of a public house with 
his pants down, while making lewd suggestions.’  Mr Gannon was sentenced to imprisonment 
with hard labour.
26
  Through offences such as drunkenness and offensive language, the summary 
jurisdiction was deployed to perform a civilizing role in the burgeoning colony. 
Obscene language charges, although only a fraction of total cases, were prevalent in the 
middle decades of the century nevertheless, and a large proportion of them (for example, 
approximately half of those prosecuted at Paramatta between 1852 and 1854) were brought by 
‘civilians’.27  These cases frequently arose between persons of equivalent social status, often 
neighbours or people conducting transactions, as illustrated by the case of Michael Dagherty. Mr 
Dagherty was mending an umbrella for Mr Wright and his wife. When Mr Wright queried the 
length of time it was taking, ‘Dagherty told him to bugger himself, slapped his [Dagherty’s] 
bottom a dozen times, and told him to kiss it. When Wright’s wife interjected … he retorted that 
“she might go and fuck herself.”’28 Trivial cases such as this caused historian Michael Sturma to 
characterise a large proportion of the prosecutions being brought in the summary jurisdiction as 
arising from ‘fits of pique’.29 In the context in which prosecutions were brought privately, the 
gender balance of defendants was relatively even, and cases were brought by, and against, people 
from all social classes.
30
  This discussion illustrates the dispute resolution role that the summary 
jurisdiction played in a society lacking the informal processes that develop organically over time. 
This can be seen as a further dimension of its civilizing function. 
By the end of the nineteenth century there was rising concern about repeat offenders, who 
had become another ‘problem’ group in the summary jurisdiction. Public drunkenness was the 
most frequently charged offence, followed by ‘riotous or indecent behaviour, vagrancy’ and 
‘obscene, threatening or abusive language’.31 However, it was estimated that there were ‘3000 
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“habitual drunkards” in Sydney alone’, and repeated arrests ‘were more common among female 
than male drinkers’, even though the overall ‘female proportion of arrests fell in the second half 
of the century from 25 per cent in 1861 to 16 per cent in 1894’.32  The majority of women were 
being arrested for behaviour relating to prostitution. Beyond Sydney, repeat offending was also a 
concern in settlements with sparse populations that were outside of major towns, such as 
Wilcania.
33
 
Concealed behind the statistics for offences against good order is the story of prostitution, 
which has been played out in the summary jurisdiction. From 1788 until the end of the second 
half of the nineteenth century there was a high tolerance of prostitution in NSW for various 
reasons, not least of which was the ‘high ratio of men to women’ in the population.34  By the late 
nineteenth century official attitudes towards prostitution had changed to such an extent that 83 
per cent of offences laid against women were prostitution-related offences.
35
  The attitudinal 
change had begun as transportation ended in the 1940s and the numbers of free settlers began to 
increase, bringing with them the influence of Victorian morals and contributing to the concerns 
about respectability in the developing colony (discussed above). During this period prostitution 
came to be seen as a ‘social problem’, not only in NSW but also in other parts of the western 
world.
36
 Prostitution was not illegal but police could, and increasingly did, charge women 
engaging in prostitution with offences such as ‘drunkenness’, ‘being drunk and disorderly’, 
‘vagrancy’, ‘being an idle or disorderly person’, ‘loitering on footways/public thoroughfares’, 
[and] ‘offensive/indecent behaviour/language’.37 However, again, a small number of repeat 
offenders accounted for the majority of the arrests. For example, in 1859, ‘fifty-one Sydney 
women were arrested at least ten times.’38  
Prostitution was hierarchical with high class brothels at the top, the ‘common prostitute’ 
or ‘street walker’ at the bottom and several other levels in between, and it was those women at 
the lowest levels of the prostitution hierarchy who were charged and appeared before the 
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summary jurisdiction.
39
 As Raelene Frances explains ‘[t]he status of a sex worker was … defined 
by the race and class of her clients as well as by her age, appearance and habits.’ While high 
class brothel owners could be charged with ‘keeping a disorderly house’ (an indictable offence 
punishable by two years’ imprisonment until 1908) it was rare for police to do so.40  The ages of 
women engaging in prostitution typically ranged from 16 to 30, but those who were arrested 
were towards the older end of the range — working class women of ‘all racial and ethnic groups’ 
who tended to drink heavily and were likely to have a venereal disease.
41
 Their street walking 
and other ‘nuisance’ behaviour brought them to the attention of the police.42  There was also a 
racial dimension with police targeting female Aboriginal and Chinese prostitutes, and those who 
worked in ‘Chinese and other “lower class” brothels’.43  Thus, by the turn of the twentieth 
century the demography of defendants in the summary jurisdiction was dominated by people 
from the lower strata of society who were charged, often repeatedly, with low level offences. 
There is evidence that Aboriginal people were being prosecuted and tried before 
magistrates, at least within the frontiers of settlement, during this period,
44
 but it is difficult to 
trace the extent to which it was being done. Prison records in NSW rarely designated 
Aboriginality,
45
 and comprehensive historical examination of proceedings before magistrates (an 
enormous and painstaking task) has yet to be undertaken.
46
  The impediments to rendering 
Aboriginal people subjects of the criminal law in the higher courts were manifold and have been 
discussed extensively in the historical literature.
47
 One of the most confounding and enduring of 
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those has been described as ‘Aboriginal difference’,48 which is a reference to ‘Aboriginal 
difference in customs, norms, and perspectives’ from those of the ‘ascendant settler 
populations’.49  
Perhaps the best-known legal impediment was the prohibition on the admission of the 
testimony of Aboriginal witnesses. Part of a broader story about Christianity and imperialism,
50
 
the prohibition excluded from court the evidence of ‘… Athiests, Persons Infamous, and Persons 
interested …’51. I have found only one reference in the historical material to the prosecution of 
Aboriginal people in the summary jurisdiction during this period in NSW.
52
 Commentary in 
Wilkinson’s treatise for Australian Magistrates suggests that Aboriginal people were neither 
prosecuted nor called as witnesses: 
[a]thiests, or persons who profess no religion, and have no belief in a future state of rewards and 
punishments, can never be admitted to give evidence. It is to be lamented that Aboriginal natives 
of New South Wales are at the present time incompetent to give evidence, on this gronnd [sic].53 
From the Turn of the Twentieth Century to the Final Quarter of the Twentieth Century 
From the early twentieth century the summary jurisdiction was used increasingly to solve social 
problems. During the period from the turn of the twentieth century to the final quarter of the 
twentieth century the demographic mix of defendants began to change as the criminal law in 
summary form was deployed to regulate constructed harmful behaviours engaged in by particular 
social groups. The increasing use of the summary jurisdiction for this purpose is best illustrated 
by the regulation of: drivers of motor cars; striking workers; people (usually women) working as 
prostitutes; ‘fallen women’; and men engaging in homosexual sex acts. From the 1930s, as the 
protection systems began to be dismantled, Aboriginal people began to appear more frequently 
before the summary jurisdiction. Despite the increasing use of the criminal law in summary 
form, across the entire period from 1900 to 1976, the overwhelming majority of defendants were 
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appearing in relation to low level offences. A study of the statistics for all magistrates’ courts in 
Australia between 1900 and 1976 shows that ‘petty offences’ and ‘offences against good order’, 
which carried sentences of a fine or a short period of imprisonment, accounted for approximately 
85 per cent of total offences.
54
  The petty offences category comprised offences such as drink-
driving, ‘parking and allied offences’, ‘other traffic offences’, drug offences and breaches of 
regulatory Acts such as the Public Health Act.
55
  Offences against good order comprised 
offences such as ‘drunkenness, drunk and disorderly, indecent, riotous or offensive behaviour’ 
and vagrancy.
56
  The remaining 15 per cent comprised approximately equal portions of low level 
offences against the person and larceny.
57
 
The first example that illustrates how the criminal law in summary form has been used to 
regulate constructed harmful behaviours is driving motor cars. Of all the social changes that have 
impacted upon the demography of the defendants in the summary jurisdiction, the invention of 
the motor car has been one of the most dramatic, and its effects can be seen along three 
demographic axes of class, gender and indigeneity. From the early 1900s until the rise of the 
middle class in the prosperous 1920s motor cars were owned ‘principally by wealthy men’.58  At 
that time cars were seen as a public nuisance so those men tended to be of a rebellious nature, 
‘did not fit into the standard mould of conservative policy-maker and were thus excluded from 
the corridors of power’.59  This social group began to appear before magistrates in the early 
twentieth century as the summary jurisdiction was deployed to regulate the potentially harmful 
behaviour of driving. In the first year of operation of the Traffic Act 1909 (NSW), 57 convictions 
were recorded for offences such as speeding, negligent driving and ‘excessive smoke’.60  Middle 
class car ownership increased rapidly in the 1920s, bringing ‘large numbers of respectable 
property owners’ before the summary jurisdiction for the first time,61 a trend that continued 
throughout the Great Depression.
62
  By the 1950s, car ownership, albeit of the second-hand 
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variety, had become possible for ‘[t]hose considered to be working class’.63  With the 
introduction of a penalty notice system in 1961 the numbers of ‘white collar offenders’ appearing 
in magistrates courts began to subside,
64
 but traffic offences nevertheless continued to produce 
defendants from a cross-section of social classes. 
A recent study by BOCSAR provides some insight into the impact of traffic offences on 
the demography of the summary jurisdiction in the current era. The study showed that while the 
offence of ‘drive while disqualified or licence suspended’ (‘DWD’) brings defendants from the 
full spectrum of social backgrounds before the summary jurisdiction, ‘relatively disadvantaged’ 
offenders are overrepresented in this offence category.
65
 So too are Indigenous offenders who are 
a disproportionately disadvantaged social group.
66
 While the class profile of traffic offences is 
complex, the gender profile is clear: it has remained a male-dominated offence category despite 
broader changes regarding the role of women in society. In 1914, women comprised 0.5 per cent 
of traffic offenders. By 1934 this had risen to approximately 3 per cent where it remained until 
the 1970s.
67
 In the current era women comprise approximately 20 per cent of traffic offenders.
68
  
I revisit the topic of traffic offences in Chapter 6 for the insight it provides into the impact of the 
formalisation of enforcement practices on the development of the law of drink-driving. 
The second example that illustrates how the criminal law in summary form was used to 
regulate constructed harmful behaviours is certain behaviours engaged in by women. For much 
of the twentieth century certain behaviours engaged in by women were treated as special social 
problems that were appropriate for regulation by the summary jurisdiction. This part of the 
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chapter examines two targeted behaviours: prostitution and first offenders. These behaviours 
were constructed as problematic primarily through police law enforcement practices and 
procedural mechanisms rather than the substantive law.  
Prostitution was formally criminalised in 1908 with the creation of a number of specific 
prostitution-related offences, but the number of women being charged with offences in relation 
to prostitution in the summary jurisdiction fell dramatically during the ensuing decade.
69
  This 
decrease seems counter-intuitive because whereas previously the police were restricted to 
charges such as offensive language and behaviour, and offences under the Vagrancy legislation, 
the Police Offences (Amendment) Act 1908 (NSW) (‘Police Offences (Amendment) Act’) gave 
them a greater range of offences with which to respond to prostitution. These offences included 
‘being a common prostitute, [who] solicits or importunes for immoral purposes, any person who 
is in any public street, thoroughfare, or place’.70  The Police Offences (Amendment) Act also 
empowered a magistrate who convicted a ‘female’ of this newly created offence to commit the 
offender to a ‘reformatory’ created for the purposes of the Act.71 This latter provision, which was 
designed as an attempt to rescue ‘fallen women’, was added to the Bill as an afterthought during 
the parliamentary debates when members realised that the criminalisation of both brothels and 
soliciting in public would ‘leave these poor unfortunate women without any place at all’.72 
Enacted in the same parliamentary session, the Prisoners’ Detention Act 1908 (NSW) 
(‘Prisoners’ Detention Act’) empowered magistrates to order that a ‘prisoner’ (that is, someone 
who was serving a term of imprisonment) who was found to be infected with a ‘contagious 
disease’ be detained in a ‘locked hospital’ for an indefinite period that may extend beyond the 
expiration of their term of imprisonment until determined to be ‘free from a contagious disease’ 
by the medical officer in charge of the hospital.
73
  ‘Contagious disease’ was defined as ‘venereal 
disease, including gonorrhoea’.74  The Act had been ‘carefully drafted’ to preserve ‘equality of 
treatment between the sexes,’75 but the parliamentary debates show that it was directed at women 
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working as prostitutes.
76
  These legal changes constructed a ‘prostitute’ problem social group 
that had not previously existed and drove prostitution ‘indoors’, forcing it to become a 
professionalised and ‘less visible’ occupation.77  Judith Allen speculates that this may explain 
why the number of prosecutions of women for offences relating to prostitution fell dramatically 
after 1908.
78
  Historians and criminologists give varying accounts of the impact of the 1908 
laws.
79
  It is clear that the overall number of women appearing before the summary jurisdiction 
charged with offences in relation to prostitution decreased,
80
 but enforcement practices that 
targeted the ‘visible and distasteful’ elements of the commercial sex trade perpetuated the ‘class 
bias’ in the demographic mix of women who appeared as defendants.81 
From 1908 until ‘decriminalisation’ in 1979, the numbers of women appearing in the 
summary jurisdiction charged with offences in relation to prostitution fluctuated wildly with 
changing government policy concerns and policing practices.
82
  For example, between 1940 and 
1971 the most commonly charged offence in relation to prostitution was offensive language 
and/or behaviour. The number of such charges laid during this period ranged from 15,391 in 
1964 to 515 in 1970,
83
 with peaks and troughs in between. As in earlier periods it was a sub-
group of female sex workers who carried the bulk of prosecutions. Because brothel owners were 
rarely charged, and many sex workers were receiving protection from prosecution, charges were 
being laid against the same ‘most troublesome women’ multiple times.84 Occasionally police 
conducted blitzes of brothels and street prostitution, often around election time, which inflated 
the number of arrests and expanded the group of women appearing before the court.
85
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The second ‘special social problem’ relating to women that the government regulated via 
the summary jurisdiction was female first offenders. In 1919 the NSW government enacted the 
First Offenders (Women) Act 1919 (NSW) whereby magistrates were to give female first 
offenders the option of having their case heard in camera and to prohibit publication of the 
details. In the parliamentary debates the government claims to have been motivated by a need to 
assist ‘the unfortunate women of our community who commit crimes’ to avoid the stigmatisation 
of imprisonment.
86
 As one member noted, unlike men, ‘[n]o woman ever recovers from the taint 
of sentence to imprisonment.’87  
This legislative innovation can be readily interpreted as a shift towards marshalling the 
summary jurisdiction to address the social problem of ‘fallen’ women. This is evidenced by the 
comments of Member of Parliament, Mr Perry who noted that many charitable and religious 
organisations were working ‘in the reforming of young girls who are inclined to fall.’88     The 
Act was introduced in the midst of first wave feminism — in the same year the NSW Parliament 
enacted the Women’s Legal Status Act 1918 (NSW), which provided that ‘women shall not by 
reason of sex be deemed to be under any disqualification to hold certain positions or to practise 
certain professions’.89 Despite the fact that the government had sought advice from the ‘women’s 
organisation committee’,90 there is a paternalistic tone running through the debates, perhaps 
reflecting religious interests and the absence of female parliamentarians and parliamentary 
counsel. Mr Hall, for example, equated women with children,
91
 and Mr Mutch, said that in the 
intimidating surroundings of a court room: 
a woman becomes absolutely helpless, if not positively terrified. … Those who have seen women 
as mere witnesses in the box will realise how difficult it is for a woman to comport herself with 
the assurance necessary to do justice to her case.  
Words such as ‘helpless’, ‘unfortunate’ and ‘poor girls’ are used repeatedly to describe these 
women. The Bill’s moralistic intentions are revealed in the government’s plan to place these first 
offenders ‘in association with some good-hearted co-religionists who would endeavour to put 
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them on their feet again’.92  The opposition pointed out that the Bill did not provide for such a 
regime, but did seek ‘to have trials heard in secret’, with some members evoking images of the 
Star Chamber.
93
 Arguments urging the protection of the principle of open justice were, however, 
defeated.  
In addition to further attempts to use the criminal law to solve social problems, a shift 
towards leniency in punishment is discernible in this, and other, legislative changes made 
throughout the first half of the twentieth century. A perception that imprisonment does not assist 
with reform had led to the enactment in 1894 of the First Offenders Probation Act 1894 (NSW), 
and was one of the motivations behind conferring power upon magistrates in 1908 to commit 
women convicted of soliciting to a reformatory, as discussed above. At the time that the First 
Offenders (Women) Act was drafted it was common for first offenders in the summary 
jurisdiction to be sentenced to a period of imprisonment; something that would rarely happen in 
the current era. In providing for private hearings the government hoped that magistrates would 
no longer send female first offenders to gaol.
94
  
The stereotype of the female shoplifter was used to construct another ‘problem’ group 
that the summary jurisdiction was deployed to regulate. It is an important example because it 
shows how in attempting to regulate one harmful social behaviour by altering the summary 
process for female first offenders, the government created another social problem. In 1929 the 
government amended the First Offenders (Women) Act 1919 (NSW) to exclude shoplifting from 
the secret hearing procedure (but not the non-publication order) because it was believed that the 
Act had encouraged criminal gangs to employ women with no prior convictions to shoplift for 
them.
95
 Shoplifting was considered to be a predominantly female offence in this era. By 1929 the 
department store had revolutionised the way in which goods were displayed and sold, no longer 
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placing them behind counters.
96
 In the debates on the 1929 amendments women were depicted as 
weak-willed and unable to resist temptation. Mr Baddley, MP, for example, said: 
it is generally accepted that women are more subject to temptation than men, and are more 
impulsive. … In the big retail merchants’ shops goods are lying strewn all about and some girls 
cannot resist the temptation to pick them up.97 
There are no statistics to indicate the numbers of women who availed themselves of the 
‘secret hearing’ procedure, but the First Offenders (Women) Act (NSW) remained in force until 
1976. It was repealed in the wake of second wave feminism on the basis that it identified women 
who were repeat offenders and was therefore unacceptably discriminatory. It was discriminatory 
because, when a woman appeared in court the magistrate was required to ask her whether she 
would be availing herself of the First Offenders (Women) Act’s closed court procedure. An 
answer of ‘no’ revealed to the magistrate that she had a prior record of offending, thus breaching 
the common law principle of fair trial that the tribunal of fact ought not to be made aware of 
prior convictions.
98
 Also, by 1976 the institutional conditions of the summary jurisdiction had 
changed rendering the First Offenders (Women) Act redundant. Sentencing practices had altered 
to such an extent that it was rare for a first offender to be sentenced to imprisonment. These two 
examples relating to women show the flexibility of the summary jurisdiction and the way its 
procedures and demographic mix changed as social attitudes towards both women and offending 
changed. 
The third example that illustrates how the criminal law in summary form was used to 
regulate constructed harmful behaviours is men engaging in homosexual sex acts. This 
behaviour, which had long been constructed as harmful, was regulated by the summary 
jurisdiction for the bulk of the twentieth century. It is difficult to determine with precision when 
summary offences were first used in relation to this behaviour, but in 1953, the NSW Supreme 
Court in Ex parte Langley (‘Langley’) stated that ‘it has been a practice of long standing’ for 
police to charge men engaging in, or inciting other men to engage in, ‘an unnatural sex offence’ 
with the summary offence of living on earnings of prostitution under s 4(2)(o) of the Vagrancy 
Act 1902 (NSW).
99
  In Langley, the Supreme Court was concerned that police were using the 
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Vagrancy Act offence, which carried a maximum penalty of six months imprisonment, instead of 
the far more serious ‘abominable crime of buggery or bestiality’ under s 79 of the Crimes Act, 
which was punishable by 14 years imprisonment. While the Court does not explore the reasons 
why police may have been doing so, two possible explanations arise from the analysis of 
offences such as cattle stealing in this thesis. The first is that the elements of the more serious 
offence of ‘buggery’, which were defined by common law, would have been difficult to prove 
unless the offenders were caught in the act; and the second is that the police, who were making 
the charging decision, may have thought the penalty for the more serious offence was too harsh. 
In reaching its decision (or perhaps in order to achieve the desired result) the NSW Supreme 
Court confirmed the long-held understanding that only women could be prostitutes. Males 
engaging in such behaviour with other males, the court held, did not fall within the definition of 
the Vagrancy Act offence because the meaning of ‘prostitute’ for the purposes of that Act was ‘a 
woman who indiscriminately consorts with men for hire’.100  Therefore they could not be 
charged with the Vagrancy Act offence, but should, instead, be charged with buggery. 
In response to Langley in 1955 the NSW government added two triable either way 
offences, ss 81A and 81B, to the Crimes Act. Section 81A made it an offence for a ‘male person 
in public or private’ to procure, attempt to procure or commit ‘any act of indecency with another 
male person’.101 The prescribed maximum penalty was two years imprisonment. Section 81B 
made it an offence for a ‘male person, in any public place’ to solicit another male to commit an 
act of indecency under s81A or an ‘abominable’ act under s 79 of the Crimes Act and was 
punishable by up to 12 months imprisonment. However, both sections were placed in the 
reclassification section, s 477 of the Crimes Act, which made them triable summarily with the 
consent of the accused. In this way the new provisions preserved summary jurisdiction over 
homosexual behaviour while conveying moral condemnation by categorising the new offences as 
capable of being finalised on indictment. The theme of using the triable either way categorisation 
of offences to convey moral condemnation is explored in more detail in chapters 6 and 7. 
It has not been possible to determine how many men appeared as defendants in the 
summary jurisdiction charged with such offences, or their social background, because the 
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statistics are camouflaged within the offence category labelled ‘offences against good order’, but 
it is likely that changing police enforcement practices impacted on the number of arrests. 
Homosexual sex acts between consenting male adults were not formally decriminalised in NSW 
until 1984.
102
 
The fourth and final example that illustrates how the criminal law in summary form has 
been used to regulate constructed harmful behaviours is behaviours engaged in by Aboriginal 
people. From the 1930s Aboriginal people began to appear in the summary jurisdiction in greater 
numbers for minor offences as the ‘protection’ systems were slowly dismantled,103 and by the 
1950s incarceration rates were increasing.
104
 Reasons for incarceration differed between rural 
and urban areas but a predominant cause during the second half of the twentieth century was 
low-level offending and drunkenness.
105
  As seen in Chapter 3 in relation to police, and above in 
this chapter in relation to prostitution, police enforcement practices have a significant impact on 
the numbers of defendants who appear in the summary jurisdiction in relation to such 
offences.
106
  Notwithstanding the predominance of low-level offending, Aboriginal people were 
increasingly being arrested for more serious intra-racial violence, including, in some 
communities, violence against Aboriginal women and children.
107
  The reasons for the high 
levels of violence in some Aboriginal communities are complex and are still being unraveled, but 
they include the ongoing impact of colonisation.
108
 Without wishing to detract from the 
importance of the impact of the colonial legacy on the relationship between Aboriginal people 
and the Criminal Justice System, the task in the context of this thesis is to understand how the 
summary jurisdiction has replaced alternative structures that regulated the behaviours of 
Aboriginal people. The best way to do this is through an examination of the NSW government’s 
response to domestic violence in the final quarter of the twentieth century, a topic to which I will 
return in the final part of this chapter.  
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From the Final Quarter of the Twentieth Century to Present 
Four significant changes to the way in which the summary jurisdiction is used to regulate 
harmful behaviours are crucial for understanding the summary jurisdiction in the current era. The 
first is the introduction of the Table System in 1995. In Chapter 1 it was seen how the 
formalisation of jurisdictional boundaries and the rationalisation of the jurisdictional allocation 
of offences created a new way of organising the substantive criminal law that cuts across the 
‘offence family’ method of organisation. Examining the summary jurisdiction through this lens 
shows that these developments have produced a new cohort of defendants in this final period. 
Because unprecedented numbers of offences have been reclassified as triable either way since 
the introduction of the Table System, the number of defendants charged with more serious 
offences whose charges are being finalised summarily has increased.  The second significant 
change is the increasing use of the criminal law in summary form as a means of protecting 
particular members of the community from harmful behaviours.  Accompanying the maturity of 
the summary jurisdiction, this change has produced a second new cohort of defendants charged 
with the category of offences that I call ‘breach of justice orders’. The best example of this 
phenomenon is the offence of contravention of an apprehended violence order (‘CAVO’) and it 
is analysed in Chapter 7. The third significant change has been the ‘decriminalisation’ of 
prostitution which has led to the near disappearance of a social group—women working as 
prostitutes—that has populated the summary jurisdiction since the late nineteenth century. This 
change shows that regulation of particular behaviours by the summary jurisdiction is not 
inevitable. The fourth significant change has been the rise to prominence of the victim which has 
seen the victim move from the periphery to take up a central role in the development of the 
summary jurisdiction in the current era.  
Defendants Charged with Increasingly Serious Offences since the Introduction of the Table System in 
1995 
Due to the intensification of the reclassification of strictly indictable offences as triable either 
way from 1995, significantly more defendants charged with formerly strictly indictable offences 
(in addition to newly created triable either way offences) are being dealt with in the Local Court 
than in previous eras. As shown in Chapter 1, there were three major overhauls of the criminal 
law during the twentieth century. The first was in 1924, the second was in 1974, and the third 
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was in 1995.  The reclassification process began modestly in 1924. This was followed by a fifty 
year gap before another tranche of reclassifications in 1974, which included Assault Occasioning 
Actual Bodily Harm and common assault. These offences comprise one of the top three largest 
offence categories in the summary jurisdiction in the current era. But the 1924 and 1974 
overhauls were a mere trickle in comparison with the tsunami of reclassifications that was 
precipitated by the introduction of tables 1 and 2 in 1995, each of which contains hundreds of 
offences.
109
  As discussed in relation to plea bargaining in Chapter 3, the combined result of the 
Table System and the presumption of summary disposition created by s 260 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) has been that 41 per cent of triable either way offences are now 
either withdrawn or finalised in the Local Court.
110
 Numerically these offences comprise only a 
small fraction of total offences in the summary jurisdiction, but they represent a significant 
proportion of total triable either way offences. Triable either way offences can also be more 
complex, particularly if defended.
111
  Two key examples examined in Chapter 6 (below) are 
affray and using a weapon to commit an offence. The intensification of the reclassification of 
strictly indictable offences as triable either way from 1995 has also contributed to increasing 
involvement of victims in the summary jurisdiction in the current era, a topic which I explore 
below in this chapter.   
Aboriginal Defendants 
In the 1970s, as the vestiges of the civil regulatory system of protection disappeared, Aboriginal 
people were increasingly appearing as defendants in the summary jurisdiction.
112
 In that decade, 
evidence began to emerge of the disproportionate enforcement and punishment of minor offences 
against Aboriginal people. Reports by BOCSAR and others revealed that there were higher rates 
of arrest for drunkenness in ‘country towns with a relatively high Aboriginal population’.113  
While these statistics may, in part, have been explained by the well-known fact that some 
                                                          
109
 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) sch 1. 
110
 New South Wales Law Reform Commission (NSWLRC), Encouraging Appropriate Early Guilty Pleas, Report 
No 141 (2014) 62 xvii–xviii. 
111
 New South Wales Sentencing Council, 'An Examination of the Sentencing Powers of the Local Court in New 
South Wales' (New South Wales Sentencing Council, December 2010 ) 30 [para 3.6]. 
112
 Finnane, Police and Government, above n 1, 122-130. 
113
 Golder, above n 4, 197.  
160 
 
Aboriginal people spend more time in public spaces than non-Aboriginal people,
114
 this does not 
explain it fully. Nor does it explain why the sentences imposed by magistrates for drunkenness in 
those towns were also disproportionately severe.
115
  The reasons are complex, but they include 
the legacy of the police role in the enforcement of the protection policies, in particular the 
removal of Aboriginal children.
116
  At the risk of oversimplification, this history, and ongoing 
discriminatory police practices, has caused tension between Aboriginal people and the police.
117
  
One consequence of this tension that is relevant to the summary jurisdiction is what has become 
known as the ‘trifecta’, where a charge of offensive language escalates into additional charges of 
resist arrest and assault police.
118
  In addition to problematic police enforcement practices the 
BOCSAR reports raised a concern that magistrates were imposing sentences in a discriminatory 
manner.  
At around this time in the late 1960s/early 1970s it was also revealed that in Redfern, the 
heart of the Aboriginal community in Sydney, the offence of drunkenness was being used against 
Aboriginal people as a de facto curfew. In a report commissioned by the National Inquiry into 
Racist Violence, Justice Wooten described the curfew in operation: ‘any Aboriginal who was on 
the streets of Redfern at a quarter past ten was simply put into the paddy wagon and taken to the 
station and charged with drunkenness.’119  This discriminatory treatment of Aboriginal people 
was the reason for the establishment of the Aboriginal Legal Service in 1971, a subject which is 
explored in Chapter 3. In 1991 the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody 
(‘RCIADIC’) revealed that during the 1980s Aboriginal people had been coming into police 
custody at a disproportionate rate for being intoxicated, for alcohol-related offences, and for 
other minor matters such as offensive language.
120
  While Aboriginal people continue to come 
before the summary jurisdiction in disproportionate numbers for low level offending despite 
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changes to legal practices recommended by the RCIADIC,
121
 in the current era more serious 
offences are also contributing to their over-incarceration. A prominent example of this is the 
introduction of the ‘beach of justice order’ offence of CAVO in the 1980s. This offence enlisted 
the summary jurisdiction in the quest to govern the newly recognised harmful behaviour of non-
fatal domestic violence. Chapter 7 analyses the rise of this offence in detail and its impact on 
Aboriginal defendants. 
The ‘Decriminalisation’ of Prostitution 
At the same time as indictable offences were being reclassified as triable either way from 1974, 
several numerically large minor public conduct offences have been ‘decriminalised’ in the 
current era. As discussed in Chapter 2, this was a product of the magistracy’s quest for increased 
status under Farquhar’s leadership,122 together with a shift from a punitive to a welfare approach 
to social issues such as drunkenness and drug use.
123
  I use quotation marks around 
‘decriminalised’ because while the substantive offences were abolished, the behaviour was 
criminalised in other ways. One important example is the offence of public drunkenness, which 
had constituted a large proportion of the case load of the summary jurisdiction since 
colonisation. It was abolished by the Intoxicated Persons Act 1979 (NSW), thus removing a large 
cohort of defendants, but remained criminalised through alternative mechanisms such as police 
detention of intoxicated persons for up to eight hours if they were, for example, ‘behaving in a 
disorderly manner’.124  
Similarly in 1979, following the sexual revolution of the 1960s and 1970s and sustained 
lobbying by feminist groups and civil libertarians, the socially progressive left-leaning NSW 
government ‘decriminalised’ prostitution by repealing the Summary Offences Act 1970 (NSW), 
which contained, among other prostitution-related offences, soliciting for prostitution.
125
 
However, in place of the repealed Summary Offences Act the government had enacted the 
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Offences in Public Places Act 1970 (NSW), which police used as a substitute for the repealed 
prostitution offences. The result is reflected in the statistics. Between 1976 and 1979, 1,663 
women were arrested for ‘offensive behaviour’ in relation to prostitution. Between 1979 and 
1981, following decriminalisation, 10,480 women were arrested for ‘causing serious alarm or 
affront’ under the Offences in Public Places Act 1970 (NSW) in relation to prostitution.126 Thus 
decriminalisation had occurred in name only. Notwithstanding the enactment of the Offences in 
Public Places Act 1970 (NSW) a small number of women engaging in visible prostitution-related 
behaviour continued to be brought repeatedly before the summary jurisdiction. Soliciting was re-
criminalised in 1988 with the re-enactment of the Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) when a 
conservative government took office after a decade of Labor rule.  
After more than two centuries of prosecuting only prostitutes for behaviour relating to 
prostitution, an offence of solicitation of a prostitute by a client was inserted into the Summary 
Offences Act in 1989
127
 and the first prosecution of a male client in the history of NSW was 
brought in the same year. It was such an event that it was reported in the Sydney Morning 
Herald.
128
 Between the year 2000 and 2013 there was a spate of prosecutions of clients under s 
19A(1) of the Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) but the numbers peaked at 161 in 2001 and 
have since dwindled to none.
129
  A likely explanation for the failure to prosecute clients is police 
enforcement practices, which is another illustration of the impact of these practices on the 
number and demographic mix of defendants offence profile in the summary jurisdiction. 
In the current era prostitution offences have all but disappeared from the summary 
jurisdiction as regulation has been assigned to alternative government structures. It must be 
noted, however, that it is not possible to tell on the current data the extent to which prostitution-
related behaviour is camouflaged by the public order offence statistics. The numbers of the most 
frequently-charged prostitution offence—soliciting within view from a dwelling, school etc130—
have declined from 307 finalised charges in 1994 to just one in 2016.
131
  The reason for the 
decline was the shift in the mid-1990s from regulating prostitution via the criminal law to 
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regulating it via local council planning and development administrative mechanisms. The shift 
was precipitated by two events: the exposure in the Wood Royal Commission of ‘a clear nexus 
between police corruption and the operation of brothels’;132 and the Supreme Court decision 
Sibuse v Shaw
133
 in which it was held that ‘a brothel is a disorderly house [within the meaning of 
the Disorderly Houses Act 1943 (NSW)] regardless of whether it is disorderly in the usual 
meaning of the word’. This decision increased the potential number of convictions of brothel 
owners.
134
  Changes to the law in 1995 enabled brothels to obtain a planning certificate from 
their local council and this regime remains in force in the current era.
135
  Once in possession of a 
certificate, a brothel may only be closed by a declaration of the Land and Environment Court, 
which is a branch of the Supreme Court, upon application by the relevant local council. Local 
councils may apply for a declaration if they have received complaints from local residents. In 
making its decision, the Land and Environment Court is directed to consider a list of factors, 
including whether the brothel is causing ‘a disturbance in the neighbourhood’.136 Frances 
reported in 2007 that illegal prostitution persists because some councils refuse to grant 
permits.
137
 
The Rise to Prominence of the Victim 
In the current era victims have moved from the sidelines to take up a key position in the criminal 
justice process.
138
 This has impacted on the summary jurisdiction in two main respects. Firstly, 
decisions made by victims now have the potential to influence the course of criminal 
prosecutions through the process of plea negotiation. Secondly, through the political power of 
lobby groups that have arisen in the final quarter of the twentieth century, victims exert 
enormous influence over law reform. This part of the chapter charts the rise to prominence of the 
victim in NSW and examines how it has shaped the summary jurisdiction in the current era. 
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Scholars have traced the roots of the focus on victims in criminal justice to a branch of 
criminology called ‘victimology’, which began to develop in the post-war period.139  
Victimology was initially used as a means of shedding new light on the traditional interests of 
criminology, namely crime and the criminal.
140
 Alongside this new ‘science’, an interest in 
victimisation developed as a method of attempting to quantify the ‘dark figure’ of crime.141  
From the late 1960s victims became an area of study ‘in their own right’, but it was the lobbying 
of victims groups that raised awareness of the dissatisfaction of victims with the criminal justice 
system.
142
  Initial efforts by victims groups focused on persuading the state to provide economic 
and psychological assistance to victims of crime. However, as victimisation surveys began to 
reveal the level of alienation felt by victims from the criminal justice process, those efforts were 
expanded to the ‘reintegration’ of victims into the criminal justice process.143  Tyrone 
Kirchengast characterises attempts to address these feelings of alienation as a backlash against 
the displacement of the victim from the criminal process by the state.
144
 Peter Ramsay attributes 
such developments to the ‘decay of liberal norms into a political culture characterised by 
permanent emergency’.145  In addition, the increased significance of victims in the criminal 
process in the last three decades has been driven by human rights discourses precipitated by the 
adoption of the United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime 
and Abuse of Power in 1985.
146
 
In NSW the first Victims Compensation Scheme was created in 1987,
147
 and the focus on 
compensation changed to rights when a Charter of Victims’ Rights was created in 1989. In 1996, 
acting on an election promise, the NSW Government gave the Charter statutory force by 
enacting the Victims Rights Act 1996 (NSW), which, the Government explained, placed a 
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‘statutory obligation on agencies to ensure that a victim is treated with courtesy and compassion 
and respect for their rights and dignity.’148 However, in keeping with the abiding suspicion of 
human rights in NSW, the Act fell short of creating enforceable legal rights by limiting the 
action that could be taken for a breach of the charter to ‘disciplinary proceedings against an 
official or a complaint to the Victims Bureau’. 149 The increasing power of the victims’ lobby is 
evidenced by the establishment in the Act of a Victims of Crime Bureau in 1996 to provide 
services to victims, and, in the same year, a Victims Advisory Board, which was to ‘provide 
advice to government on matters relating to support services for crime victims and victims 
compensation.’150  
Changes made to the victims support regime in 2013 show that government attention to 
victims has now become a necessary feature of the political landscape in the current era. In 2013 
the Victims Rights Act 1996 (NSW) was repealed and replaced with the Victims Rights and 
Support Act 2013 (NSW), which rationalised the provision of compensation to make the system 
more efficient, and created the office of the Commissioner of Victims Rights. The office of 
Commissioner was a policy commitment set out in the Premier, Barry O’Farrell’s conservative 
government’s 10-year plan to improve ‘community confidence in the justice system’.151 It was 
part of a broader plan to ‘rebuild our state and make NSW number one.’152  The increased 
political power of victims, together with women’s and feminist lobby groups, has had a 
significant impact on the summary jurisdiction via law reform. Chapter 7 of this thesis, which 
examines the use of the summary jurisdiction as a means of regulating non-fatal domestic 
violence, shows how demands from victims and feminist groups have dictated not only the 
content of the substantive law relating to domestic violence in the summary jurisdiction, but also 
changes to the practices of actors, including the police, prosecutors and magistrates. 
In addition to the political power of lobby groups, victims now have the potential to 
influence the course of criminal prosecutions through the process of plea negotiation. By virtue 
of the statutory obligation on government agencies to have regard to the Charter of Victims 
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Rights, victims must be consulted and kept informed of the progress of their case through the 
criminal justice process. The Charter of Victims Rights was appended to the ODPP Prosecution 
Guidelines in the late 1980s.
153
  Even though their views are not determinative, the process of 
requiring the victim to be consulted gives them more power to influence the outcome of criminal 
proceedings than previously.
154
  
Conclusion 
This Chapter showed how certain behaviours have been constructed as harmful, and how the 
summary jurisdiction has criminalised them. This process has resulted in the construction of 
‘problem’ social groups. The behaviours have been so diverse that it is not possible to depict 
them as sharing the same features. The Chapter also showed that the process of regulation via the 
summary jurisdiction has resulted in the construction of ‘problem’ social groups. Thus the 
demographic mix of defendants in the summary jurisdiction has changed over time. Between 
colonisation and the final quarter of the twentieth century, the demographic mix of defendants in 
the summary jurisdiction was dominated by offenders from the lower strata of society who had 
been charged, often repeatedly, with low level offences such as public drunkenness. In the final 
quarter of the twentieth century, however, there was a shift in the nature of defendants appearing 
before the summary jurisdiction as increasingly serious offences were reclassified as triable 
either way. At the same time victims began to play a greater role in the conduct of the criminal 
process. Four changes account for this shift. The first is the maturation of the summary 
jurisdiction. The second is its formalisation, which has made the intensification of the 
reclassification of strictly indictable offences since 1995 possible. The third is the 
‘decriminalisation’ of certain ‘staple’ offences of the summary jurisdiction, such as public 
drunkenness; and the fourth is the rise to prominence of victims in the criminal justice process in 
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the current era. Notwithstanding this seismic shift, there remains an element of continuity: in the 
current era a large number of defendants — more than 60 per cent — are repeat offenders.155
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Part III – Substantive Offences 
169 
 
Chapter 5: Assault and Affray 
This thesis now turns to examine substantive offences. Assault and affray are pivotal offences of 
the summary jurisdiction because they show how formalisation has made increasing vertical and 
horizontal criminalisation possible. Vertical and horizontal criminalisation have pushed forward 
the summary jurisdiction’s development. I use the term ‘assault’ as a shorthand term to refer to 
common assault, battery, and more aggravated forms of assault, such as assault occasioning 
actual bodily harm, distinguishing between them where necessary. Common assault is the third 
largest offence category in the summary jurisdiction behind drink-driving and offences against 
justice procedures, resulting in almost 20 per cent of total convictions in 2016.
1
 After lying 
dormant for two centuries, affray is enjoying a renaissance. Its prevalence has increased 
dramatically from 0.03 per cent in 1994 to 0.92 per cent in 2016.
2
 This is 30-fold increase and 
although it is still a relatively small number of cases (2,166 out of a total of 234,879), this 
represents a change over time in the government’s response to interpersonal violence.  
Unlike drink-driving (Chapter 6) and CAVO (Chapter 7), which grew up in the summary 
jurisdiction, both assault and affray have been reclassified as triable either way, but at different 
times and for different reasons. Assault has been at the epicentre of rationalisation of the 
jurisdictional allocation of offences and has therefore played a significant role in the 
development of the summary jurisdiction. Assault and affray are examined side by side in this 
chapter because in the summary jurisdiction today they are closely aligned. One manifestation of 
this alignment is the use of the offence of affray as an alternative, or ‘back-up’, to a charge of 
assault. In other words, there is evidence that the police sometimes use a charge of affray to 
secure a conviction where they would otherwise not be able to secure one for assault (for 
example, where the victim refuses to give evidence). Such use of alternative charges to secure 
convictions is an under-analysed dimension of criminalisation.  
This chapter argues that the most useful dimensions of formalisation for understanding 
assault and affray in the summary jurisdiction are rationalisation and juridification. My analysis 
suggests that change over time in these offences has been produced by changing social attitudes 
towards interpersonal violence. Three moments in time illustrate this dynamic in relation to the 
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law of assault: the adoption of the Offences against the Person Act 1828 (UK); the creation of 
offences of aggravated assault on women and children in 1854; and the evolution of the offence 
of stalking from the final decade of the twentieth century to present.  
My analysis also shows that formalisation made possible the reclassification of more 
serious offences in the assault hierarchy, and the common law offence of affray. The triable 
either way category of offences has given jurisdiction a fungible quality that enables Parliament 
to use the jurisdictional classification of offences for political purposes. Thus the jurisdictional 
allocation of offences is used normatively. As discussed in Chapter 4 in relation to homosexual 
sex acts between men, the fungibility of jurisdiction enables Parliament to attach a high degree of 
moral blameworthiness to constructed harmful behaviour through the maximum penalty 
available on indictment, while preserving the availability of the summary form. This facilitates 
criminalisation. In the context of assault-like offences, this dynamic is best illustrated by the 
offence of ‘use weapon to resist arrest’.   
From Colonisation to the Mid-Nineteenth Century 
By the time NSW was colonised in 1788 the law of assault was beginning to formalise. The 
distinction between the civil and criminal jurisdictions was hardening,
3
 and assault had come to 
lie in the criminal jurisdiction.
4
  Affray, by contrast, appears always to have been an offence 
against the peace, which placed it in the criminal jurisdiction, rather than being a matter for 
private suit.
5
  It was the construction of assault around protection of the king’s peace that gave it 
its criminal character.
6
 This characterisation of assault as an offence against the peace is 
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reinforced in the commission of the peace where assaults and batteries are described as ‘properly 
and directly against the peace’.7   
In the 1785 edition of Burn’s Justice of the Peace, the law of assault was described in this 
way:  
Assault…is an attempt or offer, with force and violence, to do corporal hurt to another; as by 
striking at him with or without a weapon; or presenting a gun at him, at such a distance to which 
the gun will carry; or pointing a pitchfork at him, standing within the reach of it; or by holding up 
one’s fist at him; or by any other such like act, done in an angry, threatening manner.8  
A brief statement of principle is followed by specific illustrations. Similarly battery was defined 
as: 
when any injury whatsoever, be it never so small (sic), is actually done to the person of a man, in 
an angry, or revengeful, or rude, or insolent manner, as by spitting in his face, or any way 
touching him in anger, or violently jostling him out of the way, and the like.9 
Affray was described as ‘a publick [sic] offence to the terror of the king’s subjects; so called 
(according to Lord Coke) because it affrighteth and maketh men afraid.’10  Words alone did not 
constitute an affray, but they empowered a constable to take the person who had spoken them 
‘before a justice in order to find sureties [of the peace].’11  There could be an affray without 
violence, such as ‘where a man arms himself with dangerous and unlawful weapons, in such a 
manner as will naturally cause a terror to the people’; but the wearing of arms without 
circumstances of terror was not an affray.
12
 A person’s status was a key aspect of determining 
liability for affray, for ‘persons of quality are in no danger of offending against this statute.’13  
From the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Turn of the Twentieth Century 
Towards the middle decades of the nineteenth century in NSW there was a social shift away 
from tolerance of interpersonal violence. A similar shift took place in England towards the end of 
the eighteenth century and has been identified as part of a longer-term ‘civilising’ process dating 
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from the sixteenth
th
 century.
14
  In early nineteenth century England, in the context of the 
Victorian concern with respectability, the criminal law began to contribute to the shaping of 
social attitudes towards violence by reducing capital and corporal punishment. At the same time 
the reach of the criminal law was extended through the increased use of the summary form,
15
 the 
creation of a hierarchy of offences with commensurate penalties, and the development of 
alternative forms of punishment, such as the penitentiary.
16
   Farmer has argued that the criminal 
law played a central role in the ‘invention’ of violence, a core component of which was a 
‘developing normative understanding of the inviolability of the person.’17  A similar normative 
development is discernible in NSW. It is explained in part by the fact that Victorian-era morals 
had made their way to the Antipodes;
18
  but the concern about respectability was also a product 
of the local context — the interrelated desires to shed the colony’s convict past (the ‘convict 
taint’) as transportation was abolished, to attract more free settlers to the colony, and to increase 
the colony’s prosperity.19   
In these changing social conditions, prosecutions for assault began to increase, and this 
precipitated the formalisation of the law of assault. The structure and content of the current law 
of assault in NSW, which includes both indictable offences and those that are triable either way, 
is based on ‘a hierarchy of offences against the person’ that was developed between 1803 and 
1861 in England.
20
  While this process began in 1803, my analysis indicates that the enactment 
of Lord Landsdowne’s Act in 1828 (which applied in NSW)21 was a significant moment in the 
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formalisation and modernisation of the law of assault. Lord Landsdowne’s Act,22 the official title 
of which was the Offences against the Person Act 1828 (UK), was one of a series of reforms 
introduced between 1825 and 1828 to simplify and consolidate criminal law and procedure. John 
Plunkett, a lawyer practising in NSW, authored the first edition of The Australian Magistrate, 
which was published in 1835. He interpreted the reason for passing Lord Lansdowne’s Act as 
being merely to reduce cost and improve efficiency.
23
 Peter King regards the Act as of little 
moment as it ‘was directly [sic] mainly at the magistrates in Petty Sessions and did little more 
than formalise existing practice by empowering two justices “to hear and determine” assault 
cases and impose fines of up to £5’.24  (If the offender defaulted on paying the fine, magistrates 
could imprison the offender for a maximum of 2 months.)
25
  However, these interpretations 
underplay the fact that placing the power of magistrates to deal with common assault on a 
statutory footing is an instance of juridification because it represents an attempt by Parliament to 
assert the authority of statute and to stamp out informal practices by placing limits on 
discretionary power.  
Prior to the enactment of Lord Lansdowne’s Act, magistrates in England disposed of 
assault matters informally, committing, it was estimated, ‘scarcely a fiftieth part of the assault 
cases that come before magistrates in their private houses’ for trial in the higher courts.26  Two 
factors combined to encourage such informality: penalties for assault dealt with on indictment 
were still harsh at this time, so disposing of matters informally circumvented those penalties; and 
magistrates had no power to impose penalties for assault in the summary jurisdiction.
27
  The 
most common outcomes before magistrates were settlement of the dispute or binding the 
offender over to keep the peace.
28
  There is a suggestion that the only matters sent before a jury 
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were those where the magistrate or ‘an influential neighbour’ sought to make an example of the 
offender.
29
   
By giving magistrates the power to impose penalties for assault, it was intended that these 
informal practices be abolished. The extension of summary jurisdiction was also designed to 
remove ‘trivial’ matters from the Courts of Quarter Sessions,30 and provide access to justice to 
people of limited means.
31
  The combination of a centralising police force that was gradually 
assuming responsibility for prosecution, and an emerging ‘humanitarian sensibility’ among the 
middle classes, led to an increase in prosecutions for assault. Lord Lansdowne’s Act, which 
formalised the power of magistrates to impose punishments for assault, enabled an ‘increasing 
number of assaults [to] be tried summarily’.32 
Due to a lack of records, and the multiple factors impacting on recorded crime rates, it is 
difficult to gauge the impact of Lord Lansdowne’s Act in NSW but there are reasons to think that 
the number of assaults finalised summarily (formally rather than informally) increased. As seen 
in chapter 2, during this period in NSW it was common for magistrates to dispose of matters 
informally and they frequently exceeded their sentencing jurisdiction.
33
  The magistrates’ 
treatises published before and after the enactment of Lord Lansdowne’s Act provide some 
indication that prosecutions for assault in the summary jurisdiction were increasing. The 1825 
edition of Burn’s Justice of the Peace (‘Burn’), an English publication, was the only treatise 
written specifically for magistrates that was available in the NSW colony between 1825 and 
1835 when Plunkett authored The Australian Magistrate. The section in Burn on assault and 
battery is brief. It sets out the definitions of assault and battery followed by one and a half pages 
of examples of when assault and/or battery will be justified.
34
  The first edition of The Australian 
Magistrate was based on Burn but was supplemented by relevant cases from the Australian 
colonies. It replicated Burn’s definition of assault and then set out the provisions of Lord 
Lansdowne’s Act. No examples were provided. By the third edition of The Australian 
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Magistrate, published in 1847, the section on assaults and batteries had been greatly expanded, 
including an extended discussion of the requirement of proportionality in justified assaults and 
summaries of cases that provided examples of particular factual scenarios.
35
  By 1881, the 
discussion of examples was divided into cases falling within the summary jurisdiction,
36
 and 
those that were dealt with on indictment.
37
  This expanding treatment of assault in the treatises 
over this period is evidence of the increasing numerical profile of assault offences in the 
summary jurisdiction at this time—both those that were finalised summarily, and those that 
magistrates committed for trial.  
By contrast with the increasing examination of assault in the treatises, the material on 
affray was shrinking. The 1835 edition of The Australian Magistrate, reproduced the definition 
of affray from Burn over one and a half pages. By 1866, the entry on affray had diminished to 
just five lines stating that it was a misdemeanour at common law and was defined as ‘[t]wo or 
more fighting in some public place, to the terror of the people’.38  The only options available to 
magistrates in relation to a charge of affray were to commit the accused for trial for assault or 
affray, or bind them over to keep the peace.
39
  This limited treatment of affray suggests the 
offence was seldom charged, and if charged, seldom committed for trial during this period. 
Given the dearth of records it is not possible to determine whether, and if so, how frequently, 
magistrates dealt with affray informally or bound accused persons over to keep the peace. 
Alongside vertical criminalisation, horizontal criminalisation in the mid-nineteenth 
century was also contributing to the formalisation of responses to interpersonal violence. This is 
best illustrated by the adoption in NSW in 1854 of the English Aggravated Assaults on Women 
and Children Act enacted by the British Parliament in 1853.
40
  In response to concerns about 
violence against women and children, the British Parliament expanded the jurisdiction of 
magistrates to deal with family violence in 1853. They did so by adding an offence of aggravated 
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assault with a higher maximum penalty than common assault to the summary jurisdiction.
41
 The 
Aggravated Assaults on Women and Children Act 1854 (NSW) (‘Aggravated Assaults Act NSW’) 
instructed magistrates to make use of the provision when of the opinion that the assault was of 
such a nature that the punishment prescribed in the Lansdowne Act (£5 and in default, a 
maximum of 2 months imprisonment) was insufficient.
42
 The Aggravated Assaults Act NSW 
augmented the sentencing powers of magistrates in two ways: it empowered magistrates to 
impose a maximum sentence of six months with or without hard labour for aggravated assaults 
(or a fine of up to £20); and magistrates could choose between imprisonment and a fine in the 
first instance. The following year, in 1855, the NSW Parliament expanded the power to choose 
between imprisonment and a fine to ‘all cases of summary convictions for assault’.43 In this way, 
recognition of a category of harm being suffered by a particular class of victims, namely women 
and children, led to horizontal criminalisation and pushed forward the development of the 
summary jurisdiction.
44
 
Prosecution practices under the new aggravated assault provision differed from those for 
common assault because they were designed to improve access to justice for victims of domestic 
violence. They were designed to overcome one of the main disincentives to having recourse to 
the criminal law, which was, the fear of reprisals from the perpetrator for initiating charges. For 
common assault the aggrieved person was required to bring the complaint,
45
 and justices were 
not empowered to convict and impose a penalty where the complainant asked the court merely to 
bind the offender over to keep the peace.
46
  By contrast, a prosecution for aggravated assault 
could be brought ‘either upon the complaint of the party aggrieved or otherwise’.47 This 
provision is important because it enabled women who were victims of domestic assaults to 
distance themselves from responsibility for the decision to initiate charges. I return to this theme 
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of changes to prosecution practices that have facilitated the criminalisation of domestic violence 
in Chapter 7.  
The law of assault was consolidated in 1883 but not rationalised, leaving the 
jurisdictional allocation of assault offences in a state of confusion, a situation that persisted for 
more than a century. As explained in Chapter 1, the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1883 (NSW) 
(‘the 1883 Act’) divided offences into ‘families’, such as ‘offences against the person’, ‘larceny 
and similar offences’ etc. At the end of the part of the 1883 Act on each offence family was a 
section that listed the offences that were ‘punishable by justices’. The 1883 Act closely followed 
the classification system and content of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 (UK) in 
relation to assault offences.
48
 The 1883 Act prescribed the punishment for common assault 
finalised summarily (imprisonment for a maximum term of three months or a maximum fine of 
£10, or up to six months imprisonment or a maximum fine of £20 for an aggravated assault upon 
women, or boys under 14) but left its definition to the common law.
49
  In doing so, it preserved 
the pre-existing jurisdiction of magistrates over common assault and aggravated assaults,
50
 and 
the requirement that magistrates commit such assaults for trial where they found them to have 
been ‘accompanied by an attempt to commit felony or … from any other circumstance … [it is] 
a fit subject for prosecution by indictment’.51  This provision gave magistrates a broad discretion 
to commit matters for trial. 
From the Turn of the Twentieth Century to the Final Quarter of the Twentieth Century 
The jurisdictional allocation of assault and the maximum penalties that could be imposed 
summarily did not change between 1883 and the final quarter of the twentieth century. In light of 
the fact that the reclassification mechanism emerged in 1891, and that Parliament had been 
expanding summary jurisdiction in relation to assault since 1828, how can this century of inertia 
be explained?   A development of the summary jurisdiction that took place in 1924 provides a 
clue to this puzzle. In the post-World War I period, as part of the first of three major overhauls of 
the criminal law undertaken in NSW in the twentieth century,
52
 the NSW government partially 
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rationalised the jurisdictional allocation of offences. The changes were minor but significant 
because it was the first time that the reclassification mechanism was used to increase the number 
of offences that could be finalised summarily with the consent of the accused by adding them to 
a reclassification provision in the Crimes Act. This reform is an instance of vertical 
criminalisation, so why was assault not included? 
In the early 1920s the NSW government was faced with high unemployment, a 
deteriorating economic situation, and rising recorded crime rates. There was much speculation in 
the parliamentary debates on the 1924 changes to the Crimes Act about the causes of the increase 
in recorded crime, such as the after-effects of the war, unemployment, and a more efficient and 
effective police force.
53
  While the causes were debatable, it was clear that both the magistrates 
courts and the Courts of Quarter Sessions were processing a higher number of cases than ever 
before in the twentieth century, and the numbers had been increasing steadily for more than a 
decade. For example, committals by magistrates to the court of quarter sessions had doubled 
since 1918,
54
 and the number of trials being run in the Courts of Quarter Sessions had doubled 
since 1913.
55
 There had been similar increases in the number of matters finalised summarily.
56
  
Faced with increasing delays in the Courts of Quarter Sessions the government framed the debate 
around two possible solutions: either incur the expense of employing more judges in the Courts 
of Quarter Sessions in straitened economic times; or permit more cases to be finalised 
summarily.  
At this time, there was no rational basis for the jurisdictional allocation of offences. One 
of several examples given in the parliamentary debates on the 1924 amendments illustrates the 
irrationality:  if a ‘man’ had stolen a dog he could — without his consent — be tried by a 
magistrate, but a man who had stolen a cat could not — without his consent — be tried by a 
magistrate.
57
  The government proposed to rid the criminal law of several such anomalies. 
Premier Bannon said repeatedly, ‘[w]e are rectifying anomalies of that kind [i.e., the cat and dog 
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scenario set out above] and that is all we are doing.’58  Nevertheless, much concern was 
expressed in the parliamentary debates that increasing the number of offences that could be 
finalised summarily without the consent of the accused would erode the foundational democratic 
institution of trial by jury.  
The power of the legitimation function served by the jury trial at this time is evident in 
the government’s awareness that the need for a more rational criminal law was not sufficient to 
justify changes that effectively restricted access to trial by jury. It therefore listed several further 
justifications. It pointed out that a ‘very large number’ of those matters committed for trial were 
matters of ‘trifling’ dishonesty,59 the implication being that they did not require the attention of 
the Courts of Quarter Sessions. It also noted that approximately 50 per cent of matters that were 
committed for trial resolved by way of a plea of guilty.
60
  Of those matters that went to trial, 
approximately 40 per cent resulted in an acquittal.
61
  Based on these justifications the 
government reclassified several strictly indictable offences by creating a provision that contained 
all of the offences in the Crimes Act that were to be dealt with summarily without the consent of 
the accused (s 501).
62
   
This is the first time this provision (which I call the ‘without consent’ provision or 
jurisdiction) makes an appearance as a provision of general application, rather than one attached 
to individual offences, in the criminal law of NSW. A general sentencing jurisdiction of 12 
months imprisonment or a fine of £50 pounds was attached to the provision. These developments 
are best understood as rationalisation, but there were restrictions. The without consent 
jurisdiction could only be exercised by two stipendiary or police magistrates; it could not be 
exercised by honorary magistrates, nor could it be exercised by magistrates sitting alone.  
The list of offences that could be finalised summarily with the consent of the accused 
was, by this time, in s 476 of the Crimes Act (which I call the with consent provision or 
jurisdiction). No further offences were added to the with consent jurisdiction in 1924. Assault 
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was not included in the rationalisation process and therefore was not included in either section 
despite the fact that in some circumstances, as explained above, it could be finalised summarily. 
The concern expressed about preservation of access to trial by jury in the parliamentary 
debates on the 1924 changes to the Crimes Act accounts for the minimal expansion of the 
summary jurisdiction in the 1924 overhaul of the criminal law. There were compelling economic 
reasons for moving offences from the expensive Courts of Quarter Sessions to the cheaper 
magistrates’ courts and yet parliament reclassified very few offences and excluded assault from 
the rationalisation process. This hints at the possibility that there is more to the expansion of the 
summary jurisdiction than a trade-off between the rights of the accused and economic 
rationalism. It was not until the final quarter of the twentieth century that due process concerns 
were satisfied in other ways as described elsewhere in this thesis. This explains why consent was 
required for common assault to be tried summarily until 1988, and why the use of the criminal 
law in summary form exploded in the final quarter of the twentieth century and not earlier.  
From the Final Quarter of the Twentieth Century to Present  
During the final quarter of the twentieth century the jurisdictional allocation of common assault 
was rationalised incrementally. It was done in three stages in 1974, 1988 and 1995. In 1974 
Parliament reclassified several strictly indictable offences as capable of being finalised 
summarily by adding them to the with consent provision of the Crimes Act (which was still s 
476).
63
  As explained above, s 501 (the without consent provision) had been inserted in 1924, but 
several reclassified offences still existed outside of these two general provisions, including 
common and aggravated assault. The 1974 amendments reclassified, among other offences, the 
strictly indictable offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm,
64
 assault with intent to 
commit felony on certain officers,
65
 and ‘common assault prosecuted on indictment’, by adding 
them to the with consent provision.
66
  Attached to the list of offences was a provision of general 
application prescribing a maximum sentencing jurisdiction of 2 years imprisonment if tried 
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summarily (unless the term fixed by law was shorter), or a $2,000 fine.
67
  The without consent 
summary sentencing jurisdiction, on conviction before two justices, remained imprisonment for 
12 months, as it had been prior to the 1974 changes, but the fine was increased to $1,000.
68
 This 
rearrangement of jurisdiction left duplicate summary common assault provisions:  s 61 of the 
Crimes Act, confusingly titled ‘common assault prosecuted on indictment’, which could be 
finalised summarily with the consent of the accused and was punishable by a maximum of 2 
years imprisonment;
69
 and ‘common assault’,70 which was a without consent summary offence 
(but was not included in the without consent provision), punishable by a maximum of six months 
imprisonment or a $500 fine or both. The 1974 amendments therefore left a residue of 
inconsistency.  
By the late 1980s the conditions that made the increasing use of the criminal law in 
summary form possible were taking hold. As seen in Part II of this thesis, the summary 
jurisdiction was experiencing lawyerification.  Courts of Petty Sessions had been abolished and 
replaced with Local Courts. The magistracy had gained independence from the Public Service, it 
was becoming increasingly professionalised, and increasing numbers of magistrates were gaining 
legal qualifications. The introduction of large-scale government-funded legal aid in the mid-to-
late-1970s had increased the number of defence lawyers appearing in the Local Courts, and the 
ODPP, which had been created in 1986, was taking carriage of a number of triable either way 
matters. In this context, in 1987 the NSWLRC tabled a report on crippling delays within the 
criminal justice system.
71
  The fact that the government of the day made it an election promise in 
the upcoming 1988 election to reduce delays and increase the efficiency of the criminal justice 
system reflects the high social profile of this issue.
72
   Members of Parliament were also 
concerned about an increase in the reported crime rates for offences against the person in the 
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period 1987-8,
73
 and there had been a spate of riots in Redfern, Bathurst, as well as Bourke and 
other parts of western NSW.
74
  In response to this constellation of circumstances the government 
proposed the rationalisation of the jurisdictional allocation of assault, the abolition of the strictly 
indictable common law offences of riot, rout and affray, and the creation of statutory offences of 
riot and affray that were to be placed in the with consent summary jurisdiction. 
The 1988 amendments can be readily interpreted as evidence that formalisation had 
created conditions that enabled Parliament to undertake further vertical criminalisation. 
Parliament repealed ss 493 (common assault) and 494 (aggravated assaults) and reclassified ss 
58 (assault with intent to commit felony on certain officers), 59 (assault occasioning actual 
bodily harm) and 61 (common assault prosecuted in indictment) from with consent summary 
jurisdiction to without consent summary jurisdiction.
75
 It placed those offences into a new s 495 
titled ‘Indictable offences punishable summarily without consent of accused: assaults’. Not only 
could these offences be finalised summarily without the consent of the accused, but they no 
longer required the attention of two magistrates; they could be finalised by ‘a Magistrate sitting 
alone’.76 For reasons that are unclear, the amendments retained the summary sentencing 
distinction between ss 58 and 59 on the one hand (2 years or a $5,000 fine or both)
77
 and s 61 
(common assault prosecuted in indictment) on the other (12 months or a fine of $1,000 or both), 
preserving a pre-existing irrationality.
78
  The overall effect of these amendments was to remove 
the accused’s ability to request a jury trial for these offences — the discretion to commit for trial 
resided solely with the magistrate.
79
      
The Formalisation of Affray 
The conditions discussed above that were amenable to vertical and horizontal criminalisation in 
relation to assault also enabled Parliament to undertake the vertical criminalisation of riot and 
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affray. While it is necessary to consider riot because of the lack of affray cases prior to 1988, and 
the similarity of the issues surrounding each offence, the focus of this chapter is on affray 
because of its relationship with assault. Vertical criminalisation in this context comprised two 
steps. The first was to abolish the common law offences of ‘riot, rout and affray’80 and replace 
them with statutory offences of riot and affray in ss93A-D of the Crimes Act (rout was 
abolished).
81
  These provisions were based on law reform reports from the UK, in particular the 
‘Law Commission Report on Criminal Law: Offences Relating to Public Order’, and the United 
Kingdom Public Order Act 1986.
82
  Until 1988 the common law offences of riot and affray had 
been strictly indictable in NSW, so the second step in the vertical criminalisation process was to 
add the new statutory offences to s 476(6)(d) of the Crimes Act, which placed them in the with 
consent summary jurisdiction.
83
  They were classified as public order offences by inserting them 
into Part 3A of the Crimes Act: ‘Offences Relating to Public Order’, rather than Part 3, ‘Offences 
against the Person’.  
It was the difficulty of securing a conviction against people charged with riot, rout and 
affray that prompted the government to replace the common law offences with statutory offences 
and to reclassify them. 
84
  This difficulty is illustrated by the fact that the offences were ‘not 
often charged’.85  Indeed, the first known conviction for the ‘indictable common law offence of 
riotous assembly’ was recorded in 1987 even though the offence had existed in NSW since 
colonisation.
86
   A case in point and catalyst for the changes to the law was when 95 persons 
were charged with riot in relation to the Easter Bathurst Australian Grand Prix motor cycle races 
in 1985. Conflict between police and motor cycle race attendees, who were part of a ‘motorcycle 
                                                          
80
 Crimes (Amendment) Act 1988 (NSW) sch 1. The common law offence of rout was not replaced. 
81
 The Crimes (Amendment) Act 1988, sch 1(2) inserted ss 93B and 93C into the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). On the 
riots as a catalyst see, eg, New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 15 Nov 1988, 3388 (Ms 
Nori).  
82
 For a discussion of the background to these amendments see Colosimo v Director of Public Prosecutions (2005) 
64 NSWLR 645, 648; Jane Sanders and Elliot Edward, 'Affray: What Is It, and what Is It Not?' (2012) 36 Criminal 
Law Journal 368. For an exploration of the causes of the Bathurst riots precipitating the enactment of the provision 
see Chris Cunneen and Rob Lynch, 'The Social-Historical Roots of Conflict in Riots at the Bathurst Bike Races' 
(1988) 24(1) Journal of Sociology 5; and Chris Cunneen, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 
Aboriginal-Police Relations in Redfern: With Special Reference to the ‘Police Raid’ of 8 February 1990 (1990). 
83
 In 1995, both offences were placed in Table 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), ‘indictable offences 
that are to be dealt with summarily unless prosecutor or person charged elects otherwise’. 
84
 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 19 October 1988, 2600 (Mr Dowd). Following 
the UK’s lead, the government abolished the offence of rout. 
85
 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 19 October 1988, 2600 (Mr Dowd). 
86
 Cunneen and Lynch, above n 82, 25.  
184 
 
subculture’, at the bi-annual Bathurst motorcycle races had been occurring since the 1960s.87  
The clashes have deep historical roots in the distrust of the police in some segments of the 
working classes and resistance to state efforts to control working class leisure activities.
88
  Prior 
to the 1988 amendments to the law of riot and affray, these ‘public order disturbances’ had been 
dealt with under ‘various summary public order offences’ punishable by a fine only.89  However, 
in the 1980s the clashes ‘escalated to riot proportions’ and the NSW government responded 
punitively.
90
   
In the parliamentary debates the government noted that ‘[c]onsiderable difficulties have 
arisen in the prosecution’ of the 95 accused mentioned above.91  The government blamed the low 
charging and conviction rates on the uncertainty of the elements of the common law offences and 
their ‘onerous’ procedural and substantive requirements.92  The government hoped that replacing 
the common law offences with statutory ones would make the law more certain and encourage 
the police to charge the offences more frequently.
93
  The government also argued that the 
maximum penalty of life imprisonment was discouraging guilty pleas and was motivating 
defendants to put the state to the expense of a trial.
94
  The 1987 case of Anderson v Attorney-
General (NSW), which arose out of the riots at Bathurst in 1985, exemplifies these obstacles to 
conviction.  Justice McHugh, JA of the NSW Supreme Court noted that ‘[d]espite the antiquity 
of the offence, the precise elements of the offence of riot are not settled.’95   The court held that 
for the accused to be guilty of riotous assembly the prosecution had to prove, beyond reasonable 
doubt, that all of them had been ‘present together’ and that ‘each of them had the intent to help 
each other’.96  The court conceded that these elements placed ‘formidable, but not impossible, 
difficulties in the way of the Crown in the present case.’97   
By the late 1970s, the definition of affray at common law in England was:  
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 (1) unlawful fighting or unlawful violence used by one or more persons against another or others; 
or an unlawful display of force by one or more public persons without actual violence; 
(2) in a public place or, if on private premises, in the presence of at least one innocent person who 
was terrified; and 
(3) in such a manner that a bystander of reasonably firm character might reasonably be expected 
to be terrified.
98
 
Due to the dearth of NSW cases the common law definition in NSW at this time was uncertain. 
The statutory definition of the NSW offence of affray enacted in 1988 was: 
 93C(1) A person who uses or threatens unlawful violence towards another and whose conduct is 
such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his or her 
personal safety is guilty of affray and liable to penal servitude for 5 years. 
(2) If 2 or more persons use or threaten the unlawful violence, it is the conduct of them taken 
together that must be considered for the purposes of subsection (1). 
(3) For the purposes of this section, a threat cannot be made by the use of words alone. 
(4) No person of reasonable firmness need actually be, or be likely to be, present at the scene. 
(5) Affray may be committed in private as well as in public. 
 The mental element was set out in s 99D(2): 
 A person is guilty of affray only if the person intends to use or threaten violence or is aware that 
his or her conduct may be violent or threaten violence. 
The new statutory offences of riot and affray were placed in s 476 of the Crimes Act, the with 
consent provision. They were designed to complement a new summary offence of violent 
disorder that had been enacted in the same year.
99
 The government described all of these new 
offences as a package of reforms that constituted a complete revision of the ‘law relating to 
public order’.100 In 2005 the government increased the 5 years’ imprisonment maximum penalty 
for the new statutory offence of affray to ten years following another large-scale riot, the 
Cronulla race riot, which was sparked by anti-Muslim sentiments.
101
. This increase in penalty 
exposes the political dimension of the jurisdictional allocation of offences. The fungibility of 
jurisdiction enables the government to increase the degree of moral condemnation attaching to a 
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particular impugned behaviour whilst preserving the availability of summary jurisdiction. I 
explore this issue in more detail in the final part of this chapter below. 
The number of affray charges finalised in the summary jurisdiction has increased 
exponentially, not since 1988 as might be expected, but rather, since the mid-1990s, and 
particularly since the late 1990s. Meanwhile, the numbers finalised on indictment have remained 
relatively low. Between 1993 and 2007 the number of affray matters finalised in the District 
Court increased only marginally, from 20 to 47,
102
 while the number finalised summarily 
increased from 57 in 1994 to 2,166 in 2016.
103
  How can this increase in summary finalisations 
be accounted for?  Why did it take place from the mid-1990s and not from 1988?  A fulsome 
answer requires empirical investigation, but the increase can be readily interpreted as a product, 
in part, of changes to police and prosecution practices resulting from the transfer of the power to 
choose the jurisdictional allocation of triable either way matters from the magistrate to the parties 
in 1995, a topic to which I now turn.  
As explained in Chapter 1, the Table System was introduced in 1995. It removed the 
discretion to elect to have a trial on indictment from the magistrate and gave it, instead, to the 
parties.
104
  The rationale for this transfer was twofold. First, the parties are in possession of the 
knowledge relating to the case, so it makes sense for them to be making the decision about the 
appropriate jurisdiction.
105
  Second, it removed the problem of the magistrate, who is the tribunal 
of fact, being made aware of the accused’s criminal history before deciding whether to proceed 
summarily. This transfer of power had a profound impact on charging and prosecution practices. 
Jane Sanders and Edward Elliot observe that the police frequently lay an affray charge as an 
alternative to an assault charge. This means that if the assault charge cannot be proven because, 
for example, the victim refuses to attend court to give evidence; the prosecution may 
nevertheless secure a conviction for affray.
106
  Alternatively, defence lawyers may negotiate a 
plea of guilty to assault, which carries a lower maximum penalty than affray, in exchange for 
withdrawal of the affray charge; or the defence may negotiate a plea of guilty to affray on the 
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understanding that the prosecution will not elect to have a trial on indictment. Securing a plea of 
guilty to affray in the summary jurisdiction limits the maximum penalty to two years’ 
imprisonment. Prior to 1995 such negotiations were more difficult, if not impossible, because the 
magistrate made the decision about jurisdiction, and prior to the reclassification of affray as 
triable either way in 1988, affray could not be used as an alternative (or ‘back-up’) to summary 
assault charges at all.  
There is anecdotal evidence that at trial the element of affray that the conduct be ‘such as 
would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his or her personal 
safety’ is assumed rather than proven, rendering convictions easier to secure.107  Sanders and 
Elliot speculate that this is because of s93C(4), which states that ‘[n]o person of reasonable 
firmness need actually be, or be likely to be, present at the scene’. This may account for some of 
the increase in the number of convictions for affray, but the majority of offences are finalised by 
way of a guilty plea (the average is 60 per cent in the Local Court and 75 per cent in the District 
Court).
108
  It is likely that the charge of affray, and the choice of jurisdiction in which it is to be 
finalised, have been used increasingly as bargaining chips in plea negotiations since the 
introduction of the table system in 1995. For these reasons criminalisation via the offence of 
affray has a horizontal dimension — a deliberate broadening of the offence definition — as well 
as a vertical dimension.  
Use Weapon to Resist Arrest and Stalking 
The offence of ‘use weapon to resist arrest’ (s 33B of the Crimes Act) is a useful case study of 
the summary jurisdiction, not because it is prolific—the numbers finalised each year are low—
but because it illustrates how vertical criminalisation operates in the post-1995 era and reveals an 
otherwise hidden political dimension to the jurisdictional allocation of offences.
109
 Enacted as a 
strictly indictable offence punishable by ten years imprisonment in 1974 as part of the second 
major overhaul of the criminal law in the twentieth century, s 33B was reclassified as a Table 1 
offence in 2002, which means it is to be finalised summarily unless either the prosecution or the 
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accused elect to have a trial on indictment.
110
 Since then the numbers finalised in the Local Court 
have increased from 76 in 2002 to 318 in 2016.
111
 The reason the government cited for creating 
the offence was ‘[t]he recurrence of the “siege” situation [which] has pointed up the lack of any 
serious penalty for the random use of weapons to the danger of people generally, rather than of 
any particular person.’112 It was designed to address problems of proof with s 33 of the Crimes 
Act, which contained the element ‘shoots at … any person’.113 Proving that ‘any specific person’ 
was ‘the intended target for the weapon’ was difficult and was a barrier to securing 
convictions.
114
 In 1989 the maximum penalty for s 33B was increased from 10 to 12 years 
imprisonment. 
Two aspects of the reclassification of the s 33B offence as triable either way reveal the 
hidden political dimension of the jurisdictional allocation of offences. The first relates to the 
politics of penalties. In 2001, just one year prior to the reclassification of s 33B, the government 
had created an aggravated ‘in company’ form of the offence with a harsher penalty of 15 years 
imprisonment. This was one of a number of amendments made to the criminal law to address 
‘gang’ violence.115 The Opposition had objected to the increased penalty quoting statistics which 
showed that prison sentences for the non-aggravated form of the offence were imposed in a 
minority of cases only and the maximum sentence had rarely been used.
116
 There was no 
evidence, they said, that increased penalties were necessary. In response the government argued 
that the increase was designed to send a ‘clear message’ to the courts to impose more severe 
penalties.
117
 Only 12 months later the non-aggravated form of the offence was reclassified as 
triable either way,
118
 thereby limiting the maximum penalty to two years imprisonment if 
finalised summarily.  The aggravated form, s 33B(2), remains, for the time being, strictly 
indictable. It is not possible to access records of the parliamentary drafting process, but the 
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reason for the reclassification of the non-aggravated form of the offence is likely to have been 
the fact that the penalties being imposed in the District Court were within the sentencing 
jurisdiction of the Local Court.
119
 The reclassification of this offence shows how the fungibility 
of jurisdiction enables Parliament to express ‘populist outrage’ and moral condemnation through 
high maximum penalties while preserving access to the summary jurisdiction, which facilitates 
criminalisation.
120
  The second revealing aspect of the reclassification of this offence is that it 
was not discussed in the parliamentary debates. Similarly, newly drafted offences appear to be 
given a jurisdictional classification in the drafting process, which is often not debated.
121
 This 
suggests that while jurisdictional allocation is sometimes contested in the parliamentary process, 
it is often dealt with administratively in the drafting of the bill in a process that escapes public 
scrutiny. 
In a process that I conceptualise as horizontal criminalisation, several statutory offences 
have been introduced since 1988 to address newly recognised harms to the person. In his 
historical analysis of offences against the person in England, Farmer detects a shift from 
concerns about preserving the king’s peace to protection of the body of the person and, more 
recently, to protection of individual autonomy.
122
 NSW has followed a similar trajectory via the 
creation of offences such as stalking,
123
 which recognises mental harm, and ‘using a carriage 
service to menace, harass or cause offence’,124 which expands personal autonomy to the virtual 
realm. In the final part of this chapter I examine the offence of stalking. 
A statutory offence of stalking was created in 1993 and has been one of the fastest 
growing offence categories in the Local Court over the last decade and a half. The number of 
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stalking matters finalised in the summary jurisdiction has increased from 712 (0.39 per cent of a 
total of 179 276) in 2001 to 10, 489 (4.46 per cent of a total of 234 879) in 2016.
125
 A BOCSAR 
Report in 2013 found that intimidation related to domestic violence, which is encompassed in the 
offence of stalking among other offences, is ‘driving the overall increase in intimidation 
observed in NSW over recent years.’126 Stalking has also been the biggest cause of increases in 
the NSW prison population in recent years.
127
  In 1999 Parliament made two amendments to the 
offence to expand it and address difficulties of proof. The first amendment was to include mental 
harm, and the second was to redefine the element of ‘intention to cause fear of personal injury’ 
as ‘knows that the conduct is likely to cause fear in the other person’. 128 The fact that 
convictions for stalking in the Local Court did not begin until 2001 despite the fact that it 
commenced operation in 1993 is evidence of the difficulty of proving the requisite mental 
element of the provision as it was originally drafted. 
The jurisdictional trajectory of stalking shows how the jurisdictional allocation of 
offences can serve political purposes. The original penalty for stalking was 2 years imprisonment 
or a fine of 50 penalty units or both, which placed the offence in the summary only category.
129
 
In 1994, the maximum penalty was increased to 5 years imprisonment.
130
 In the parliamentary 
debates the government said that reclassifying the offence as triable either way and increasing 
the penalty would ‘reflect the seriousness with which this type of behaviour is viewed and will 
provide an effective deterrent.’131  In 1995, the offence was placed in Table 2 when the Table 
System was enacted,
132
 which means that it must be finalised summarily unless the prosecution 
elects a trial on indictment.
133
 There are two possible explanations for the upward trajectory of 
stalking; one practical and one normative. The practical explanation is that it represents 
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recognition by Parliament that stalking offences can involve complex issues of fact and evidence 
law that require the attention of the higher courts. The normative explanation is that although, 
even in its modern administrative guise, the summary jurisdiction is capable of conveying moral 
condemnation, as is seen in chapters 6 and 7, there are limits to its moral-condemnatory capacity. 
The factor that frequently persuades the prosecution to elect to have a trial on indictment is when 
the maximum sentencing jurisdiction of the summary jurisdiction (2 years imprisonment) does 
not reflect the seriousness of the offence.
134
  The fungibility of jurisdiction enables Parliament to 
attach the moral condemnatory capacity of the higher courts to offences that are, in practice, 
finalised summarily, performing a normative or symbolic function that can be used for political 
purposes. 
Conclusion   
This chapter argued that formalisation is a useful concept for understanding the development of 
the offences of assault and affray. Rationalisation and juridification are the two most prominent 
dimensions here. This chapter depicted how rationalisation and juridification have facilitated 
both vertical and horizontal criminalisation, particularly since the final quarter of the twentieth 
century. Common assault is a paradigm example of this process. It was seen how Lord 
Lansdowne’s Act placed the power of magistrates to finalise common assault on a statutory 
footing, a move that can be interpreted as juridification. It was also seen how, in a series of 
legislative changes that took place in 1974, 1988, and 1995, the jurisdictional allocation of 
assault finally settled into the category of triable either way offences, a process that can be 
interpreted as rationalisation. Changing social attitudes towards interpersonal violence supplied 
the catalyst for change, but rationalisation of the jurisdictional allocation of assault was not 
achieved before the late 1980s because the conditions that made it possible were just beginning 
to take hold by that time. Those conditions included the autonomy of the magistracy from the 
government and lawyerification. In the final quarter of the twentieth century the formalisation of 
the summary jurisdiction began to be seen as performing a legitimation function that was capable 
of being substituted for that formerly performed by the criminal trial for reclassified offences. 
However, formalisation of the law of assault has not resulted in the complete separation of law 
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from politics; far from it. The politicization of the criminal law is well-known, but my analysis of 
the offence of ‘use weapon to resist arrest’ revealed a hidden political dimension of the 
jurisdictional allocation of offences that has escaped analysis.  
193 
 
 
Chapter 6: Drink-Driving 
Drink-driving is an illuminating case study in the summary jurisdiction because it shows how the 
dynamic interaction between changing social conditions and practices of procedure and proof 
pushed forward the development of the summary jurisdiction from a forum that deals primarily 
with ‘drunks’ and ‘fine defaulters’1 to one that deals with offences that are considered to be 
‘truly’ criminal. This notion of what is ‘truly’ criminal is a reference to the ‘moral distinctions’ 
that have traditionally been drawn between minor ‘mischief’ and ‘truly’ criminal behaviour, 
which, as mentioned in the Introduction, was one of the objections to the expansion of summary 
jurisdiction in the mid-nineteenth century.
2
  Drink-driving offences constitute approximately 20 
per cent of offences finalised every year in the NSW Local Court,
3
 and yet while they have been 
the subject of intense scrutiny from sociologists and behavioural scientists, they have received 
little attention in Australian criminal law scholarship.
4
  The offence of drink-driving provides a 
different perspective on the summary jurisdiction because, unlike assault and affray, it ‘grew up’ 
in the summary jurisdiction; it is younger, having arisen at the beginning of the twentieth 
century; and it has always been a summary only offence.  
The law relating to drink-driving was the government’s response to a major new threat 
resulting from the development of the motor car. Parliament had options other than the criminal 
law with which to respond to this major new threat, such as regulation via the insurance industry 
or civil remedies, but it chose the criminal law in part because of its capacity to convey moral 
condemnation. Just as new technology created the threat, new technology has been the key to 
responses to the threat. The development of technologies of breath analysis, and the growth of 
bodies of expert scientific and social knowledge in relation to alcohol consumption have 
precipitated significant changes in criminal process.  
                                                          
1
 Hilary Golder, High and Responsible Office: A History of the New South Wales Magistracy (Sydney University 
Press, OUP, 1991) 133. 
2
 Leon Radzinowicz and Roger Hood,  A History of English Criminal Law and its Administration from 1750 
(Stevens & Sons, 1986) 619–620. 
3
 Source: New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research yearly court statistics 
<http://www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/Pages/bocsar_court_stats/bocsar_court_stats_archived.aspx>  (2014) 21. 
4
 A notable exception is Julia Quilter et al, 'Criminal Law and the Effects of Alcohol and Other Drugs: A National 
Study of the Significance of Intoxication in Australian Legislation' (2016) 39 UNSW Law Journal 913. 
194 
 
This chapter argues that the most useful dimension of formalisation for understanding 
drink-driving is juridification. Juridification in this context incorporates the use of precise 
technology-derived rules that enable removal of more open-ended evaluative judgements, such 
as the degree of drunkenness, and the use of the appellate process to curb the sentencing 
discretion of magistrates. This chapter shows how the behaviour of drink-driving has been 
criminalised. It can be seen as an example of horizontal criminalisation. Here criminalisation 
means the turn to law (legislation) via the summary jurisdiction to respond to a major new threat 
of harm resulting from the technological development of the motor car. It includes not only 
changes to the substantive law, but also changes to enforcement practices. Attempts to make the 
criminal law more effective characterise the development of the substantive law and practices of 
procedure and proof in relation to drink-driving.  
In contrast to the preceding chapters, in analysing change over time in this context, 
different chronological periods emerge from my research:  from the early twentieth century to 
the 1960s; from the 1960s to the early 1980s; and from the early 1980s to present. The time 
periods in this chapter are different because change in the context of drink-driving has been the 
product of technological advances and the development of bodies of scientific and social 
knowledge.  
At this point, some clarification of the terms used throughout this chapter is required. 
‘Drink-driving’ is an umbrella term that is used to refer to all offences that criminalise driving 
with alcohol in the body.  Since at least 1968 it has also encompassed occupying the driver’s seat 
of a motor vehicle and attempting ‘to put the vehicle in motion’.5  ‘Driving under the influence’ 
(‘DUI’) was the first drink-driving offence in NSW. It was introduced in 1915 and remains in 
force today. Since then two further offences have been introduced: ‘Drunk or under the influence 
and incapable’ was introduced into the Crimes Act in 1929,6 but was repealed in 1951. Driving 
with the prescribed concentration of alcohol in the blood (‘PCA’) was introduced in 1968 and is 
the offence upon which our current drink-driving offence regime is based. It exists alongside 
DUI. 
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From the Early Twentieth Century to the 1960s 
The first motor car was imported into New South Wales in 1900.
7
  This new technology, which 
revolutionised transportation as the twentieth century progressed, was initially met with 
ambivalence. There was division in the community between motoring enthusiasts and those who 
were dubious about the new technology. Complaints by some members of Parliament about the 
nuisance of the noise and smell caused by cars were indicative of the ‘atmosphere of hostility’ in 
the broader community towards motor vehicles.
8
  Other members of Parliament were anxious not 
to stifle the fledgling motoring industry with excessive regulation, as had happened in England.
9
  
These diverse imperatives presented a new challenge to the NSW government.
10
   
It quickly became clear that motor cars were more than a mere nuisance; they also 
created a new threat of injury and death.  In response to this new threat the NSW government, 
following moves in England and elsewhere, began to legislate to regulate the use of motor 
vehicles. Between 1900 and 1909 the regulation of motor vehicles was left to the Sydney City 
Council,
11
 but in 1909 the NSW Parliament passed the first statute to regulate motor vehicles 
bringing NSW into line with ‘all countries where motor vehicles are now in the habit of being 
used.’12 Using the English Motor Car Act 1903 (UK) as a model, the enactment of the Motor 
Traffic Act 1909 (NSW) (the ‘MTA’), was motivated by concerns with increasing numbers of 
motor accidents.
13
 There was much discussion of drivers not stopping after an accident,
14
 which 
led to the inclusion of the offence of failing to stop in the case of an accident.
15
A second purpose 
of the 1909 Act was to establish a registration scheme for motor cars. Motorists, who at this time 
were from the privileged classes, were feeling persecuted by over-zealous prosecutors, so they 
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formed various ‘motorists’ protection societies’, one of which was the Royal Automobile Club of 
Australia, established in 1903.
16
 These clubs became a strong lobbying force for legislative 
change. The MTA was parliament’s attempt to balance these divers imperatives by regulating 
‘motor traffic’ while avoiding creating a ‘vindictive measure for the suppression of motorists.’17 
 Early in the twentieth century it was recognised that the combination of drinking alcohol 
and driving a motor vehicle presented a particular threat of injury and death. In 1906 in England, 
where there had been a far greater number of cars for a longer period than in NSW, a Royal 
Commission on Motor Cars had recommended the creation of ‘a special penalty for being drunk 
when in charge of a car’, among other matters relating to road safety.18  Despite this 
recommendation, a drink-driving offence relating specifically to ‘mechanically propelled’ 
vehicles was not enacted in England until 1925,
19
 perhaps for fear of its potentially stifling effect 
on the motor car industry. By contrast, the NSW Parliament enacted a drink-driving offence in 
1915. It was in these terms: ‘Any person who drives a motor vehicle while he is under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor shall be guilty of an offence under the Act’. This was the original 
DUI offence.
20
 A provision in almost identical terms remains in our road traffic legislation 
today.
21
 The penalty in 1915 was a maximum fine of £20 and the legislation gave courts the 
discretion to impose an additional penalty of licence suspension and/or disqualification ‘for such 
time as the court thinks fit’.22 There was minimal discussion of the 1915 provision in the 
parliamentary debates. What little was said indicates that it was enacted to address the absence of 
an offence of driving ‘while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.’23 By this time there was 
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growing recognition in England of a link between drink-driving and road accidents,
24
 but the 
extent to which this knowledge was influential in Australia is unclear. 
Traffic offences such as drink-driving had a profound impact upon the summary 
jurisdiction. By the immediate post-WWI period, breaches of traffic regulations constituted a 
substantial percentage of the matters heard by magistrates.  The statistics reveal that 44 per cent 
of summary convictions were for offences against good order, and 41 per cent were for ‘other 
offences’, comprising breaches of local government (4425) and traffic (3798) regulations. These 
new offences had begun to ‘change the traditional image of the magistrate’s court’, which had 
been seen as merely dealing with ‘drunks’ and ‘fine defaulters’.25  Contemporary statisticians did 
not consider traffic offences to be ‘truly criminal’,26 and it has been argued that underlying this 
view of traffic offences in general, and drink-driving in particular, was the belief that ‘to label 
such offences’ as ‘really crimes’ ‘would be to criminalise the behaviour of the very people who 
make and enforce the laws.’27  The view that traffic offences were not truly criminal was 
reinforced by the creation of a separate traffic court in Sydney in the 1920s.
28
 By 1973 traffic 
courts had been established in the large regional centres of Gosford and Newcastle,
29
  although 
beyond these highly populated centres traffic matters were dealt with in the ordinary courts of 
Petty Sessions. Magistrates presiding over traffic courts were on a lower Public Service grade 
than stipendiary magistrates sitting in the regular courts of Petty Sessions,
30
 which further 
reinforced the non-criminal perception of traffic offences.  
The remainder of the period from the late 1920s to the 1960s is characterised by several 
difficulties with rendering drink-driving amenable to regulation by the criminal law. These 
difficulties can be divided into two categories: practical and normative. There were three main 
practical problems:  difficulties with the interpretation of the elements of drink-driving offences; 
difficulties with proof of drunkenness leading to confusion amongst the driving public about the 
level of intoxication that would result in a criminal conviction; and perceived leniency in 
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sentencing. Underlying these practical difficulties was the normative debate about whether drink-
driving was truly criminal. The following analysis suggests that there is a relationship between 
proof of drunkenness and the degree of wrongfulness attaching to the offence of drink-driving. 
The degree of difficulty of proving drunkenness goes to the degree of wrongfulness because it is 
relevant to knowledge that one is drunk.   
Difficulties of Interpretation and Proof 
The practical criminalisation difficulties are illustrated by the introduction of a new drink-driving 
offence into the Crimes Act in 1929. It will be recalled from the discussion above that until 1929 
the only drink-driving offence relating to motor vehicles was DUI under the MTA. Against a 
backdrop of an escalating road toll and alarm at the danger presented by ‘drunken men’ driving 
‘these machines’ sometimes at ‘an excessive speed, and without regard to the safety of other 
people’,31 the NSW government introduced an offence of being ‘drunk or under the influence 
and incapable’ into the Crimes Act. It read: 
 Any person who, while driving on any highway or other public place any mechanically-propelled 
vehicle, is drunk or being under the influence of intoxicating liquor is incapable of properly 
controlling such vehicle, shall, on conviction before two justices, be liable to imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding six months, or to pay a fine not exceeding fifty pounds, or to both such 
imprisonment and fine.
32
 
Insertion of the new offence into the Crimes Act instead of the MTA may be interpreted as an 
indication that Parliament intended to mark it out as a criminal offence. The penalty was 
significantly harsher than for the offence of DUI. Because the MTA was designed primarily to 
regulate motor vehicles, placing the offence in the MTA would have given it the characterisation 
of a mere traffic violation. By inserting it into the Crimes Act Parliament (whether intentionally 
or not) had begun the process of attaching a degree of moral blameworthiness to the offence of 
drink-driving. 
  It was difficult to secure convictions for the new Crimes Act offence because its elements 
raised significant difficulties of both interpretation and proof. For instance, what did ‘drunk’ 
mean? How was it to be proven?  Similarly, what does it mean to ‘be under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor’ or ‘incapable of properly controlling’ a vehicle?  How were these elements to 
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be proven?  In drafting the new offence the NSW Parliament was mindful of the English 
provision, incorporated into the Criminal Justice Act in 1925, which made it an offence to be 
‘drunk while in charge on any highway or other public place of any mechanically propelled 
vehicle…’, but the meaning of drunkenness and how it could be proven was obscure.33 The 
NSW Parliament wished to avoid these difficulties of interpretation and proof.
34
 The 
parliamentary debates reveal that there was a disjunction between the commonly understood 
meaning of drunkenness in the community and the level of drunkenness that was dangerous 
when driving. One MP told an anecdote about a King’s Counsel in Melbourne who, in an attempt 
to assist the court with a definition of drunkenness, quoted Thomas Love Peacock:  
He is not drunk who from the floor, 
Can rise and drink, and ask for more;  
But drunk is he who prostrate lies,  
Without the strength to drink or rise.35  
This appears to have been a popular refrain in the context of drink-driving at the time as it also 
appeared in an article in the Maitland Weekly Mercury titled ‘When is a man Drunk?’ in 1928.36 
More than an amusing anecdote, the repetition of this passage is indicative of the reliance on lay 
knowledge for proof of drunkenness and the anxiety in the community caused by the uncertainty 
of the tests used in court. As the author of ‘When is a man Drunk?’ wrote: ‘[i]n the popular mind 
the demarcation between sobriety and inebriety is vague and indeterminate.’ In the absence of 
breath analysis technologies and widely publicised guidelines promulgated by health experts, 
drivers relied on local newspaper accounts of drink-driving cases from the courts as a guide.
37
  
Some commentators argued that the courts were applying a standard of drunkenness that 
was too high thereby encouraging people to drive in a state that presented an enormous danger to 
the public.
38
 By way of contrast, some factions in the community thought the standard of 
drunkenness was too low. In a 1929 example, the National Roads and Motorists’ Association 
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(the ‘NRMA’) protested against the over-zealousness of a witness who was a medical 
practitioner: 
One drink will not make a man drunk. Doctors should apply practical tests to themselves as to a 
man’s sobriety. If a doctor is a teetotaller, he cannot judge whether a man is drunk or not.” These 
remarks were made at Parramatta Court by Mr Kemp, defending a motorist who, after holding a 
license for 23 years, made his first appearance in court. The motorist was fined £15 and 
delicensed for six months for driving while drunk.39 
In an attempt to address these problems, the NSW Parliament added the phrases ‘being 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor’ and ‘is incapable of properly controlling such vehicle’ 
when drafting the new Crimes Act offence, a move which, rather than removing the difficulties 
experienced in England, merely created new ones.  
At the same time as these problems were being grappled with, the 1915 offence of DUI, 
which existed alongside the new 1929 offence of being drunk or under the influence and 
incapable, was also causing difficulties, and the confusion persisted for decades. A newspaper 
article in 1943 summarising successful appeals from the summary jurisdiction to the Court of 
Quarter Sessions under the MTA set out in detail the evidence led in one case in relation to the 
question of whether the appellant was ‘under the influence’: 
 Constable Swaddling … noticed that the appellant’s breath smelt strongly of intoxicating liquor. 
Appellant said he had had about six glasses of beer, the last about a quarter of an hour before … 
At the police station appellant had been unsteady on his feet and the pupils of his eyes were 
dilated and his speech rather hesitant … Up to the time that he approached the appellant in the car 
[the constable] had no reason to think that he was under the influence. He got out of the car quite 
well and walked quite well, but a little unsteadily to the police station. His eyes had been a little 
bleary, but his speech was quite intelligible, but a little hesitant. The car proceeded past him to the 
corner about 200 or 300 yards quite steadily and in a straight line… [Counsel for the appellant] 
took the view that anyone who had had liquor was to some extent under the influence … [The 
appellant stated] he had had some drink but was not drunk. He was perfectly capable of driving 
the car.40 
The article then reported the Court’s decision: 
 His Honour said that he had no doubt that the appellant was under the influence and drove the car 
in that condition. Under the Section he did not have to show drunkenness, but that a defendant 
was under the influence. He agreed that there were degrees of ‘under the influence’, and in this 
case the degree was a slight one. 
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By 1951, after 14 years in operation, it had become clear that s 526B of the Crimes Act 
was not only unworkable but counterproductive. It was unworkable because the double 
requirements of proving that a driver was drunk or under the influence of intoxicating liquor and 
incapable of controlling the vehicle had rendered guilt under s 526B so difficult to prove that 
police preferred to prosecute DUI under the MTA despite its lower penalty.
41
 Because the DUI 
offence was restricted to motor vehicles, s 526B was being used only in relation to drivers of 
vehicles other than motor cars, such as trams or trains.
42
 As a result, s 526B had become ‘almost 
useless in the administration of justice’.43  
Section 526B was counter-productive because the motoring public was confused about 
the difference between being ‘drunk or under the influence and incapable’ under the Crimes Act, 
and DUI under the MTA, and the permissible level of inebriation.
44
 The parliamentary debates on 
the repeal of s 526B of the Crimes Act provide evidence that the disjunction between the 
commonly understood meaning of drunkenness and a level of drunkenness that was dangerous 
when driving had persisted into the 1950s. Parliament scolded the press for using the term 
‘drunken driving’ as a label for the DUI offence under the MTA because it had led people to 
believe one was permitted to drive unless drunk, a word associated with a high degree of 
intoxication as discussed above.
45
 The press was encouraged to use the term ‘drinking driving’ 
for the DUI offence to clear up the confusion.
46
  
For all of these reasons, the government — with the agreement of the opposition —  
repealed s 526B of the Crimes Act and increased the penalty for DUI under the MTA from a fine 
and disqualification to a maximum sentence of six months imprisonment. Because s 526B had 
carried a maximum penalty of twelve months imprisonment, concern was expressed in the 
debates that its repeal represented an effective reduction of penalty from 12 to 6 months 
imprisonment, which would send a message to the public that drink-driving was not serious.
47
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The government justified doing so on the basis that ‘real objects of the bill … are primarily to 
deal with a social rather than a criminal problem,’48 reflecting a broader shift in criminal justice 
from correctionalism to rehabilitation under the welfare state.
49
   To this end there was some 
indication that alternative or complementary governmental strategies, such as education in 
schools about road safety, were being explored.
50
  The government also introduced compulsory 
third party insurance alongside the development of the criminal law.
51
  Underpinning this policy 
approach that sought solutions beyond the criminal law was a concern that increasing 
punitiveness was eroding the rule of law. Mr Sheahan warned honourable ‘[m]embers to beware 
lest they impair the temple of justice that has been built in this State, by attempting to “cash in” 
on current popular publicity.’52  
Normative underpinnings of the difficulties of interpretation and proof   
The practical difficulties with criminalisation enumerated above can be understood as being 
underpinned by the normative debate about whether people convicted of drink-driving were ‘true 
criminals’53. This debate arose in the context of discussions about the perceived leniency of the 
penalties being imposed by the courts. Contemporary newspaper reports reveal how the debate 
manifested itself. For example, in the 1943 case mentioned above, the appellant, Ronald James 
Horton, was appealing against a penalty of £10 and an automatic licence disqualification of 12 
months for an offence of driving under the influence to which he had pleaded guilty. Mr Horton 
was a grazier and a corporal in the Volunteer Defence Corps (‘VDC’). It was the drinks he had 
consumed following a VDC parade that had led to the DUI charge. Counsel for the appellant 
urged the court to take into account the evidence of good character and give him the benefit of a 
dismissal under s 556A of the Crimes Act. This provision, introduced in 1929, enabled the court, 
in cases concerning trivial offences where the offender was otherwise of good character, to find 
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an offender guilty but dismiss the charge without proceeding to a conviction and, importantly, 
without imposing a penalty.
 54
 The judge reminded counsel of the rule of law principle of 
equality before the law by observing that while the appellant’s good character was relevant, ‘his 
station in life’ was not. His Honour explained, ‘[t]he effect of [s 556A] was to give a man a 
second chance. However, he warned [the] defendant that the Legislature took a very serious view 
of this offence and it was unlikely that any Court would give a third chance in relation to such an 
offence.’  Then, as now, evidence of good character inclined the courts towards leniency. 
Reports of the sentencing decisions in drink-driving matters, such as that of Ronald James 
Horton, suggest that ‘good character’ in this context extends beyond the offender’s lack of 
criminal antecedents to reputation. As Mr A.S McDonald, Stipendiary Magistrate said in 1952, 
‘men charged with driving under the influence of liquor were usually of good character ‘but I 
must view the offence seriously as there have been more than 100 deaths this year as the result of 
road accidents’’.55  
The press had been expressing concerns about the leniency of penalties for drink-driving 
for some time.
56
 For instance, in April 1951 The Sun ran a lengthy report on Judge Nield from 
the Court of Quarter Sessions, who, over a period of two weeks, had granted, on appeal, s 556A 
dismissals to 17 out of 23 offenders who had been convicted of DUI. In a strident critique the 
article declared that Judge Nield’s ‘policy’: 
must, the Sun believes, inevitably increase these offences, by breeding contempt among a section 
of drivers for the laws of the road and their penalties, and thus it must help to defeat the good 
work done by police and magistrates in the cause of road-safety. In the opinion of this newspaper, 
drunken or dangerous driving is one of the gravest breaches of the criminal code, and should be 
punished with the utmost severity.57  
There were two perspectives in the ‘truly criminal’ debate. The first, propounded by 
members of the government of the day, derived from a rule of law perspective and is exemplified 
by the speech of Mr Sheahan in relation to the repeal of s 526B discussed above.
58
 Mr Sheahan, 
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who had had ‘over twenty years’ experience’ in criminal practice as a solicitor, was of the view 
that ‘juries, comprised of ordinary men of the world’ do not regard traffic offences as ‘truly 
criminal’. A bulwark of justice, he argued, was ‘criminal intent that British communities have 
come to regard as essential before convicting.’59  While the parliamentary debates do not draw 
the link expressly, this perspective can be seen as a concern that the criminal liability ought not 
to be imposed where there is a risk that the defendant did not know they were drunk to a 
sufficient degree to be in breach of the criminal law. The second perspective on the ‘truly 
criminal’ debate derived from a class argument — that motorists are not common criminals and 
should not be treated as such.
60
  
It was not only members of Parliament who participated in the debate about whether 
drink-driving was truly criminal, but also government departments and their officers. In a speech 
reminiscent of Yes Minister, Mr Sheahan declared that ‘[g]overnment departments have a 
structure that comprises both a democracy and an aristocracy’, and the Attorney-General’s 
Department, the Justice Department and the Police Department consider themselves to be in 
charge of the criminal law. Some in these departments regarded the Crimes Act as the ‘aristocrat 
of penal enactments’ and ‘[a]ny intrusion by departments other than those three into the field of 
penal law was frowned upon as just “not the thing”’.61  This can be understood as an indication 
of the developing professionalisation of the public service and adds another layer of complexity 
to the process of criminalisation.   
From the Late 1960s to the 1980s 
During this period, between the late 1960s and the 1980s, the introduction of breath analysis 
technology went some way towards addressing the problems of proof of drunkenness. This 
period is characterised by renewed attempts to criminalise drink-driving that had been made 
possible by this new technology. However, there were two main impediments to criminalisation, 
both of which were underpinned by rule of law issues. The first was a concern that the new 
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technology presented a threat to civil liberties, and the second was the inconsistency of 
sentencing practices among magistrates.  
In 1968 the NSW government revolutionised the law of drink-driving by introducing 
breath analysis technology. Until this point the police had relied upon ‘mere observation’ of 
signs of intoxication to prosecute drink-drivers.
62
  Breath analysis addressed, to a large extent, 
the problems of proving the driver’s degree of intoxication, and clarified the law for motorists by 
providing them with ‘an objective guide to follow’.63 While the adoption of procedural practices 
that were designed to protect individual liberties perpetuated problems of detection, the 
incontrovertibility of the scientific knowledge demonstrating the dangers of drink- driving, and 
its acceptance in the general community, meant that the amendments to the law attracted bi-
partisan support.
64
 
The new technology of breath analysis enabled Parliament to insert a new offence of 
driving with the prescribed concentration of alcohol (‘PCA’) into the MTA, and the mode of 
imposing criminal liability for drink-driving has not changed since it was enacted in 1968.
65
  The 
provision read: 
Any person who while there is present in his blood the prescribed concentration of alcohol- 
a. Drives a motor vehicle; or 
b. Occupies the driving seat of a motor vehicle and attempts to put the motor vehicle in 
motion, 
Shall be guilty of an offence under this Act and shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding four 
hundred dollars or to imprisonment of a period not exceeding six months or to both such penalty 
and imprisonment.
66
  
Viewed from the perspective of criminalisation this provision has several notable features. When 
the provision was first introduced the prescribed concentration was 0.08 per cent despite Victoria 
and some other countries already having adopted a limit of 0.05 per cent. This discrepancy 
reflects conflicting scientific literature about safe levels of alcohol consumption at the time. The 
original provision did not create a hierarchy of offences distinguishing between low, medium and 
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high levels of blood alcohol concentration. Instead, all drivers with a blood alcohol concentration 
above 0.08 were placed in the same category. Concerns expressed in the debates about the failure 
to ‘differentiate between the person driving at a concentration of 0.05, 0.08 or 0.09…and the 
person who is the real danger on the road’ hint that the offence of drink-driving was beginning to 
attract increasing moral condemnation, but only at the higher levels of blood alcohol 
concentration.
67
 
While these changes to the substantive law, which were made possible by technological 
advancements, went some way towards addressing the problem of proof, accompanying changes 
made to procedural law undermined criminalisation. The government of the day was concerned 
that the new powers being conferred upon the police would unduly encroach upon individual 
liberty. For this reason they rejected random breath testing.
68
 Weighing community safety 
against individual liberties the government concluded that prevention of the harm of road deaths 
justified incursions into individual rights.
69
 But, in an attempt to convince the chamber that they 
had built in adequate protection of those rights, the government included a procedural restriction 
on the new police powers in relation to the administration of breath analysis. There were two 
stages to the breath analysis procedure: a ‘breath test’ administered at the roadside; and a ‘breath 
analysis’ conducted at the police station.70 Before police could lawfully administer the first test 
the legislation required them to have ‘reasonable cause to believe’ one of three things: (a) that 
the driver had breached a road traffic provision;
71
 (b) ‘by the manner in which any person drives 
a motor vehicle, or occupies the driving seat of a motor vehicle and attempts to put the motor 
vehicle in motion, that person has alcohol in his body’;72 or (c) the driver had been a driver 
involved in an accident.
73
 However, this ‘reasonable cause to believe’ procedural protection in 
the drink-driving context created an obvious problem for detection, apprehension and proof. 
Unless the driver had breached a road traffic rule, or been involved in an accident, enforcement 
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of the criminal law was dependent, once again, upon ‘mere observation’ — the very feature 
Parliament was attempting to eradicate.  
The second stage of the test, which was conducted at the police station, caused 
understandable consternation in the parliamentary debates for its restriction of liberty. If the 
preliminary roadside test detected a level of alcohol above 0.08, the provision empowered police 
to arrest the driver without a warrant, ‘or cause that person to be taken with such force as may be 
necessary’ to the police station ‘and there detain him’ in order to administer a breath analysis.74  
Mr Cox, spokesperson for the opposition, protested that being detained by police pursuant to 
either the first or second stages of the test was a deprivation of liberty and a form of 
criminalisation. 
75
 The opposition noted that the test kits were not yet reliable and objected to the 
possibility of motorists being subjected to coercive police power on the basis of a false positive. 
Notwithstanding these problems and objections, the Bill passed and the two-stage test was 
enacted into law. 
Attempts by defence lawyers to find loopholes in the new legislation led to judicial 
clarification of the law that facilitated criminalisation. Deriving inspiration from a series of cases 
in the United Kingdom known as the ‘loophole cases’, where offenders had escaped conviction 
because of ‘failure to follow the procedures precisely’,76 one offender, Mr Merchant, from New 
South Wales, through his lawyer, appealed his conviction under the new PCA provision all the 
way to the High Court.
77
 The case gave common law imprimatur to the PCA offence and the 
accompanying procedural provisions that dealt with the admissibility of the results of the new 
technology of breath analysis. Despite the introduction of breath analysis, a residue of confusion 
and/or concern about how to know when one was sufficiently intoxicated to fall foul of the law is 
evident in contemporary newspaper reports on drink-driving cases.
78
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From the Early 1980s to Present 
During the period from the 1980s to the present, technological advancements have revolutionised 
the law of drink-driving and facilitated criminalisation. Faced with statistical evidence of an 
escalating road toll, Parliament, and then the courts, attempted to increase the degree of moral 
blameworthiness attaching to the offence of drink-driving. This was done primarily through 
increasing penalties and the promulgation of sentencing guidelines. Implicitly grounded in 
deterrence theory, such efforts were designed to render the criminal law a more effective tool for 
regulating the harmful behaviour of drink-driving. Both historically and today, evidence of the 
harm caused by drink driving has been seen to legitimate the ascription of criminal liability to, 
and the imposition of significant penalties upon, drivers who are caught with the prescribed 
concentration of alcohol in their blood. Technological advancements, in the form of breath 
analysis, and the promulgation of alcohol consumption guidelines, have gone a significant way 
towards addressing the difficulties of definition and proof that previously undermined the 
legitimacy of the criminal law in this context.  
In 1982, amid escalating concerns about the ‘tragic road toll’, which are exemplified by 
an editorial declaring that ‘[t]he Roads of NSW are awash with blood’,79 random breath testing 
(RBT), which had already been introduced in other jurisdictions, including Victoria, was 
introduced in NSW almost without objection.
80
 Members of Parliament recognised that RBT 
would change the structure and content of the criminal law in two important respects. Firstly, 
RBT reflected a broader change in the orientation of the criminal law from being reactive and 
backward-looking to being preventive and forward-looking. As one Member of Parliament 
pointed out, this entailed ‘a complete reversal of the normal roles for the traffic police in 
NSW’.81 Secondly, it eliminated the need for the procedural protection requiring police to 
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believe on reasonable grounds that the driver was under the influence of alcohol thus eradicating 
the reliance upon lay knowledge of intoxication from the criminal law of drink-driving.
82
   
While widespread community support for the measure made such bi-partisan support 
politically palatable,
83
 the changes to the law were only possible because of several 
advancements in scientific knowledge and technology. The scientific evidence on the effect of 
alcohol on driving was, by this time, incontrovertible.
84
 A specialised Traffic Accident Research 
Unit in NSW was contributing to the production of ‘world-class’ research on traffic accidents 
and road safety.
85
  The statistics, much repeated in the debates, demonstrated a clear link 
between fatal road accidents and the blood alcohol level of drivers, and both the government and 
opposition were persuaded by statistics indicating that random breath testing in Victoria had 
dramatically reduced the number of road deaths.
86
 Finally, the breath testing technology had 
been vastly improved so that police needed to detain people only for a very short time to 
administer them,
87
 a fact that eroded the basis of the civil liberties objection to RBT.  
In addition to RBT, the 1982 legislative package contained features that suggest drink-
driving, at least in the higher range of blood alcohol concentration, was beginning to be regarded 
as truly criminal. The prescribed concentration of alcohol was lowered from 0.08 to 0.05, 
bringing NSW into line with other states such as Victoria, and a three-tiered hierarchy of 
offences was introduced based on ranges of blood alcohol concentration with corresponding 
penalties that were intended to be commensurate with differing levels of moral 
blameworthiness.
88
 It will be recalled that in the debates on the introduction of the PCA offence 
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in 1968, the offence was criticised for failing to differentiate between drivers with a low 
percentage of blood alcohol (implicit in which is the assumption that such levels are not 
dangerous) and ‘the person who is the real danger on the road’.89  In making this distinction the 
1982 provisions went some way towards reconciling the substance of the criminal law with 
community attitudes.  
Members of Parliament voiced a need for education to change community attitudes 
towards combining driving with alcohol consumption.
90
 There was evidence that drink-driving 
was, at this time, ‘less clearly a crime in public consciousness than other behaviours traditionally 
regarded as such’.91  Through an extensive ‘multimedia publicity campaign’ the government 
planned to educate the public about the new regime and ‘influence community attitudes and 
behavior in relation to drinking and driving’.92 In this way the law of drink-driving became part 
of the ‘preventive turn’ in the criminal law from the 1980s, which was precipitated by a desire to 
prevent road injuries and fatalities, and was fueled by scientific knowledge and statistics.
93
  
While the government was attempting to shape community attitudes towards drink-
driving through legislation such as the 1982 reforms and media campaigns, there is evidence that 
the sentencing practices of magistrates were undermining, or at least failing to reinforce, those 
efforts. In response to the perceived leniency of magistrates’ sentences for drink-driving, in 1978 
the government increased the maximum available penalties in the statute in an attempt to place 
pressure on magistrates to increase penalties.
94
  This tactic was chosen despite available 
criminological evidence that the risk of detection, which had been increased by the introduction 
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of RBT, was the greater deterrent.
95
  A study of the sentencing practices of magistrates in drink-
driving matters dealt with in NSW courts of Petty Sessions in 1976 and published in 1981 
showed that magistrates did not yet perceive drink-driving as truly criminal.
96
 This was 
significant because the study found that one of the most highly influential factors in sentencing 
was the ‘sentencing style’ of the magistrate, which was said to include their ‘sentencing 
philosophy as well as the magistrate’s perceptions of the nature and seriousness of the offence.’97  
During the sentencing process magistrates tended to pay heed to driving offences only, and not 
other criminal offences in their prior offending history. The author of the study concluded that 
the existence of this practice ‘supports the argument that drinking and driving is not perceived as 
a crime, and that blameworthiness is seen in the context of delinquent driving rather than in the 
more general context of law breaking and criminal behaviour.’98  The study also found that the 
practice of individualised sentencing, whereby the sentence is tailored to the particular 
characteristics and circumstances of the offender, was resulting in a ‘direct bias against lower-
class groups in the sentencing process.’99 There was ‘enormous variation in penalties from court 
to court’ which indicated that the influence of magistrate sentencing style was pervasive.100  In 
the 1970s the rotation of country magistrates had been introduced ‘to neutralize differences in 
sentencing between magistrates, without encroaching on their judicial independence’,101 but this 
had not solved the problem. The author of the 1976 study recommended that sentencing 
guidelines be introduced to diminish the impact of magistrate sentencing style and the corrosive 
effect of inconsistent penalties on general deterrence.
102
  Such guidelines were not introduced 
until 2004. 
Throughout the remainder of the twentieth century, magistrates, and judges in the District 
Court on appeal, continued to use s 556A of the Crimes Act (which became s 10 of the Crimes 
(Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW)) to exercise mercy in cases of drink-driving, including 
for high range PCA cases, despite regular admonishment from Parliament and calls for the 
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limitation of its use in drink-driving cases.
103
 This is evidence that magistrates (and indeed 
District Court judges) still did not regard drink-driving as truly criminal, especially when faced 
with the offenders’ good character. It is also evidence of a relatively unfettered sentencing 
discretion. In the decades between 1969 and 2004 Parliament had steadily increased the 
maximum penalties and minimum disqualification periods for PCA offences,
104
 but there is 
evidence in the parliamentary debates throughout the period of concern that the perceived 
leniency of the courts was continuing to undermine attempts to convey the seriousness of the 
offence to the public. In 2004, in another attempt to force the courts to impose harsher penalties 
for drink-driving offences, the Attorney General, acting on instructions from the government, 
sought a guideline judgment from the Court of Criminal Appeal (‘CCA’) under s 37 of the 
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW).
105
 In promulgating a guideline for high range 
PCA the CCA listed the features of an ‘ordinary case’, which included ‘prior good character’, 
and stipulated that prior good character should no longer result in a dismissal under s 10 of the 
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) unless the case was otherwise extra-ordinary. 
The Court also held that dismissal under s 10 for a first or subsequent offence that displayed the 
characteristics of the ordinary case ‘will rarely be appropriate’.106 The court reasoned that 
Parliament’s recurring increase of the penalties was evidence that it considered drink-driving to 
be a very serious offence. It acknowledged submissions put by the Public Defender that ‘there 
are more effective ways of deterring drink-driving’ but concluded: 
… that is a matter for the legislature and not the courts. Parliament … has sent a clear message to 
the courts that it believes that a penal regime is the appropriate method for addressing this social 
problem.
107
  
These attempts by Parliament and the courts to curtail the sentencing discretion of magistrates 
can be seen as juridification: the replacement of informal practices with formal legal rules. 
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Juridification in this context becomes a tool for controlling the level of moral blameworthiness 
being attached to a particular behaviour. 
The following year a single Judge of the Supreme Court, in DPP v Bone,
108
 was called 
upon to determine whether the PCA drink-driving offence
109
 was an offence of absolute liability 
or of strict liability according to the ‘tripartite classification of statutory offences’ set out by the 
High Court in He Kaw Teh.
110
 As is well-known, He Kaw Teh divided criminal offences into 
three categories: (1) those that require the prosecution to prove a mental element; (2) offences of 
strict liability where the prosecution is not required to prove a mental element but the defence of 
honest and reasonable mistake of fact is available; and (3) absolute liability where the 
prosecution is not required to prove a mental element and the defence of honest and reasonable 
mistake of fact is not available. By the final decades of the twentieth century, and subsequent to 
the High Court’s decision in He Kaw Teh in 1985, the courts had detected ‘a discernible trend in 
modern authorities away from construing statutes as creating absolute liability and towards 
recognising statutory offences as falling within ... the category in which the prosecution must 
negative the honest and reasonable belief in innocence…’.111 Thousands of drink-driving 
offences are finalised in the NSW Local Court yearly,
112
 but the higher courts were not called 
upon to clarify the classification of the offence until 2005. One reason for the delay in seeking 
judicial clarification of the construction of PCA was that scientific and technological 
advancements had helped Parliament to close the loopholes in the legislation to such an extent 
that by the end of the century most people charged with drink-driving entered a plea of guilty at 
first instance.
113
  Many offenders appeal to the District Court each year against the severity of the 
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penalty, but challenges to criminal liability were rare.
114
  In deciding that it was a strict liability 
offence Justice Adams, paraphrasing Chief Justice Gibbs in He Kaw Teh, confirmed the degree 
of moral blameworthiness attaching to the offence from the perspective of the common law:  
it must now be accepted that conviction for an offence of driving while having a prohibited range 
of PCA in one’s blood will result in public obloquy and disgrace, especially for a mid range or 
high range offence.
115
 
The Court’s reasoning in DPP v Bone illustrates how the degree of moral blameworthiness 
attaching to a criminal offence impacts upon how the offence is dealt with procedurally.
116
     
The cases of Application by the Attorney General under s 37 of the Crimes (Sentencing 
Procedure) Act 1999 (2004) and DPP v Bone (2005) tell us two things about the use of the 
criminal law in summary form to achieve criminalisation. The first is the pivotal role played by 
the degree of moral blameworthiness attaching to the subject matter of the offence in 
determining how the offence will be dealt with procedurally; namely, to paraphrase Chief Justice 
Gibbs in He Kaw Teh, whether the subject matter is ‘truly criminal’. 117 The second is that the 
classification of an offence as summary cannot be assumed to imply that an offence is not truly 
criminal; or, in other words, is merely regulatory and does not attract a high degree of moral 
blameworthiness.  
The lens of criminalisation also helps to explain why drink-driving has not (yet) been 
‘defined down’118 as an infringement (or penalty) notice offence. In 1961, to clear a backlog of 
40,000 traffic cases in the courts of Petty Sessions, Parliament introduced a penalty notice 
system in NSW for ‘various moving traffic offences’.119 In the 1980s a ‘self-enforcing 
infringement notice scheme’, according to which infringement notices are enforced 
administratively through the State Debt Recovery Office without the intervention of a magistrate, 
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was introduced to free up magistrates’ time for other work.120  It has been estimated that self-
enforcing infringement notices ‘removed almost 450,000 traffic matters from court lists’.121 But 
despite the enormous number of drink-driving matters finalised yearly in the NSW Local Court, 
drink-driving has never been included amongst those traffic offences that may be finalised by 
way of infringement notice. O’Malley has argued that the infringement notice regime effected 
the ‘monetisation’ of justice, which enabled it to become a primary mechanism for the 
‘massification’ of criminal justice in the latter decades of the twentieth century. This 
massification was accompanied by the ‘de-moralisation’ of crime, by which O’Malley means 
that moral blameworthiness has been removed from the impugned behaviour.
122
  If the saving of 
court time were the decisive factor in ‘defining deviance down’ it might be expected that drink-
driving would be converted into an infringement notice offence, especially given the high 
conviction rate. However, the fact that it has not been supports the argument that moral 
blameworthiness may be conveyed via the summary jurisdiction. 
Conclusion 
This chapter argued that the lens of formalisation is helpful for understanding the use of the 
criminal law in summary form to regulate the major new threat of harm resulting from the 
technological development of the motor car. It showed that change over time in this context has 
been a product of the dynamic interaction between technological advances and the development 
of new bodies of scientific knowledge, which generated changes in social conditions and led to 
changes in practices of procedure and proof. The development of the science of breath analysis is 
a key illustration of this point. Before breath analysis emerged as a reliable means of proof of 
degrees of drunkenness, the courts were dependent upon the evaluative judgments of non-expert 
witnesses, usually police officers. For decades, the legal meaning of drunkenness did not map on 
to the popular meaning of drunkenness. The science of breath analysis, and the technology of 
random breath testing, led to changes in practices of detection and proof that removed evaluative 
judgement from the practices of proof in the law of drink-driving. This can be understood as 
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juridification. Breath analysis also enhanced enormously the efficiency of the summary 
jurisdiction.  
While the lens of formalisation helped to expose these under-analysed aspects of the 
development of the law of drink-driving, it does not explain it fully. My analysis revealed the 
competing forces that have impacted upon the development of the law. As practices of procedure 
and proof changed, Parliament grappled with rule of law issues that arose as a result of 
technological advances and debated the level of seriousness of the offence. On the one hand, the 
high risk of physical harm suggested that the behaviour of drink-driving should attract a high 
degree of moral blameworthiness, and a correspondingly higher level of seriousness. My analysis 
led to recognition of a relationship between proof and the degree of moral blameworthiness. The 
degree of moral blameworthiness has been pivotal in determining how an offence will be dealt 
with procedurally. The debates over the degree of moral blameworthiness that should attach to 
drink-driving suggested that the classification of an offence as summary cannot be assumed to 
imply that it is not ‘truly’ criminal as tends to happen in scholarly accounts that focus on the 
nineteenth century. On the other hand, the resource implications of the sheer number of offences 
finalised every year requires expeditious treatment, which suggests a lower level of seriousness 
is warranted. It may be that the current strict liability offence, which gives offenders an 
opportunity to raise a defence of honest and reasonable mistake of fact in the Local Court, is a 
compromise between a trial on indictment and proceeding by way of infringement notice. 
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Chapter 7: Contravening an Apprehended Violence Order 
Contravening an apprehended violence order (‘CAVO’) is one of the most important offences in 
the summary jurisdiction in the current era because it, and offences like it, has been responsible 
for the enormous expansion of the use of the criminal law in summary form to regulate harmful 
behaviours. CAVO is one offence in a category that I call ‘breach of justice orders’. The growth 
of this offence category has created a new cohort of defendants in the summary jurisdiction.  The 
gravamen of breach of justice orders is a breach of standards of behaviour that have been set by 
the courts under a range of mechanisms such as Apprehended Domestic Violence Orders 
(‘ADVO’, formerly Apprehended Violence Orders), Suspended Sentences and Good Behaviour 
Bonds. Of these, by far the largest categories of offence are breach of bond – supervised and 
unsupervised,
1
 breach of suspended sentence,
2
 and breach of violence order.
3
     
The focus of this chapter is the ADVO and accompanying offence of CAVO (the 
‘ADVO/CAVO mechanism’). It is necessary to understand the ADVO/CAVO mechanism 
because in the 1980s it became a key weapon in the battle against domestic violence. I use the 
war metaphor advisedly; feminist scholars and lobby groups consciously chose to employ the 
rhetoric of ‘gender war’ in its campaign to raise awareness of domestic violence.4  With the 
prevalence of domestic violence, CAVO, a summary only offence,
5
 brought the front line of the 
domestic violence battle to the summary jurisdiction.  
 This chapter argues that juridification is the most prominent dimension of formalisation 
in this context. As set out in the Introduction to this thesis, I use the concept of juridification as a 
means of understanding what I have identified as the turn to law to regulate the constructed 
harmful behaviour of domestic violence. This chapter shows how the criminalisation of domestic 
violence has been achieved via the summary jurisdiction. It can be seen as an example of 
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horizontal criminalisation. While domestic violence has been constructed as harmful for at least 
one-and-a-half centuries, the way in which it has been criminalised has changed significantly in 
the current era. Analysing the ADVO/CAVO mechanism through the formalisation lens reveals 
that the criminalisation of domestic violence has been as much a product of changing procedures 
and enforcement practices as it has a product of changes to the substantive law.  
In analysing the development of the ADVO/CAVO mechanism, three chronological 
periods emerge from my research: the period prior to the late nineteenth century; from the late 
nineteenth century to the final quarter of the twentieth century; and from the final quarter of the 
twentieth century to the present. The reason why the time periods in this chapter differ from 
those in preceding chapters is because change in the context of domestic violence, at least since 
the 1970s, has been the product of different social factors, in particular lobbying by victims’ and 
women’s groups. However, as in all of the preceding chapters, the final period is the most 
important for understanding the summary jurisdiction in the current era. 
The Period Prior to the Late Nineteenth Century 
The direct ancestor of the ADVO/CAVO mechanism, the surety to keep the peace, arose out of 
custom prior to the fourteenth century in England and was then incorporated into the 
Commission of Justices of the Peace (the ‘Commission of the Peace’), which, as set out in 
chapter 2, was a statutory instrument enacted by King Edward III, in 1361.
6
 The power to bind 
over to keep the peace was one of the earliest forms of summary jurisdiction and was called a 
security or surety.
7
 It empowered justices to cause those who threatened the peace to appear 
before them and be bound over to keep the peace. Only if the bound-over person breached the 
surety did justices have power to imprison them.
8
 Despite its inclusion in the Commission of the 
Peace, it remained a broad discretionary power that was not amenable to precision and could not 
be enforced. The primary purpose of the surety to keep the peace was to preserve peace in the 
community, although it could also have the effect of protecting the individual complainant. 
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The surety to keep the peace was one of the ‘so-called powers of preventive justice’9 that 
have long been a cause of concern to treatise writers and academics. For example, Dr Burns, 
writing in 1845, lamented that the requirement to keep the peace had been so broadly construed 
that it had ‘become difficult to define how far it shall extend, and where it shall stop’.10  These 
powers of preventive justice stem from an ‘executive or ministerial’ power which has its roots in 
the royal prerogative, rather than from a judicial power, and is a legacy of the policing role 
magistrates formerly performed.
11
  The surety to keep the peace is an ancestor of what is known 
in Australia as the ‘common law bond’,12 and in the UK as the ‘common law bind over’.13   
Justices were empowered to grant a surety of the peace ‘wherever a person has just cause 
to fear that another will burn his house, or do him corporal hurt,—as, by killing or beating him, 
or that he will procure others to do him such mischief’.14 Thus the surety was designed to protect 
‘people, concerning their bodies, or the firing of their houses’,15 and ‘just cause to fear’ could be 
proven by giving evidence upon oath of such fear ‘by reason of the other’s having threatened to 
beat him, or laid in wait for that purpose’.16  Sureties to keep the peace did not require a 
conviction, and therefore were not premised on the usual justifications for the use of coercive 
state power. There was no requirement that they be associated with an alleged criminal offence. 
Indeed, they could be imposed ‘[i]f a complaint for an assault is dismissed, and the Justices think 
from the evidence such a precaution is necessary’.17  The usual course was for a surety to be 
imposed on information provided ‘by the person who fears the personal injury’, but Justices 
could also act upon information provided by others. This underlines its focus on the community 
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and the role of magistrates at that time in preserving peace in the community. 
18
  As Stephen CJ 
said in Ex parte Beckett, justices: 
are conservators of the public peace; and if they are satisfied that it is likely to be endangered, it is 
their duty to preserve it by whatever preventive powers the law gives them…A refusal to do so on 
the part of a justice would be something contrary to the very nature of his office. 
The person against whom the surety was being sought could resist it on the basis that the fear 
was unfounded, or, by ‘direct’ evidence, proving that it was ‘preferred from malice only’.19 
When NSW was colonised in 1788, justices of the peace, who brought with them all the 
powers of justices in England, had the power, pursuant to the commission of the peace, to bind a 
person over the keep the peace. This was the state of the law until 1883. 
From the Late Nineteenth Century to the Final Quarter of the Twentieth Century 
Close examination of the surety during the period from the late nineteenth century to the final 
quarter of the twentieth century reveals that the shortcomings of the criminal law as a means of 
responding to domestic violence account for the development of the ADVO/CAVO mechanism. 
During this period magistrates used the surety as a means of protecting victims of domestic 
violence when it was not possible to convict the perpetrator of a more serious assault-based 
offence. By the latter decades of the nineteenth century the criminal law intervened in non-fatal 
domestic violence via two mechanisms: a charge of an offence such as assault or aggravated 
assault;
20
 and the surety to keep the peace. Although the police tended to intervene in domestic 
assaults only where serious injury or death was inflicted,
21
 there is evidence that domestic 
violence-related charges were brought far more frequently than scholars have previously 
recognised, but in the summary jurisdiction.
22
 These cases, which ‘crossed class lines,’23 were 
sometimes commenced by police arrest, although the most common means of commencing 
prosecutions was a ‘victim-initiated summons’.24  This is significant because it disrupts the 
orthodox narrative that domestic violence was considered to be a private matter until second 
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wave feminism began to agitate for it to be brought into the public sphere in the second half of 
the twentieth century.  
Even though the criminal law intervened in domestic violence more frequently than 
previously recognised, it was not an effective option for most women, and because of the 
reluctance of women to give evidence in assault cases, convictions were often difficult to secure. 
For this reason courts were often forced to resort to the surety to keep the peace, sometimes for 
extremely serious assaults that could not otherwise have been dealt with summarily.
25
  Carolyn 
Ramsay recounts one case from the state of Victoria where a police officer had found the victim 
‘covered in blood from being stabbed with a three-cornered file’ and had intervened to prevent 
her husband from choking her.
26
   
The reasons why women were reluctant to pursue criminal sanctions are complex. Some 
relate to the inhospitableness of the criminal justice system. This includes the unwillingness of 
police to collect evidence or lay charges and the trauma of the prosecution process. Others relate 
to the social circumstances in which women found themselves. In the late nineteenth century, at 
a time when women were not encouraged to join the workforce, and before the state assumed 
responsibility for financial welfare, women were largely financially dependent upon their 
spouses.
27
  In such circumstances the conviction and imprisonment of a woman’s husband would 
often leave her —  and any children she may be responsible for — without financial support. 
Bringing charges could also result in reprisals from the husband. For these reasons, among many 
others, victims frequently refused to testify or withdrew the charges. It was in the context of 
failed prosecutions that the surety to keep the peace came to play a central role in the criminal 
law’s response to domestic violence.  
The surety to keep the peace had many statutory incarnations from 1883 onwards.
28
 The 
first ‘native’ version, the recognizance to keep the peace in cases of apprehended violence (‘the 
recognisance’), was incorporated into the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1883 (NSW)29 and was 
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in force, almost unchanged, for a century.
30
  This recognisance was a descendant of the surety to 
keep the peace and the immediate ancestor of the current ADVO.
31
  It was not directed 
specifically to domestic violence and was, in practice, unenforceable because, as with its 
predecessor, the only penalty for breach was forfeiture of the surety, if one had been imposed.  
The recognisance was based on a present subjective apprehension of future violence to ‘the 
person … or of his wife or child, or of apprehended injury to his property …’.32 From the 
wording it can be seen that it was not originally designed for the protection of women and 
children from domestic violence; it was adapted to that purpose.
33
  It was a broad, imprecise 
power circumscribed only by the objective test of whether the justice was of the view that the 
apprehension was reasonable. Like its predecessor it could be imposed for conduct that did not 
amount to a criminal offence and therefore a conviction was not a prerequisite. Unlike its 
predecessor, it could be sought only ‘on the complaint of the person apprehending violence to the 
person’. This made it impossible for women who feared retribution from their assailants to 
distance themselves from the enforcement process. The only order justices were empowered to 
make was a general one requiring the defendant to enter a recognisance to ‘keep the peace’ — it 
could not be tailored to the defendant or the circumstances of the relationship between the 
complainant and the defendant. If the defendant refused to enter into the recognisance he (or she) 
could be imprisoned for three months but there was no judicial power to punish for breach. The 
recognisance persisted in this form in NSW until 1982.  
From the Final Quarter of the Twentieth Century to Present 
As seen in previous chapters, against a backdrop of the rise to prominence of ideas of social 
equality and human rights in the post-war era, the late 1970s was a time of immense social and 
political change in NSW, and also at the federal level. In 1972 the federal left-leaning Whitlam 
Labor government was elected after decades of conservative rule. Similarly, in 1976 in NSW the 
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left-leaning Wran Labor government was elected and each government immediately set about 
implementing their progressive agendas. The impact of second wave feminism can be seen in 
one of the key initiatives in NSW — reform of the public service based on the values of equal 
opportunity for minorities and women, and promotion on merit rather than seniority.
34
   At the 
federal level the government instituted no-fault divorce and introduced a sole parent pension,
35
 
among many other reforms. The federal reforms in particular created conditions that made the 
introduction of the ADVO/CAVO mechanism possible because they provided women with an 
avenue of escaping a violent marriage and accessing independent financial support.
36
  In doing 
so, these reforms went some way towards addressing one of the most significant impediments to 
the efficacy of the criminal law in addressing domestic violence, namely, the woman’s 
dependence on her spouse. 
In 1982 the front line of the battle against domestic violence was brought to the summary 
jurisdiction by the NSW Wran Labor government’s strategy of creating the ADVO, which was 
based on the recognisance discussed above. The criminal law’s treatment of domestic violence 
altered radically at this time as Australian jurisdictions, and common law jurisdictions around the 
world, began to implement varying statutory domestic violence regimes.
37
  The NSW legislation 
was explicitly drafted ‘to make keep the peace orders more effective in relation to domestic 
violence through the introduction of specific apprehended domestic violence orders.’38 While it 
was recognised that violence was also perpetrated against children, the initial focus was on 
domestic violence against women because of the ‘particularly high incidence of wife beating’.39 
The immediate impetus for the 1982/83 legislative changes to the criminal law relating to 
Domestic Violence in NSW was the discovery in the 1970s of a link between homicide and 
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domestic violence.
40
 This link was revealed by studies, both in New South Wales,
41
 and 
internationally,
42
 which exposed the fact that a high proportion of murders were committed by 
intimate partners. This revelation prompted the government to undertake law reform to address 
the serious end of domestic violence offending.
43
 Changes made to the criminal law included 
removal of the immunity from prosecution for rape in marriage in 1981,
44
 and the law relating to 
provocation began to evolve to enable a defence on the basis of ‘battered women’s syndrome’.45 
Investigations into the domestic context of homicide revealed that these homicides had often 
been preceded by incidents of lower level domestic violence.
46
 This realisation in turn led to the 
discovery of the prevalence of lower level, but nonetheless serious, domestic violence. It was 
against this backdrop of a rising awareness of the prevalence of lower-level domestic violence 
that attention turned to the potential for a civil-based ADVO to provide a means of protecting 
women. 
It was widely acknowledged by the early 1980s that the criminal law was, in its current 
form, an ineffective means of responding to domestic violence for the reasons discussed above, 
and because it was reactive rather than proactive.
47
 In response to research and lobbying by 
various women’s groups, the measures introduced in 1982 took a holistic approach to the 
problem, addressing allied problems such as health and housing, as well as attempting to make 
the criminal law more effective.
48
  The criminal law was a central measure for both practical and 
normative reasons. The practical reasons concerned the belief in the criminal law’s potential to 
protect victims through both pre-emptive protection orders and deterrence. The normative 
reasons, which were related to the practical ones, concerned the criminal law’s capacity to 
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convey to the community that domestic violence is no longer tolerated. Regarding the former, 
measures included introducing an exception to the rule against the compellability of spouses in 
cases of domestic violence.
49
  By denying women the choice not to give evidence, this exception 
was designed to address the impossibility of proving substantive offences when the victim 
refused to give evidence.
50
 A further problem was the high criminal standard of proof.
51
 In 
relation to proactive measures, it was recognised that the recognisance in NSW,
52
 and injunctions 
under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) at a federal level, were ‘notoriously ineffective’ for 
protecting women against domestic violence.
53
  This ineffectiveness was attributed to the fact 
that ‘there is no power of arrest attached directly to a breach of the order and it is necessary to 
institute further legal proceedings of contempt of court to enforce them.’54 Regarding the 
normative reasons for including the criminal law in its reforms, Wran said in his Second Reading 
Speech: ‘community attitudes still have a long way to go before the last vestige of the tacit 
sanctioning of wife beating is eliminated.’  Therefore, in addition to ‘making the police and 
courts more effective’, the government intended the legislative reforms to help to re-shape 
community attitudes by ‘recognising that domestic assault is assault’.55     
The impact of lobbying by feminist and victims’ groups on these reforms is evident in the 
long list of individuals and organisations that Premier Wran thanked in his Second Reading 
Speech when introducing the 1982 Bill to the NSW Parliament.
56
  These included the Women’s 
Legal Resources Centre, the Women Lawyers’ Association and the Women’s Electoral Lobby. 
The list also included the NSW Police Association, refuges, churches, universities, hospitals and 
numerous government departments, indicating the extent of public concern about domestic 
violence in this period.  
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Why did feminist and victims’ groups choose to channel reform efforts into the criminal 
law rather than, for example, the civil family law jurisdiction?  An injunction against violence 
had been available in the federal family law jurisdiction since 1975. It too had been criticised for 
its ineffectiveness,
57
 as the recognisance and its predecessors in the criminal jurisdiction had 
been, but reform of the family law injunction was not pursued with the same vigor as reform of 
the recognisance in the criminal jurisdiction. At the risk of over-simplification, the reason for 
choosing the criminal law as a key state response to domestic violence was its capacity to force 
offenders (men) to accept responsibility for perpetrating violence against women and children 
through the responsibility attribution practices of the criminal law. Doing so was a ‘key strategy 
of feminists … to seek to make lines of accountability for gendered violence clear’ in order to 
disrupt patriarchal social structures.
58
  Simultaneously, the denunciation function of the criminal 
law served the purpose of conveying the state’s moral condemnation of violence against women. 
Via the imposition of criminal liability, punishment and retribution, the state recognises and 
denounces the ‘harm done to the victim and the community’.59  Also, because police are often 
the first to respond to domestic violence, their activities feed easily into the infrastructure of the 
criminal law. Other reasons for favouring criminal law over family law include the fact that legal 
aid was more readily available for state criminal matters than for federal family law matters.  
The Apprehended Domestic Violence Order 
Having set out the reasons why the criminal law, up to the final quarter of the twentieth 
century was an ineffective tool for dealing with domestic violence, and the social context within 
which the ADVO/CAVO mechanism was introduced, this section examines the content of the 
ADVO/CAVO mechanism and assesses the utility of the formalisation lens for understanding the 
subsequent changes to the substantive law, procedures and practices.  
The ADVO, enacted in 1982, was a civil order that empowered a court of summary 
jurisdiction to impose ‘such restrictions or prohibitions on the behaviour of the defendant as 
appear necessary’ if satisfied on the balance of probabilities that ‘the person in need of 
protection’ (‘PINOP’) ‘apprehends’ ‘the commission by a person of domestic violence upon 
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another person’ and the court is satisfied ‘that the apprehension is reasonable.’60  Thus the key 
criterion of the ADVO is the PINOP’s perception of threats. While this is circumscribed by an 
objective test, the civil standard of proof, which was consciously chosen by women’s groups to 
overcome the difficulties of meeting the criminal standard,
61
 reduces the limiting effect of the 
reasonableness requirement. 
The ADVO extended the reach of the criminal law by criminalising a broader range of 
behaviours than were previously captured by the recognisance (and its ancestor, the surety to 
keep the peace). It did so by shifting the focus of the recognisance from protection of the king’s 
peace to protection of personal autonomy. As such it was constructed around an expanded 
conception of ‘the person’ of the victim; specifically, as originally designed, ‘the person’ of a 
class of women.
62
  Some scholars, such as Peter Ramsay, have charted these changes in the 
English context in detail,
63
 but their impact on the operation of the criminal law in the summary 
jurisdiction has been little studied in Australia.
64
  As Farmer’s work shows, personhood now 
extends beyond harm to the body of the person to the ‘victim’s own perception of threats and of 
their vulnerability in particular contexts … Personhood is understood as a kind of personal space 
in which an individual is able to exercise or develop their autonomy and sense of self.’65  As a 
result of this new understanding of personhood, our understanding of the responsible individual 
has extended to incorporate ‘responsible conduct in relation to others’,66  both of which 
developed in the domestic violence context.
67
 The ADVO brought about this change to the 
criminal law in NSW.  
These changes to the substantive law were accompanied by changes to enforcement 
practices, which were designed to improve the effectiveness of the criminal law. For example, 
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either the aggrieved person or a police officer could lay a complaint, instead of the aggrieved 
person only.
68
 This was an important change that attempted to address victims’ fears of reprisals, 
as discussed above. Further, the court was empowered to impose ‘such restrictions on the 
behaviour of the defendant as appear necessary or desirable’, which enabled orders to be 
moulded to the defendant and the particular circumstances of the relationship, thus creating a 
personalised criminal law.
69
  
When first enacted the ADVO provision contained two important restrictions that have 
since been discarded. The erosion of these restrictions shows how rule of law issues have played 
out in the summary jurisdiction in NSW.  The first restriction was that a court could only make 
an order if the complainant feared being subjected to behaviour that was already a criminal 
offence. Additionally, it could not be a fear of just any offence, but only a selection of offences 
classified as ‘domestic violence offences’.70  The legislation did not create a new domestic 
violence offence but deemed pre-existing offences to be domestic violence offences.
71
  Only one 
year after its enactment, the ADVO provision was extended to include an apprehension of 
conduct, which, at the time, did not constitute an existing criminal offence, namely, ‘conduct 
consisting of harassment or molestation, falling short of actual or threatened violence.’72 This 
amendment offends the rule of law principle of equality before the law because it expands the 
range of behaviour that is considered to be harmful, but not for everyone in the community, only 
for individuals who had been made the subject of an ADVO.  
The second restriction was that the period of the order was limited to six months. In 2007 
the duration of an order was extended to ‘as long as is necessary, in the opinion of the court, to 
ensure the safety and protection of the protected person’,73 or 12 months if the court fails to 
specify the period of the order.
74
  This is a considerable expansion of the reach of the criminal 
law by extending the duration of what Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner have called ‘self-
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policing’ mechanisms.75 Self-policing mechanisms are mechanisms like the ADVO which, 
Ashworth and Zedner argue, have reoriented the criminal law away from its traditional 
‘retrospective orientation of punishment for past actions towards what might be termed ‘future 
law’’.76  They govern behaviour by eliciting a quasi-contractual consent from the defendant to be 
subjected to punishment in the future if they breach the conditions of the mechanism.
77
 Thus 
self-policing mechanisms challenge the rule of law principle that no punishment shall be 
inflicted without a determination by the courts that there has been a breach of law. Eroding core 
principles of the rule of law in this way has facilitated criminalisation. It was a conscious choice 
— a political choice — not only of the NSW government, but also of the women’s groups who 
advocated for the changes. 
Contravening an Apprehended Violence Order 
The creation of the contravening an apprehended violence order (‘CAVO’) offence is an 
example of the maturation of the summary jurisdiction, by which I mean, as explained in the 
Introduction to this thesis, it was given the power to regulate its own processes by imposing a 
punishment for breach of its orders. But this power extended far beyond the creation of court 
procedures. It created a new regime for regulating the behaviour of citizens. CAVO served both 
normative and practical purposes. The terms of the offence were that ‘a person against whom an 
[ADVO] has been made’ and who ‘has been personally served with a copy’ of the order, and 
who ‘knowingly fails to comply with a restriction or prohibition specified in the order’ is guilty 
of an offence.
78
  In normative terms it gave effect to the criminal law’s denunciation function by 
conveying the state’s moral condemnation of domestic violence.79  When initially enacted, 
CAVO was punishable by six months imprisonment.
80
  The penalty has now been increased to 2 
years imprisonment and if the breach ‘was an act of violence against a person’, the defendant 
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must be sentenced to imprisonment ‘unless the court otherwise orders’.81 If the court otherwise 
orders it must give reasons for doing so.
82
   These provisions are evidence of the seriousness with 
which the behaviour is regarded and reflects the impact of demands for greater recognition of 
harm to victims.  
In practical terms, the offence of CAVO addressed the main criticism of its predecessor, 
the recognisance to keep the peace; namely, its lack of enforceability. As Premier Wran said in 
his Second Reading Speech to Parliament when it was first introduced: ‘I believe that this last 
reform [i.e., the creation of the offence of CAVO] will provide effective and immediate relief for 
those women who spend their lives worrying when the next battering will be.’83 When 
considering how best to adapt the recognisance to the domestic violence context the various law 
reform bodies around Australia considered models implemented in the United States and the 
United Kingdom.
84
 In NSW the Domestic Violence Task Force recommended the English model 
but with important adaptations. In the English model, the police had no power to arrest for 
breach of a recognisance unless the court had attached such a power to the order.
85
 This created 
uncertainty for the police about their powers of arrest in each case and either delayed or deterred 
intervention.
86
 To avoid this uncertainty, the NSW Parliament enacted a specific police power to 
arrest for CAVO.
87
 The legislative changes also confirmed the right of police to enter premises 
when invited and empowered magistrates to issue warrants to police via radio or telephone.
88
  
Thus the ADVO/CAVO mechanism made a relatively unregulated field of social interaction 
amenable to regulation by the criminal law. This can be seen as a process of juridification that 
has facilitated criminalisation.  
It might be objected that the ADVO/CAVO mechanism has resulted in de-criminalisation 
rather than criminalisation. In a study of breaches of domestic violence orders in Queensland, 
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Heather Douglas found that convictions for the Queensland equivalent of CAVO were being 
accepted in cases where the facts warranted a conviction for more serious assault offences; or, 
the nature of the breach that was recorded in court minimised the violence actually experienced 
by the victim.
89
  Douglas observes that this constitutes de-criminalisation (or a failure to 
criminalise) because the offender is being held liable and being punished for an offence that is 
much lower in the offence hierarchy than that actually committed, and some offenders are 
escaping conviction entirely. Even though this was a Queensland-based study, NSW has faced 
similar issues.
90
  Examination of individual cases in this way indeed paints a picture of de- or 
non-criminalisation. However, the power of an analysis of change over time to substantive law 
that incorporates an examination of procedures and practices lies in its capacity to paint a 
different picture. It shows that the law is facilitating convictions for CAVO in circumstances 
where offenders have previously escaped conviction for the reasons set out earlier in this chapter, 
the main one being the refusal of the victim to give evidence in court. Viewed from this 
perspective, the ADVO/CAVO mechanism represents criminalisation rather than de-
criminalisation. Douglas’ study was conducted in 2008 and much has changed since then. An 
analysis of recent legislative changes in NSW illustrates how the turn to law to regulate police 
enforcement practices is facilitating criminalisation.  
In the twenty-first century the prevention of domestic violence has become a high-profile 
national priority. In response to a series of reports and inquiries, broad-ranging domestic 
violence regimes designed to address the problem holistically have been introduced across 
Australia. Due to Australia’s federal structure, those regimes differ across jurisdictions, but there 
have been moves to develop a national strategy.
91
 The most prominent and comprehensive 
inquiry was the Victorian Royal Commission into Family Violence which issued a seven-volume 
report in 2016.
92
  In NSW, the 2006 Ombudsman’s special report to Parliament, Domestic 
Violence – Improving Police Practice (‘2006 Ombudsman’s Report’), led to the NSW 
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government’s Domestic Violence Justice Strategy 2013–2017.93  The strategy ‘outlines the 
approaches and standards justice agencies in NSW will adopt to improve the criminal justice 
system’s response to domestic violence’.94  A key pillar of that strategy was implementation of 
the Code of Practice for the NSW Police Force Response to Domestic and Family Violence 
(‘NSW Police Code of Practice’).95  The core goal of the NSW Police Code of Practice is 
‘building trust and confidence in the NSW Police Force amongst victims … with the aim of 
increased reporting and legal action rates.’96  Increasing the reach of the criminal law — which 
will be achieved primarily through the ADVO/CAVO mechanism in the summary jurisdiction — 
is therefore central aim of these initiatives.  
Amendments to the ADVO/CAVO mechanism made since the tabling of the 2006 
Ombudsman’s report can best be understood as attempts to increase the criminalisation of 
domestic violence. A selection made in 2007, 2013 and 2015 illustrate the ongoing nature of 
those efforts. In response to calls from women’s group advocates,97 in 2007 the domestic 
violence regime was removed from the Crimes Act and enacted in a stand-alone Act, the Crimes 
(Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW).
98
 The reasons given by the government for 
doing this were expressed in the language of denunciation and improving the effectiveness of the 
criminal law. In the parliamentary debates members of the government said the stand-alone 
regime would give ‘full recognition to the seriousness of violence against women and children’, 
make it ‘easier for women and children to obtain apprehended violence orders’, and easier for 
police and practitioners to navigate the legislation.
99
 Two examples illustrate how the 
amendments facilitated criminalisation. The first was the granting of a power to magistrates to 
impose an interim apprehended violence order automatically where the alleged assailant was 
charged with a ‘serious personal violence offence’ ‘to spare victims of violence the trauma of 
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being cross-examined at the hearing for an apprehended violence order as well as at the hearing 
of the criminal charges’.100  The second was a mechanism ‘to identify repeat offenders’ by 
requiring domestic violence offences to be noted on an offender’s criminal record.101  It will be 
recalled that there is no specific ‘domestic violence’ offence. Instead, offenders are convicted of 
offences such as assault and assault occasioning actual bodily harm. Before the 2007 
amendment, when these offences were entered on an offender’s criminal history, there was no 
indication of the domestic violence context of the offence. The proposal to note the domestic 
violence context of such offences on the offender’s record was intended to serve two functions. 
The first was to make it easier for courts to identify repeat offenders and impose harsher 
penalties. The second was the use of labelling to shame repeat offenders.
102
 
 In this tranche of amendments, however, Parliament again acknowledged that the 
criminal law alone could not solve the problem of domestic violence. Both the government and 
the opposition pointed to the complexity of the issues underpinning domestic violence, including 
gender inequality, learned behaviour and socioeconomic factors that require a more nuanced 
approach than the criminal law is capable of delivering.
103
 
 In 2013 police powers in relation to domestic violence were expanded,
104
 and recorded 
statements were introduced in 2015.
105
 The 2015 amendments enable the complainant in Local 
Court trials relating to a domestic violence offence to ‘give evidence in chief … wholly or partly 
in the form of a recorded statement that is viewed or heard by the court.’106 This practice only 
applies to hearings relating to applications for domestic violence orders that are connected to the 
alleged commission of a domestic violence offence,
107
 and is intended to avoid the necessity of 
the complainant giving evidence twice in two different proceedings.
108
  The statement is often 
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taken from the victim at the time of the offence when any injuries that may exist are visible and 
the alleged victim is likely to be emotional, which renders them highly compelling. These 
provisions, which mirror provisions previously enacted to protect vulnerable witnesses and 
victims in prescribed sexual assault proceedings,
109
 do not entirely preclude the defendant from 
cross-examining the complainant. In principle the complainant is still required to attend court to 
give evidence on oath. However, they reduce the opportunity for defendants to confront their 
accuser. These changes in the practices of procedure and proof were explicitly designed to 
overcome two impediments to criminalisation: domestic violence incidents not being brought to 
the attention of the police; and the failure of complainants to attend court.
110
 In his Second 
Reading Speech the then Attorney General (Brad Hazzard) noted a 2014 BOCSAR study which 
estimates that ‘only half of domestic assaults are reported to police.’111  Failure to report 
domestic violence to police has been recognised as a problem at least since the issue of domestic 
violence rose to prominence in the late 1970s. The 2015 amendments were also designed to 
‘increase the number of early guilty pleas’,112 which, Hazzard argued on behalf of the 
government, would have the dual benefits of improving efficiency and reducing the trauma of 
the process for victims. 
 As well as these ongoing reforms aimed at increasing the criminalisation of domestic 
violence, initiatives have been introduced that go some way towards ‘redefining success’.113 In 
2005 the Domestic Violence Intervention Court Model (‘DVICM’) was implemented in two 
Local Courts, one in western Sydney at Campbelltown, and one in the regional town of Wagga 
Wagga. Its purpose was ‘to apply good practice in the criminal justice process for domestic 
violence matters and improve the coordination of services to victims and defendants.’114 The 
main features of the ‘inter-agency’ scheme are: the provision of ‘regular, although not specialist, 
police prosecutors’;115 victims being excused by agreement with the magistrate from all but the 
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first court appearance (and presumably the hearing if the matter is defended); the police being 
supplied with ‘domestic violence evidence collection kits’ which assist them to collect high 
quality evidence and their being supported to produce briefs of evidence at the earliest possible 
date. By 2007 the evidence kits were being rolled out around the State.
116
 A victims’ advocate 
provides support for victims through the process and assists with matters relating to personal 
security.
117
 Two evaluations of the scheme, one in 2008,
118
 and one in 2012,
119
 showed that 
while the incidence of guilty pleas had not increased as was hoped, the scheme had reduced court 
delays and victims reported satisfaction with the process and improved feelings of personal 
security. The scheme remains active in Campbelltown and Wagga Wagga but has not been rolled 
out across the State. The Victoria Royal Commission into Family Violence (‘Victoria RCFV’) 
has recommended augmenting moves towards a similar ‘therapeutic approach’ in Victorian 
Magistrates Courts.
120
  While schemes such as the DVICM provide an opportunity to redefine 
success in terms of participant satisfaction rather than by the number of convictions or a 
reduction in the incidence of domestic violence, criminalisation through securing convictions 
remains at the heart of the process. 
We are yet to see what the NSW response to the Victoria RCFV will be, but one 
legislative measure recently introduced in Victoria portends increasing criminalisation via the 
summary jurisdiction. In July 2016 Victoria introduced self-executing interim family violence 
intervention orders (the equivalent of the NSW interim ADVO) despite the recommendation of 
the Victoria RCFV that they not be adopted.
121
. The benefits of self-executing orders include that 
they save court time and they relieve the victim of having to return to court for confirmation of 
the final order. However, as the Victoria RCFV pointed out, they make the ‘person subject to the 
order responsible for independently challenging the order.’122  In light of evidence demonstrating 
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that a high proportion of defendants (and PINOPS) do not understand family violence orders 
when they are dealt with in court,
123
 self-executing orders carry the obvious risk of exacerbating 
that lack of understanding. The NSW Police Code of Practice pledges what may be interpreted as 
extra-curial surveillance: ‘Police will work with local communities and external agencies to 
reduce and prevent domestic and family violence through monitoring the behaviour of 
offenders.’124  The inevitable result of such far-reaching criminalisation will be greater numbers 
of prosecutions by an increasingly vigilant police force that will swell the ranks of defendants 
and increase the prison population, as the final part of this chapter shows. 
In the current era the offence category of breach of justice orders has created new cohort 
of defendants. This phenomenon is best illustrated by an investigation of the impact of CAVO on 
a particular social group: Aboriginal people. The overrepresentation of Aboriginal people in the 
summary jurisdiction charged with low-level public order offences, such as offensive language, 
has been examined in detail in the criminal law literature, due, in large part, to the revelations of 
the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody in 1991.
125
  What is less well-known is 
the impact that the summary jurisdiction’s increasing maturity is having on the Aboriginal 
charging and incarceration rates. The oft-quoted statistics on the overrepresentation of 
Aboriginal people in prison are well-known:  Aboriginal people comprise approximately 3 per 
cent of the total population and are imprisoned at a rate that is 13 times greater than non-
Indigenous persons.
 126
  BOCSAR has drawn attention to the fact that the broad category of 
‘offences against justice procedures’ has contributed to the overrepresentation of Aboriginal 
people in the criminal justice system,
127
 but a less-well-known statistic is the extent to which 
Aboriginal people are overrepresented as both victims and defendants of, and among those 
sentenced to imprisonment for, CAVO.  
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Victimisation rates are notoriously difficult to measure but a number of policy documents 
have noted that ‘the occurrence of violence in Indigenous communities and among Indigenous 
people “is disproportionately high in comparison to the rates of the same types of violence in the 
Australian population as a whole”’.128  The reasons for this, again, are complex and are beyond 
the scope of this thesis, but they include interrelated factors such as generational trauma caused 
by colonisation, higher rates of socioeconomic disadvantage and removal of children from their 
families.
129
  The Australian Bureau of Statistics reports that in NSW, ‘Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander people had more than three times the victimisation for Assault compared to non-
Indigenous people, and the rates are rising,
130
 while the national rates of assault have been 
decreasing since 2011–2012.131 A disproportionately large proportion of the victims of such 
violence are women, accounting for 65 per cent of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander assault 
victims.
132
 
Conviction rates are more readily determined, but they are not without their problems. 
Because the way in which statistics were recorded and organised changed in 1994 it is not 
possible to compare the data from 1982 (when CAVO was introduced) to 1994 with post-1994 
data. Even the post-1994 data must be approached with caution. For example, it is clear that the 
recording of Indigenous status improved between 1994 and the mid-2000s such that the size of 
the category of offender whose Indigenous status was ‘unknown’ decreased from 431 in 1994 to 
three in 2008. Despite these limitations it is possible to make some general observations.
133
  
Between 1995 and 2015 the total number of CAVO offences finalised in the NSW Local Court 
more than doubled from 1555 to 3626. In 1995, Indigenous people accounted for 19 per cent of 
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CAVO charges finalised in the Local Court of NSW. By 2005 this proportion had increased to 
24.5 per cent, but this increase may be explained by the improvements in the recording of 
Indigenous status. In 2008, after the enactment of amendments in 2007 that changed police 
enforcement practices, that figure had increased to 28 per cent and it has remained between 27 
per cent and 30 per cent ever since.
134
  
Perhaps more striking is the proportion of offenders sentenced to imprisonment for 
CAVO, and of those the proportion that is Indigenous. Between 1995 and 2015 the total number 
of people sentenced to imprisonment has almost tripled from 217 to 565. Over the same period, 
the proportion of those that are Indigenous has fluctuated between 38 per cent and 50 per cent.
135
  
Contributing to the disproportionately high Indigenous imprisonment rate is the fact that 
Indigenous offenders sentenced to imprisonment for CAVO have ‘significantly higher’ 
reconviction rates than their ‘non-Indigenous counterparts’.136 One reason for this is that 
Indigenous offenders are more likely to have a lengthier prior history of offending,
137
 which is 
one of the predictors of being sentenced to imprisonment.
138
 Similarly, offenders from ‘socio-
economically disadvantaged areas’ also had higher recidivism rates for CAVO.139  Another  
factor leading to imprisonment for CAVO is where the breach involves a physical assault,
140
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Conclusion 
This chapter argued that the lens of formalisation is helpful for understanding how the criminal 
law in summary form has been used to regulate domestic violence. It showed that the 
ADVO/CAVO mechanism has deep historical roots in the surety to keep the peace, thus 
revealing the longevity of the use of the criminal law as a preventive tool. However, in the 1980s 
the summary jurisdiction was used to effect a radical shift in the way in which the criminal law 
responds to domestic violence. The broad and open textured mechanism of the surety to keep the 
peace, which became the recognisance to keep the peace, was replaced with the ADVO/CAVO 
legislative mechanism. The ADVO/CAVO mechanism extended the reach of the criminal law by 
criminalising a broader range of behaviours than were previously captured by the recognisance 
(and its ancestor). But the criminalisation of domestic violence has been achieved primarily via 
myriad legislative provisions enacted from the 1980s to the present that regulate enforcement 
practices. This proliferation of statutory provisions can be seen as juridification. This process has 
been driven by the efforts of expert consultative bodies rather than the government choosing 
unilaterally to respond to domestic violence punitively. These bodies, activated by the lobbying 
of feminists and victims groups, consciously chose the criminal law as a key measure to combat 
domestic violence rather than alternative regulatory systems such as the civil family law 
jurisdiction. This choice was motivated, in large part, by the criminal law’s capacity to convey 
the state’s moral condemnation of domestic violence, and the ready availability of the 
infrastructure of the criminal law. However, while the fomalisation lens revealed these under-
appreciated aspects of criminalisation, it does not explain it fully. The ADVO/CAVO mechanism 
empowers magistrates to mould a personalised criminal law to the circumstances of the 
defendant and (usually) his relationship with the PINOP.
141
 This move away from offences of 
general application to offences defined with increasing particularity can be seen as a return to the 
type of informality that was prevalent until the mid-nineteenth century when offences were 
defined with a high degree of specificity. This move from the general to the particular has 
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produced a new cohort of defendants in the current era and has raised rule of law issues that have 
been under-analysed in the criminal law literature. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis presents an analysis of the NSW summary jurisdiction. It is built on an argument that 
the concept of ‘formalisation’ is useful for understanding the historical development of the 
summary jurisdiction. My concept of formalisation, which arose from my research and was then 
applied as an analytical lens, has four overlapping and interacting dimensions:  juridification, 
rationalisation, professionalisation together with ‘lawyerification’, and separation of law from 
other spheres of social power, such as religion and politics. In conclusion I offer an assessment 
of how the formalisation concept has helped me to develop a fresh understanding of the 
summary jurisdiction, and discuss the implications of my analysis for criminal law scholarship. 
To demonstrate the utility of the formalisation lens it is useful to return to Doreen 
McBarnet and Lindsay Farmer, the two scholars who have given the most comprehensive 
accounts of the summary jurisdiction. McBarnet’s account is particularly pertinent because the 
way in which it has been taken up in the criminal law literature in NSW has shaped our 
understanding of the summary jurisdiction. McBarnet’s account is that ‘two tiers of justice’ 
operate in the criminal justice system. In the higher courts — the upper tier — the ‘ideology of 
justice is displayed’ for public consumption.1 In the summary jurisdiction — the lower tier — the 
imperative is to secure convictions to achieve crime control. It therefore operates according to a 
paradigm that differs from that operating in the higher courts. An ‘ideology of triviality’ operates 
to justify the absence of due process and common law fair trial protections of accused persons. 
McBarnet’s account presents a static image of a summary jurisdiction that diverges sharply from 
the traditional processes of justice that apply in the higher courts. This understanding persists in 
the scholarly literature in Australia, as demonstrated by a book chapter written in 2017 that 
characterises the summary jurisdiction as operating according to a nineteenth century paradigm.
2
 
However, the formalisation lens reveals that while McBarnet’s account may once have been true, 
significant changes to procedures and practices in the final quarter of the twentieth century, 
particularly from 1995, have brought the two jurisdictions into closer alignment. For example, in 
the current era, procedural protections of accused persons and the common law principles of fair 
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trial (which I will call, collectively, ‘procedures and protections’) are seen to apply equally to 
matters being finalised summarily as to matters tried by judge alone in the higher courts.
3
  This 
shift has been a product of formalisation; in particular, lawyerification. 
Another prominent understanding of summary jurisdiction in the criminal law literature is 
that it deals exclusively with regulatory or other minor offences that carry no moral 
blameworthiness. An exemplar of this understanding is that of Alan Norrie.
4
 Similarly, as set out 
in the Introduction to this thesis, the understanding of the ‘modern criminal justice system’ that 
Lindsay Farmer developed through his examination of the formalisation of summary jurisdiction 
in the nineteenth century was that; 
it is a complex administrative system geared towards dealing with large numbers of people in a summary 
manner and controlling behaviour through small penalties for minor offences. And the crucial period for its 
formation was the nineteenth century.
5
 
Due, primarily, to Farmer’s work, it is now accepted that the mid-nineteenth century saw the 
creation of a form of jurisdiction defined by procedure as summary jurisdiction began to 
formalise.
6
 What this thesis shows, through an historical analysis that encompasses the twentieth 
century and beyond, is that the contemporary summary jurisdiction is no longer confined to 
‘small penalties for minor offences’. Practices and procedures have been transformed and the 
summary jurisdiction now employs significant penalties of up to two years’ imprisonment—five 
years for cumulative sentences—to generate moral condemnation as a means of regulating 
constructed harmful behaviours. The crucial period for this transformation was the final quarter 
of the twentieth century. However, while the understanding of the summary jurisdiction 
developed in this thesis differs from that of Farmer’s, it corroborates Farmer’s argument that the 
criminal law does not represent community values, but rather ‘seeks to create them’.7  
As noted in the Introduction to this thesis, few criminal law scholars have studied the 
summary jurisdiction. It has, instead, attracted the attention of sociologists and criminologists. 
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And yet, the discussion in this thesis demonstrates that it is of great interest to criminal law 
scholars for two reasons. First, my demonstration that the summary jurisdiction has been used by 
parliament to produce moral condemnation as a means of regulating constructed harmful 
behaviours raises a question about whether criminal offences can, or should, be defined in moral 
terms. Much of the theoretical criminal law scholarship proceeds upon the assumption that moral 
blameworthiness arises organically from the impugned behaviour in the absence of the law.
8
 
Such scholarship tends to focus on what is considered to be the ‘core’ of the criminal law: 
offences such as murder and rape. To the contrary, this thesis shows that moral blameworthiness 
is not reserved for a core of morally culpable behaviours; it is generated by the criminal justice 
system as new harmful behaviours are recognised.   
The second reason why the summary jurisdiction is of great interest to criminal law 
scholars is because of its implications for the growing normative literature on criminalisation 
theory. Generally speaking, this body of literature assumes that criminalisation is achieved 
through the creation of new offences.
9
 This thesis shows that a large proportion of 
criminalisation happens not through the creation of new offences, but through changes to the 
infrastructure of procedures and practices that supports exiting offences.  A key example of 
change to the procedural infrastructure that emerges from my analysis is the evolution of the 
reclassification mechanism, which I analysed in Part I. This mechanism began its life in the mid-
nineteenth century attached to a particular offence: simple larceny. It was then detached from 
simple larceny and re-enacted as a provision of general application at the end of the nineteenth 
century. Over the twentieth century, slowly at first, and interspersed with long periods of 
inactivity, this mechanism was used to organise the jurisdictional allocation of offences. Then, in 
1995, introduction of the Table System—a magnified and systematised version of the 
reclassification mechanism—precipitated a tsunami of reclassifications, and the process is 
ongoing. I characterise the evolution of the reclassification mechanism as the rationalisation of 
the jurisdictional allocation of offences; a dimension of my formalisation concept. It can be 
                                                          
8
 See eg, Antony Duff, 'Perversions and Subversions of Criminal Law' in Antony Duff et al (eds), The boundaries of 
the Criminal Law (OUP, 2010) 88, 88–92.  
9
 A notable Australian exception is Luke McNamara, 'Criminalisation Research in Australia: Building a Foundation 
for Normative Theorising and Principled Law Reform' in Thomas Crofts and Arlie Loughnan (eds), Criminalisation 
and Criminal Responsibility in Australia (OUP, 2015) 33. 
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understood as vertical criminalisation, and has facilitated the increasing use of the criminal law 
by, to choose just one example from this thesis, making plea negotiation more attractive.  
Part II of the thesis explores the relationship between formalisation, the practices of the 
actors, and criminalisation. In relation to magistrates; lawyerification, and the separation of law 
from politics, are the most helpful dimensions of formalisation. An illustration of the utility of 
the formalisation concept here is supplied by the changes that were precipitated by the 
‘constitutional crisis’ that happened in the 1980s. The dearth of legal qualifications among 
magistrates and their lack of independence from the NSW government had been recognised as 
problems since the early decades of the colony, but it took revelations of corruption and the 
ensuing crisis of confidence in the justice system to force the government of the day to address 
them. This crisis led to the intensification of lawyerification, which had begun in the mid-
twentieth century, and the separation of the magistracy from the executive branch of 
government. Lawyerification and autonomy from the government provided conditions that have 
made it possible to escalate vertical and horizontal criminalisation in the current era.  
In relation to the justice personnel, formalisation has been piecemeal and particular to 
each actor. One example that illustrates the utility of the formalisation lens in this context is the 
persistence of police prosecutors who have resisted lawyerification and separation from the 
executive branch of government. The impact of the piecemeal nature of formalisation is 
discernible in my analysis of the practice of plea negotiation. Complex protocols designed to 
maintain an appearance of (and actual) propriety have been constructed around plea negotiations 
conducted by police prosecutors. This has been necessary because of their lack of structural 
independence from the police force. This complexity slows or eliminates plea negotiation and 
reduces the efficiency of the summary jurisdiction. Another example that illustrates the utility of 
the formalisation lens is the increasing appearance of defence lawyers in the current era. On an 
individual level, defence lawyers can insist on the application of procedures and protections 
thereby increasing the formality of court hearings. However, on an institutional level, defence 
lawyers can be understood as facilitating criminalisation; they oil the cogs of the plea negotiation 
process and have helped to respond to legitimation demands raised by escalating criminalisation.  
Part II concludes with an exposition of defendants and victims, which shows how certain 
behaviours have been constructed as harmful, the diversity of those behaviours, and how they 
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have been criminalised by the summary jurisdiction. Due to the diversity of those behaviours it is 
not possible to depict them globally as sharing the same features, such as an absence of moral 
blameworthiness, as is the tendency in some of the existing scholarship. This exposition also 
shows how victims have shifted from the periphery to take up a more central position, not only in 
the conduct of individual cases as they progress through the courts, but also in law reform.  
Part III the thesis exposes the relationship between formalisation, the development of 
substantive offences, and changes to the infrastructure of procedures and practices in the 
summary jurisdiction. In relation to assault and affray, rationalisation and juridification are the 
most useful dimensions of formalisation. The power of the formalisation lens is demonstrated by 
its capacity to explain why the rationalisation of the jurisdictional allocation of common assault 
was not achieved until the late 1980s. In the final quarter of the twentieth century the 
formalisation of the summary jurisdiction meant that it could perform the function of 
legitimating the imposition of the coercive powers of the criminal law, a function which, until 
that time, had been performed by the jury trial for formerly strictly indictable offences.  
Formalisation is also helpful for understanding the development of the law of drink-
driving, but because change over time in this context has been driven by technological advances 
and emerging bodies of scientific knowledge, formalisation has taken on a different hue. The 
example of breath analysis illustrates this point. Aided by the technological development of 
breath analysis, formalisation of the law of drink-driving comprised the eradication of evaluative 
judgments in the proof of degrees of drunkenness. This enhanced enormously the efficiency of 
the summary jurisdiction, both in the sense of increasing the proportion of convictions, and in the 
sense of improving the flow of matters through the court. However, the lens of formalisation is 
not able to account fully for the development of the law of drink-driving. As I discussed in 
Chapter 6, the current strict liability offence can be seen as a compromise that attempts to 
reconcile the competing imperatives faced by Parliament in attempting to regulate the behaviour 
of drink-driving. 
Finally, this thesis uses the formalisation lens as a way of exploring the development of 
the ADVO/CAVO mechanism. Juridification proved to be the most applicable dimension of 
formalisation here. In the 1980s the recognisance to keep the peace, a descendant of the surety to 
keep the peace, was replaced by the ADVO/CAVO legislative mechanism to effect a radical shift 
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in the way in which the criminal law regulates domestic violence. When considered together 
with the many legislative provisions regulating enforcement procedures that have been enacted 
subsequently, the turn to the criminal law via the ADVO/CAVO mechanism can be seen as 
rendering non-fatal domestic violence amenable to regulation by the criminal law.  
In broad terms, the formalisation lens has also been useful for revealing that there are 
diverse reasons why criminalisation is the regulatory tool of choice. Illustrations of this diversity 
include the type of criminalisation that can be characterised as a knee-jerk reaction to populist 
outrage triggered by an atypical event, of which my analysis of ‘use weapon to resist arrest’ in 
Chapter 5 is a good example. That analysis exposed a hidden political dimension of the 
jurisdictional allocation of offences. Another illustration of the diversity of criminalisation is that 
resulting from extensive research, the development of new bodies of knowledge, and 
consultation. The law of drink-driving and the ADVO/CAVO mechanism are paradigm 
examples of this type of criminalisation. 
Overall, the formalisation concept exposed hitherto neglected aspects of the summary 
jurisdiction and assisted in understanding how the summary jurisdiction achieves criminalisation. 
My analysis therefore makes it clear that if criminalisation theory is to determine the proper 
boundaries of the criminal law, it needs to account for the role of procedures and practices in 
achieving criminalisation.  
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